[Discussion] Samuel P. Huntington'un Istanbul'd yaptigi konusma

[Sule Tarakcioglu]

Biraz gec olarak, Samuel Huntington'un Istanbul'da yaptigi konusma

Not: Huntington 1997 yilinda gene T=FCrkiye'ye gelmisti. O zaman =FCnl=FC=
=20
makalesini
artik yayimlamis ama hen=FCz kitaba d=F6n=FCst=FCrmemisti. Bilkent=20
=DCniversitesi'nde bir
konusma yapti. Bilkent'e--belki de T=FCrkiye'ye--davet eden (ya da etmesi
saglanilan) Ergun =D6zbudun idi. Taniyanlar bilir, Ergun Bey son derece k=
ibar,
efendi bir insandir. Huntington agir elestiriye maruz kalir diye=20
korkuyordu--bu
cok belli idi. Biraz da Ergun Bey'e saygidan kendisine y=FCklenilmedi. Za=
ten
dinleyicilerin genel tutumu, "s=F6yledikleriniz o kadar sacma ki, size so=
ru
sormaya dahi tenezz=FCl edecek degiliz" seklinde idi. Bir =F6gretim =FCye=
si,
Huntington'un cok daha =F6nce yazmis oldugu bir makaleyle ilgili bir soru=
=20
sorarak
onun =FCn=FCn=FC yapan "uygarlik catismasi" teorisinin akademik acidan bi=
r=20
hic, o g=FCn
verdigi konferansin da zirvadan ibaret oldugunu cok g=FCzel ihsas etti. A=
ncak
Huntington'un bir soruya verdigi cevabi iyi hatirliyorum. "Sovyetler Birl=
igi
yikilinca bir teori boslugu dogdu. Ben de bu boslugu doldurmak i=E7in bu=20
'uygarlik
catismasi' teorisini tasarladim" dedi. Uygarlik catismasi konusunda=20
yapabilecegi
tek aciklama bu idi. Entelekt=FCel d=FCzeyi kendisininkiyle bir olan insa=
nlar
karsisinda verebilecegi baska cevap yoktu. Yani (ortaya attigi teoriyi=20
atisinin
arkasindaki siyasi amac ne olursa olsun) kendisi de akademik acidan=20
teorisinin
arkasinda durulamiyacaginin, bilimsel hic bir gecerliliginin, dolayisiyla
savunulacak yani olmadiginin farkinda idi.

Asagidaki konusmaya gelince, akademik cevreler iyi bilir, bu t=FCr=20
konusmacilarin
gelisini ABD b=FCy=FCkelciliginin k=FClt=FCr m=FCstesarligi (ya da eski a=
diyla USIS)
finanse eder. Oysa anlasilan Akbank yetkililerinin gereginde Gani=20
M=FCjde'yi de
pazarlayan bir ticari firmaya para =F6deyerek Huntington'u konusturmalari
saglanmis. Bu cehalet ve aymazlik nedense bana b=FCy=FCk h=FCz=FCn verdi.

G=F6n=FCl Pultar

---------------

From: Mehmet Tutuncu <m.tutuncu@QUICKNET.NL>


Culture, Power, and War: What Roles for Turkey in the new Global Politics
by
Samuel P. Huntington


I. INTRODUCTION
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by expressing my deep=20
gratitude
to the directors of AKBANK for inviting me to this meeting and to CSA=20
Celebrity
Speakers, who worked so hard on the arrangements making it possible for=20
me to be
here.

It is great to be back in Istanbul, which is such a wonderfully exciting =
and
cosmopolitan city, with its overlays of so many different cultures and
civilizations and its role as a major meeting point for West and East.=20
My only
regret is that I can be here for only twenty-four hours, but I do hope=20
to return
in the near future with my wife who is also a great enthusiast and=20
booster of
this city.

I have been asked to speak on "Global Politics and the Role of Turkey in =
the
Near Future." In this connection, I will advance four themes:

First, cultural and religious identities are increasingly shaping the=20
interests,
antagonisms, and affinities of activist groups and of states.

Second, the structure of power in contemporary global politics is marked =
by
the existence of one superpower, several major regional powers, a larger=20
number
of secondary regional powers, as well as many, many other countries.

Third, the prevailing conflicts in this new global politics are communal=20
wars,
particularly those involving Muslim groups.

Finally, the interaction of these forces of culture, power, and war rende=
r
largely obsolete the roles Turkey played in the Cold War and yet fail to=20
define
explicit new roles for it.

During the Cold War Turkey had a well-defined status as one of the strong=
est
members of NATO and one of the closest allies of the United States. The n=
ew
global politics, however, is very different, and the central issue=20
confronting
Turkey's leaders and people is how to define the Turkish role in this=20
new world.
Let me hasten to say, in order to ward off unwarranted expectations,=20
that I have
no easy answer to this question but I will attempt to indicated some of=20
the more
important factors affecting Turkey's place in the new global politics.


II. CULTURE

Twelve years ago I published an article in the American journal, Foreign=20
Affairs
arguing that ethnic, religious, linguistic, historical, and institutional
factors were supplanting political ideologies as central elements in the
identity of people and nations. Throughout most of the world, people were
increasingly defining themselves by their membership in ethnic groups,=20
religious
communities, linguistic communities, historical communities. Local=20
politics is
becoming the politics of ethnicity, global politics is becoming the=20
politics of
civilizations, which are the broadest cultural groups with which people
identify. For the first time in human history, global politics is truly
multipolar and multicivilizational. In my subsequent book on the clash of
civilizations, I set forth at some length the evidence which seemed to=20
support
this interpretation of the evolution of global politics. Countries which =
may
have been partners in the Cold War as members of the Western or Soviet bl=
ocs
were reshaping their alliances along cultural lines. This produced not on=
ly
new potential lines of conflict but also new bases of cooperation between
countries which felt that their common values, ways of life, produced a=20
basis
for trust and understanding and the promotion of common objectives. Where
cultural commonality did not exist, on the other hand, cooperation was
difficult. Consider, for instance, the efforts to create regional=20
associations
to promote economic integration. The EU has been most successful since=20
all its
members with one possible exception, Greece, do share in a common culture=
.
MERCOSUR in Latin America has been partly successful, helped by the commo=
n
Iberian culture of its peoples. Efforts at regional economic integration=20
in the
Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia have been largely unsuccessfu=
l,
involving as they do countries of very different cultures and civilizatio=
ns.

The rise of religion has been one central element of this new role for
culture. From the French Revolution down to the last half of the twentiet=
h
century, countries and peoples almost everywhere seemed to be moving=20
away from
religion. Secularization was the dominant trend in most societies=20
throughout the
world. A few decades ago, however, that trend faded away, and scholars be=
gan
producing books with titles like The Revenge of God and The=20
Desecularization of
the World.

These global trends have posed, it seems to me, two major challenges to=20
modern
Turkey's secularist identity as defined by Musafa Kemal Ataturk. First, t=
he
new religiosity has led to a new emphasis on Muslim symbols, rituals, and
practices in many sectors of Turkish society, including its urban middle=20
class,
professional people, and entrepreneurs. Most important politically, of=20
course,
has been the formation of a succession of religiously oriented parties,
culminating in the victory of the Justice and Development Party in 2002. =
Of
equal significance is the extent to which Prime Minister Erdogan has=20
carefully
rejected religious fanaticism, identified his party as a Muslim=20
equivalent of
the Christian Democratic parties of Europe, and has actively promoted=20
Turkish
membership in the European Union.

That, of course, has been a central goal in Turkish foreign policy since=20
1957.
Year by year Turkey has attempted to remove the obstacles to achieving th=
at
goal, in terms of broadening the protection of individual liberties and t=
he
rule of law, imposing restraints on the activities of the military in=20
Turkish
politics, and adopting a more lenient and accommodating policy towards it=
s
Kurdish minority. Yet Turkey's admission to the EU has been delayed=20
again and
again, while ten other countries which applied later than Turkey have bee=
n
accepted as members. How can this be explained? The fundamental reason,=20
which
few European leaders will state publicly, but which is pervasive among
European publics and many European elites, is that despite its efforts=20
to adopt
European values and practices, its society, culture, and history make Tur=
key
basically a non-European country.

So long as these views are widely shared among European elites and public=
s,
Turkish EU membership remains improbable. The Europeans have gotten=20
themselves
into a position where they feel that they cannot say no to Turkey but the=
y
also cannot say yes. So they have followed a policy and, I think, will=20
continue
to follow a policy of postponement and procrastination.

One newly developing factor makes it even more unlikely that policy will
change. A short while ago, the journal Foreign Affairs, published an arti=
cle
with the title "Is Turkey Ready for Europe?" One can also ask the reverse
question: Is Europe ready for Turkey? The answer is no and it is=20
becoming less
and less so. Turkey has valiantly attempted to highlight the secular=20
aspects of
its society and culture, so as to meet what it sees as the conditions for=
 EU
membership. As Turkey moves in a secular direction, however, Europe=20
would appear
to be moving in a religious direction. Until recently Europe was=20
undoubtedly the
most secularized area of the world. Now that is beginning to change, and =
the
stimulus to change has been the massive Muslim immigration into Europe=20
and the
intensified interactions between European countries and their Muslim=20
neighbors.
These developments have forced Europeans to confront once again the=20
question:
"Who are we?" Some scholars have argued that the growing Muslim presence =
is
transforming Europe into a Eurabia, in which Muslims and non-Muslims=20
will have
comparable if not equal roles and which will more and more define its=20
foreign
policy in terms of opposition to the United States and Israel. By and lar=
ge,
however, Muslims in Europe have lacked higher education, have been poor,=20
have
remained isolated in ghettos, have insisted on maintaining their Muslim
practices, and have demanded governmental policies accommodate those=20
practices.
This generates reaction against them. As one prominent German has said,
"Immigrants came to America because they wanted to become Americans. The=20
Turks
have not come to Germany because they want to become Germans."

Europeans now confront the issue of the extent to which they should=20
define the
identities of their countries and their Union in religious terms. The=20
European
constitutional convention hotly debated whether to include references to =
God
and/or Christianity in the constitution it was drafting. Two major=20
coalitions
of countries, pro and con, emerged, with the latter eventually winning=20
out, and
so God and Christianity were omitted from the constitution. Issues of=20
religious
identity have also surfaced in individual countries. In France, headscarv=
es
and other Muslim practices have been viewed as challenges to laicite,=20
that is,
the French tradition of secularism. The chairman of France's presidential
commission on religion declared: "There are indisputably Muslim groups=20
seeking
to test the resistance of the Republic, that bear a grudge against the=20
values
of the Republic, that want France no longer to be France. We cannot toler=
ate
that." Reflecting this fear, President Chirac proposed and the French=20
parliament
overwhelmingly approved legislation banning "conspicuous" religious=20
symbols in
public schools.

In Italy a different but parallel reaction occurred. Italians are not the
world's most observant Catholics. Yet the flood of legal and illegal Musl=
im
immigrants has generated intense anti-Muslim feelings among the=20
population and
politicians and a reaffirmation of Italy's Catholic identity, which was
dramatized in two recent incidents. In 2001 a schoolteacher removed the=20
crucifix
which is supposed to be on the wall of every Italian classroom because=20
she did
not want to offend a Muslim student entering her class. The result was a
surge of outrage all across Italy. The principal of the school declared t=
hat
Muslims "should know that this is a Catholic state." Catholicism is "part=
 of
our history." The crucifix went back up on the wall. Two years later a=20
similar
reaction occurred when a judge ordered the removal of the crucifix from a
classroom wall. Italians, it was reported, reacted with "fury" at this=20
decision
which dominated the news for days. One leader of the Italian Communist Pa=
rty
declared "I don't know of a higher symbol in the world than Christ's cros=
s."
The president of Italy said "The crucifix has always been considered not=20
only a
distinctive sign of a particular religious credo, but above all a symbol=20
of the
values that are at the base of our Italian identity." Religion and=20
nation, in
short, are inseparable.

These trends towards the reaffirmation of their religious identities are
occurring in other European countries and clearly fuel the opposition to=20
seventy
million Turks joining the EU. Public opinion polls generally do not show
majority support for Turkish membership. Political leaders are publicly m=
ore
circumspect, but often share this hostility. The leaders of Germany's two
conservative parties, however, have been outspoken in questioning Turkish
membership, and, of course, former French President Valery Giscard D'Esta=
ing
dramatically declared that the admission of Turkey "would be the end of=20
Europe."
Turkey "has a different culture, a different approach, a different way=20
of life.
Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population live outside Europe,=20
it is
not a European country." Turkey's attempts to qualify for EU admission by
becoming more secular are being undermined by the extent to which Europe=20
itself
is becoming more religious.


III. POWER

Let me now turn to the new global power structure and its potential=20
implications
for Turkey.

During the Cold War a bipolar international system existed with two=20
superpowers.
Each dominated part of the world and competed for influence in the rest=20
of the
world. Rivalry between them was inherent in the situation and was=20
enhanced by
each promoting its own political ideology throughout the world. Turkey wa=
s
firmly anchored in NATO and played a crucial role in deterring Soviet=20
aggression
in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Now there is only one superpower. Much debate goes on, however, as to=20
whether
today's world is unipolar, multipolar, or something else. A unipolar=20
world is
one which has one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor
powers. In that world the superpower acting unilaterally with little or n=
o
cooperation from other states can effectively resolve major international
issues, and no combination of other states has the power to prevent it fr=
om
doing so. For several centuries, Rome, and at times in history East Asia,
dominated by China, approximated this model. A multipolar world has sever=
al
major states of comparable strength, which cooperate and compete with=20
each other
in shifting patterns and in which a coalition of major states is=20
necessary to
resolve important international issues. European politics approximated th=
is
model for several centuries.

Contemporary global politics does not fit either of these models. Instead
it is a mixture or hybrid with one superpower and several major powers.=20
It is
what might be called a uni-multipolar system. This means two things.=20
First, with
respect to major international issues the single superpower is usually=20
able to
veto the actions of combinations of other major powers. Second, the singl=
e
superpower can effectively resolve key international issues only in=20
cooperation
with some of the other major states. If that cooperation is not=20
forthcoming, the
system suffers a significant crisis, as the Bush Administration has perha=
ps
learned. In this uni-multipolar world, the global power structure has fou=
r
levels. At the top, the U.S. is the only superpower, with preeminence in=20
every
domain of power. (Figure 1). At the second level are major regional power=
s,
which are the dominant actors in important areas of the world but whose
interests and capabilities do not extend as globally as those of the=20
U.S. These
include the EU, (meaning basically Germany and France), Russia, China,=20
India,
Iran, Brazil, and others. At a third level are secondary regional powers=20
whose
influence in their region is less than that of the major regional powers.
Finally, the fourth group includes the remaining countries, some of which=
,
like Turkey, are quite important for various reasons but which are not an
integral part of this global power structure. (Figure 2).

The Cold War bipolar structure of power inevitably generated conflict=20
between
the two superpowers. This new uni-multipolar structure generates its own=20
very
different patterns of conflict. As the only superpower, the U.S. has glob=
al
interests and actively attempts to promote its interests in every region =
of
the world. This, however, brings it into conflict with the major regional
powers, which view the U.S. as an intruder and believe they should play t=
he
dominant role in determining what goes on in their regions. Thus a natura=
l
rivalry exists between the U.S. and the principal regional powers.=20
Within each
region, however, the secondary powers do not want to be dominated by the=20
major
regional power, and try to restrict the ability of the major regional=20
power to
shape events in that region.

These competitive relations create a basis for cooperation between the U.=
S.
and secondary regional powers, and that has happened. To counterbalance=20
China,
the U.S. has strengthened its alliance with Japan and has supported the
extension of Japanese military capabilities, and Japan has joined the=20
U.S. in
protecting the security of Taiwan. The U. S. and Britain maintain their=20
special
relationship, which provides leverage against the emerging power of a uni=
ted
Europe dominated by Germany and France. In addition, Poland has become=20
America's
closest European ally next to Britain, and the Eastern and Central Europe=
an
states have from time to time seized the opportunity to side with the U.S=
.
against Germany, France, and Russia. The U.S. has developed close=20
relations with
Ukraine, as well as Georgia and Uzbekistan, as counters to the expansion =
of
Russian power. The U.S. maintains close cooperation with Saudi Arabia to=20
balance
Iran's power in the Gulf. In South America, the United States has=20
historically
had friendly relations with Brazil and antagonistic relations with=20
Argentina. In
the 1990s, however, Brazil emerged as the rival of the United States for
influence in South America, and the United States formed closer=20
relations with
Argentina. In all these cases and potentially in others, cooperation=20
serves the
mutual interest of the U.S. and the secondary regional powers in=20
containing the
influence of principal regional powers.

The major regional powers share a common interest in cooperating to=20
limit the
influence of the U.S. Many of them - France, Russia, China, Iran, India=20
- have
at times tried to act together to promote their interests against the=20
U.S. as
Germany, France, and Russia have done at the Security Council. At the=20
same time,
however, each of the major regional powers, apart from France and Germany=
,
usually wants to get things from the U.S. - membership in international
organizations, technology, weapons, economic assistance, diplomatic suppo=
rt,
invitations to the White House for their leaders. This has so far=20
limited their
ability to form a stable anti-American alliance. International relations=20
theory,
however, predicts such an alliance should emerge, and that could well=20
happen as
U.S. relative power declines.

How does Turkey relate to this global structure? It has interests in the
Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and central Asia but in none of these=20
areas is
it the major regional power. In some respects, it is a secondary=20
regional power
to Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus, to Israel in the Middle East,=
 to
Iran in the Gulf, and to whatever Western powers choose to involve=20
themselves
in the Balkans. Turkey's NATO membership is clearly of declining=20
significance
given the evaporation of NATO's primary mission and, for Turkey, the=20
denial by
some NATO members that a Syrian attack on Turkey should be considered an=20
attack
on NATO. This was in sharp contrast to the unanimous NATO declaration on=20
12 Sept
2001 that the attacks on the U.S. were an attack on NATO.

The end of the Cold War thus left Turkey floating as far as its security
arrangements were concerned. It did, however, take two significant region=
al
steps. First, aided by mutual earthquakes, Turkey did act to reduce tensi=
ons
with Greece and to promote understanding and collaboration between their
military establishments. Second, Turkey moved to intensify and tighten it=
s
security arrangements with Israel, based on their understanding that both
confront similar and often the same threats to their domestic security.=20
They are
both stable and prosperous democracies in an unfriendly and unstable
neighborhood. They also are the two strongest military powers in the Midd=
le
East and both have and have had close security relations with the United
States. Their cooperation could generate opposition and collaboration by=20
Arab
countries, but given the difficulties Arabs have in the past faced in
trying to work together, this seems like a not-unreasonable risk.


IV. WAR

The third major change in global politics concerns the dominant form of
conflict. The first half of the twentieth century was the age of world=20
wars; the
second half was the age of the Cold War. The twenty-first century is=20
beginning
as the age of civil and communal wars. During the 1990s, 110 wars=20
occurred in
which more than a thousand people were killed. All but seven of these=20
wars were
civil wars within states, and seventy percent of these civil wars were=20
communal
wars between ethnic and religious groups. Most often these wars involved
Muslims. Muslims fight each other and fight non-Muslims far more often=20
than do
peoples of other civilizations.

In the 1990s significant violence between Muslims and non-Muslims=20
occurred in
Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Ind=
ia,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Palestine, Sudan, and Nigeria. In the mid-199=
0s,
roughly half the ethnic conflicts in the world involved Muslims fighting=20
each
other or non-Muslims. According to the International Institute of Strateg=
ic
Studies, thirty-two major armed conflicts were underway in 2000,=20
twenty-three -
roughly two-thirds - involved Muslims. Yet Muslims are only about=20
one-fifth of
the world's population.

The causes of this Muslim violence are not inherent in the nature of Isla=
m
as a religion. They are the offspring of the resurgence of Muslim=20
consciousness
and identity. In addition, throughout the Muslim world, and particularly=20
among
Arabs, there exists a great sense of grievance, resentment, envy, and
hostility towards the West and particularly the United States. This is=20
in part a
result of Western imperialism and domination of the Muslim world for=20
much of the
twentieth century. It is also in part the result of particular Western=20
policies,
including the continuing close relation between the United States and=20
Israel. It
is, more broadly, a reaction of Muslim peoples to their own corrupt,
ineffective, and repressive governments and the Western governments they =
see
supporting those regimes.

Islam is less unified than any other civilization. Tribal, religious,=20
ethnic,
political, and cultural divisions stimulate violence between Muslims. The=
y
also promote violence between Muslims and non-Muslims because different=20
Muslim
groups and governments, such as those of Saudi Arabia and Iran, compete w=
ith
each other in promoting their own brand of Islam and have supported Musli=
m
groups fighting non-Muslims from Bosnia to the Philippines. If one or=20
two states
dominated the Muslim world, as is the case with other civilizations but=20
which
has not been the case with Islam since the end of the Ottoman Empire, les=
s
violence would occur among Muslims and, probably, between Muslims and
non-Muslims. When he was Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger once said in
exasperation, "If I want to talk to Europe, what number do I call?" The=20
Muslim
problem is even more serious. If you want to talk to Islam, do you call=20
Cairo,
Riyadh, Teheran, Ankara, Islamabad, or Jakarta? Any one would be=20
reasonable, but
no one could meaningfully speak for Islam as a whole.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the Islamic resurgence has=20
coincided with
and been invigorated by high birthrates in most Muslim societies which ha=
ve
produced a "youth bulge" with large numbers of people between the ages of
sixteen and thirty. (Figure 3). Males in this age cohort often have=20
secondary,
technical, or higher education, are in large part unemployed and hence=20
migrate
to the West, join fundamentalist organizations and political parties,=20
and enlist
in the Muslim guerilla groups and terrorist networks. Young males are the
principal perpetrators of violence in all societies: they exist in=20
over-abundant
numbers in Muslim societies. For the immediate future, the relations betw=
een
Islam and others are likely to be at best distant and acrimonious and at=20
worst
conflictual and violent.


V. TURKEY'S OPTIONS IN THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS

During the Cold War the positions of countries in global politics were
relatively stable as members of the Soviet bloc, the Western "Free=20
World," and
the Third World grouping of largely less developed countries. Only=20
rarely, as
in the cases of China and Egypt, did countries shift from one group to=20
another.
In addition, after the Cuban missile crisis the Soviet Union and the Unit=
ed
States carefully adhered to meaningful if not formalized rules governing=20
their
competition with each other, while Third World countries tried competing =
for
economic and other assistance, playing the superpowers off against each=20
other.
By the mid 1980s this pattern of relationships had become fixed and the
relations between the superpowers were largely devoted to negotiating the
details of possible arms control agreements, which were seldom signed=20
and almost
never ratified.

The new global politics introduced by the end of the Cold War and the=20
collapse
of the Soviet Union is very different. Due to differences in power and=20
culture,
lasting and close alliances tend to be rare (one notable exception being =
the
Anglo club of the U.K, U.S., Australia, and at times Canada). Overall,=20
however,
politics is much less predictable, a development underlined by the=20
appearance of
a global network of Muslim extremists which could strike in almost any=20
country
at almost any time. In the global power structure depicted in the=20
accompanying
figure, antagonisms are most likely between countries from different
civilizations and on adjoining power levels. Muslim countries are also mo=
re
likely to become involved in conflicts than non-Muslim countries. For=20
Turkey,
this situation presents many challenges and opportunities. Turkey is=20
most likely
to follow a cautious, pragmatic course in the dealing with other countrie=
s.
(Figure 4). It is, however, possible to identify at least three broad
alternatives which could contribute to Turkish policy.

First, there is the "European" option which Turkish governments with the
support of Turkish elites have pursued for decades. Full membership in=20
the EU
would undoubtedly produce significant economic benefits for Turkey. It wo=
uld
also, as Giscard d'Estaing said, drastically change the nature of that
organization and probably lead to several different forms and levels of
membership. The concentration of power in Brussels would greatly limit=20
Turkey's
freedom of action in economic and other areas. Turkey would also have to=20
adjust
to membership in a club, in which many members thought it did not belong.
Turkey's ability to carry out an independent foreign policy in the=20
Middle East
or elsewhere would disappear. All in all, it seems quite possible that=20
Turkey
could end up in but not of the European Union, a large Muslim entity in a
community that was increasingly defining itself in terms of its Christian
heritage. In many EU countries more general doubts have developed about i=
ts
advantages and its future, reflected in the controversies over=20
ratification of
the draft constitution. It seems quite possible that the European Union a=
nd
net advantages to Turkey of EU membership may diminish over time.

A second alternative is the "Muslim" option. As has been indicated=20
above, Islam
is in a state of disarray and is far more divided than any other=20
civilization
and spreads across many more diversified regions of the world than other
civilizations. The lack of one or two generally recognized leading states=
 in
Islam not only fosters internal divisions and external conflicts. It also
greatly reduces the influence of Islam in world affairs. The "Dynamics of
Global Politics (See Figure 5) includes five Muslim countries, omitting=20
Turkey,
but these significant Muslim states do not exercise the influence of the=20
leading
states of other civilizations. Recent proposals to reform the permanent
membership of the U.N. Security Council always agree on the desirability =
of
adding Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil. South Africa is also mentioned=20
as a
potential representative of Africa. Conceivably, however, Nigeria might f=
ill
this role and would add at least a partially Muslim voice to the permanen=
t
membership. Surely, the one and a quarter billion Muslims in the world=20
rate a
least one permanent Security Council member.

As I argued in my book on the clash of civilizations, a leading state=20
for Islam
would be good for Islam and good for the world. It also seems to me,=20
that Turkey
is better suited to fulfill that role than anyone else. This does,=20
however, pose
two problems. First, the Ataturk legacy defines Turkey as a modern, secul=
ar,
Western (that is European) state. Ataturk formulated his six principles f=
or
Turkey three-quarters of a century ago. Surely the time has come for some
reconsideration and possible amendment and emendation of these=20
guidelines. I am
no expert on Ataturk, but from what I have read about him, I think he was=
 a
far-sighted pragmatist who could well agree that the time had come for=20
Turkey to
reconsider and redefine its role in this very different twenty-first cent=
ury
world. In America, we regularly reinterpret the wisdom of our Founding=20
Fathers -
Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, Franklin - so as to adapt and=20
apply that
wisdom to the totally different conditions of today. It seems to me that=20
Ataturk
would expect and deserves comparable treatment.

Another less serious possible obstacle exists to Turkey's assuming a=20
leadership
role in Islam. Most of Turkey's neighbors were at one point part of the=20
Ottoman
Empire. Many of them, including the Arabs, had to fight for their=20
independence.
Historical fears linger in their thinking and require that Turkey make=20
it clear
it will not threaten their independence and any leadership it exercises=20
will be
based on extensive consultation with the affected parties. If Turkey can =
do
this, it will be in a good position to reduce conflict among Muslims and=20
between
Muslims and others.

Finally, there is what might be called the "nationalist" option for Turke=
y.
This would mean foreswearing the previous two options and not attempting=20
either
to join the EU or to provide leadership to the Muslims. Turkey instead wo=
uld
focus on its own security and development. As I've mentioned, Turkey=20
exists in a
dangerous neighborhood. At some point in the next decade, all five major
non-Arab states in this neighborhood - Israel, Russia, Iran, Pakistan,=20
and India
- will have nuclear weapons. It seems probable that one or more Arab=20
states -
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria - may also follow in this=20
path. State
control of nuclear weapons is often lax or incompetent. It is highly=20
possible
and even likely that one or more extremist Muslim terrorist groups could=20
acquire
the technology or even the weapons themselves from one or more of these=20
nuclear
weapons states, either by theft, the conscious decision by the state=20
government,
or rogue actions by its officials for commercial and/or political=20
reasons. In
this situation, inevitably Turkey will have to face the issue as to=20
whether it
should acquire them also. An additional response to these dangers would=20
be for
Turkey to intensify its security relations with the United States and=20
Israel and
also attempt to adapt NATO to be more directly relevant to its security=20
needs.

For several decades, Turkey's foreign and security policies were frozen=20
into a
Cold War mode, which served its interests well. In this unstable and
unpredictable new global politics, Turkey has no alternative but to=20
abandon the
dogmas of the past and adapt its policies to cope with the dangers, the
challenges, the unpredictability, the instability, and the complexity of=20
this
new world in which Turkey, the United States, and all the rest of us find
ourselves.

Thanks very much for listening so patiently to these pessimistic, but I h=
ope
also constructively realistic remarks.

Remarks, AKBANK Conference, Istanbul

24 May 2005



The Celebrity Speakers Agency (CSA) is an organization based in London wi=
th
for booking the world's most influential international speakers. CSA is
represented in many countries around the world and opened an office in=20
Istanbul
in 1999.

Currently, CSA continues its activities as a part of the widest speaker
network around the world with offices and representatives in 22=20
countries. Its
portfolio includes over 6,000 of the world's most famous, best and the mo=
st
effective speakers. Prominent names include:

Neil Armstrong, Hernando de Soto, William Duisenberg, Bob Geldof, Chan Ki=
m,
Carl Lewis, Mike Moore, Sir Bill Morris, John Naisbitt, Kjell Nordstrom,=20
Chris
Patten, Miha Pogacnik, Dame Stella Rimington and Joseph Stiglitz.

The CSA-Turkey portfolio includes:

Ali K=FDrca, Ali Poyrazo=F0lu, Ali Tigrel, Asaf Sava=FE Akat, Ata Demirer=
, Atilla
Dorsay, Ayd=FDn Boysan, Ay=FEe S=F6zeri Cemal, Ayla Algan, Bahattin Y=FCc=
el, B=FClent
Akarcal=FD, B=FClent =DEenver, B=FClent Tanla, Can Baydarol, Can D=FCndar=
, Can G=FCrzap,
Cengiz Aktar, Cengiz Bekta=FE, Co=FEkun Aral, C=FCneyt Kory=FCrek, C=FCne=
yt=20
=DClsever, Deniz
G=F6k=E7e, Do=F0u Ergil, Ege Cansen, Gani M=FCjde, Haluk =DEahin, Hasan C=
emal,=20
Hasan Fehmi
G=FCne=FE, Hasan Suba=FE=FD, Ha=FEmet Babao=F0lu, H=FDfz=FD Topuz, Hilmi =
Yavuz, Hur=FEit=20
G=FCne=FE,
=DDbrahim Kavrako=F0lu, =DDclal Ayd=FDn, =DDshak Alaton, =DDsmet Berkan, =
Kerem Doksat,
K=FCr=FEat Bumin, Leyla Umar, Mahir Kaynak, Mehmet Ali K=FD=FElal=FD, Meh=
met Ya=FEin,
Mete Tun=E7ay, Mithat Bereket, Murat Belge, Murathan Mungan, Mustafa=20
Alt=FDoklar,
Nasuh Mahruki, R=FC=FEd=FC Saraco=F0lu, Yal=FDm Erez, Yank=FD Yazgan, Yas=
emin Dalk=FDl=FD=E7,
Zeynel Abidin Erdem, Zeynep G=F6=F0=FC=FE, Zuhal Olcay...

Even though focal point of CSA is to provide speakers for meetings of=20
companies
and institutions, the organization also holds conferences. CSA provided m=
any
distinguished names for the conference in Istanbul including Samuel=20
Huntington,
Joseph Stiglitz and John Nasibit and Hernando de Soto.



Turkistan Newsletter Thu, 9 Jun 2005 21:54:46
Turkistan Bulteni ISSN:1386-6265