[Discussion] kitap elestirileri

[sule tarakcioglu]

I. Betigul Ercan Argun. Turkey in Germany: The Transnational Sphere of De=
utschkei. Middle East Studies: History, Politics, and Law Series. New Yor=
k and London: Routledge, 2003. xix + 199 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. =
$70.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-415-93568-7.=20
Reviewed by Rita Chin, Department of History, University of Michigan.
Published by H-German (December, 2003)=20

Conceptualizing a Turkish-German Transnational Public Sphere=20
With Turkey in Germany: The Transnational Sphere of Deutschkei, Betigul A=
rgun makes an important contribution to the growing body of scholarship o=
n transnationalism, as well as to work on the post-World War II migration=
 of Turks to Germany.[1] Before delving into a discussion of the book its=
elf, it is helpful to be clear about the author's analytical framework an=
d focus. Argun is a political scientist, and her project aims to "bring p=
olitical science into transnationalism and transnational politics into po=
litical science" (p. 7). At the most basic level, her study seeks to demo=
nstrate the political significance of transnationalism. More specifically=
, Argun sets out to answer the question, "How are migration movements and=
 the transnational communities they create connected to the possibility o=
f enhanced political voice in sending countries" (pp. 7-8)? Her central c=
oncern, then, is not so much with migrants in Germany, or what migration =
means for Germany. Rather, she wants to g
 ain a deeper understanding of Turkish domestic politics by looking at "T=
urkish civil society outside of Turkish national boundaries" (p. 6). In t=
hese respects, it is not quite fair to consider Argun's book within the c=
ontext of H-German, although her study offers a number of insights that s=
hould prove thought-provoking for scholars of Germany's postwar labor mig=
ration and its attendant social, cultural, political, and ideological eff=
ects.=20

Roughly the first third of the book is devoted to fleshing out what Argun=
 has coined "Deutschkei," an amalgam of the German words "Deutschland" an=
d "Tuerkei," which she uses to indicate the "transnational connections be=
tween Turkey proper and Turkey in Germany" (p. xi). One of the defining c=
haracteristics of Deutschkei, according to Argun, is the development of a=
 critical political discourse akin to the type of independent exchange th=
eorized in Juergen Habermas's well-known concept of the public sphere (p.=
 29). Because it occupies a space between Germany and Turkey, the "transn=
ational public sphere" of Deutschkei serves as an arena uniquely situated=
 to exert pressure on and even shape "ideas about national identity, citi=
zenship, social integration, and democracy in the native setting" (p. 30)=
=2E Argun posits a number of factors in both Germany and Turkey that have=
 contributed to the emergence of a transnational public sphere oriented t=
oward Turkey. In Germany, strict citizenshi
 p laws and ongoing hostility to foreigners caused migrants to feel unwel=
come and isolated, encouraging them to identify most closely with politic=
al developments in the homeland. At the same time, German discussions of =
multiculturalism in the late 1980s facilitated the articulation of new id=
entities (e.g. Alevi or Kurd) within the Turkish immigrant community (pp.=
 68-73). In Turkey, a generally closed and repressive political culture--=
especially in the wake of the 1980 military coup--drove migrants to becom=
e political activists from the safe distance of Germany. Turkey's ongoing=
 bid to join the European Union, moreover, has meant that the Turkish sta=
te is far more sensitive to the criticisms and concerns expressed by memb=
ers of the migrant community (pp. 71-73, 55-57). Argun is clearly engaged=
 here with the scholarship on transnationalism that began to emerge aroun=
d 1990, and she rehearses many of its key insights.[1] One that is worth =
highlighting is her assertion that transn
 ationalism draws attention to that which it seemingly negates--the natio=
nal (p. 19). This is a useful point because it reminds us that transnatio=
nalism always operates in dialectical relation to the nation. Deutschkei,=
 in other words, is always defined, both socially and ideologically, vis-=
a-vis Germany and Turkey.=20

A key objective of Turkey in Germany is to demonstrate that this reciproc=
al relationship is not just a matter of academic theorizing, but has conc=
rete political effects. The book's middle section traces the particular i=
mpacts of Deutschkei on Turkish politics and political discourse. Specifi=
cally, Argun looks at the "ethnic differentiation of migrants from Turkey=
 into sub-national groups," a process which emerged in the German context=
 but eventually had important ramifications for the Turkish state (p. 73)=
=2E For example, the Kurdish Cultural and Information Center, established=
 in Germany in the early 1980s, began to demand separate Kurdish language=
 classes for Kurds in the German school system. These demands gradually m=
ade Germans more aware of the ethnic and religious differences among gues=
t workers from Turkey (p. 67). Similar kinds of consciousness-raising act=
ivities were undertaken by the Alevi, a religious minority who comprise n=
early 30 percent of the Turkish nationals i
 n Germany. In 1990, Alevi Turks in Cologne organized the first political=
ly active Alevi organization, which later became the Federation of Alevi =
Unions in Europe (AABF).=20

Argun then contrasts these developments in Germany with contemporaneous p=
olitical discourse in Turkey. In the process of creating a Turkish nation=
-state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, she suggests, the category o=
f Turk (defined as any citizen of Turkey) was elevated at the expense of =
other ethnic or religious identities. For the Kurds, state centralization=
 also eliminated previous administrative and cultural autonomy (pp. 82-84=
). Prior to the early 1990s, it was not possible to use the term "Kurd" i=
n the public media; the Turkish state and press couched Kurdish unrest as=
 a "separatist" movement that stemmed from "regional underdevelopment." B=
y contrast, early Kemalism initially benefited the Alevi because its phil=
osophy of secularization reduced Sunni dominance. Despite this apparent a=
lliance, according to Argun, the Alevi have been critical of religion-sta=
te relations in Turkey. In particular, they have questioned the legitimac=
y of the state's Directorate for Religiou
 s Affairs (DIB) and its sponsorship of the Sunni sect. Throughout the 19=
80s, the government engaged in overt attempts to assimilate Alevi (who fo=
r centuries have worshipped privately in their homes) by building mosques=
 in their communities. "Since Alevis do not pose a territorial threat and=
 since they support secularism," Argun concludes, "they enjoy a certain s=
tate sponsorship not felt by Kurds ... [h]owever, by asserting their iden=
tity and culture and by fighting for recognition of their group name, Ale=
vis are challenging the illusion of ethnic homogeneity in Turkey forceful=
ly" (p. 104). At this point, we might expect Argun to explain how the act=
ivities in Germany effected a transformation of the discourse around Kurd=
s and Alevis in Turkey. Instead, Argun merely asserts that the Alevi rena=
issance and Kurdish activities abroad have pressured Turkey to come to te=
rms with the myth of a homogeneous nation (p. 87).=20

I think that Argun is on to something important in the connections she at=
tempts to draw here. Yet the historian in me wants to know much more prec=
isely how developments within Deutschkei have altered Turkish politics an=
d discourse. The particularly vivid example that opens Argun's book, I wo=
uld suggest, goes a long way in illustrating how this reciprocal relation=
ship works in actual practice. In February 1999, Turkish commandos captur=
ed Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), in Kenya=
 and brought him back to Turkey to face charges of treason, murder, and c=
rimes against humanity (pp. 3-4). This event, Argun relates, immediately =
provoked numerous demonstrations by PKK members and sympathizers at consu=
lates and embassies throughout Western Europe. The scene in Berlin turned=
 particularly violent when Israeli consular guards killed three Kurdish p=
rotesters. The demonstrations and violence on German soil prompted the Ge=
rman government (among others) to appeal=20
 to Turkey to guarantee Ocalan a fair trial, open the process to internat=
ional observers, and refrain from seeking the death penalty. Turkey's dom=
estic politics thus became a matter of international concern and interven=
tion in direct response to the activities of Deutschkei in Germany. Most =
of these protesters were refugees, legal residents, or naturalized citize=
ns of the Federal Republic, who had grown particularly savvy about the wa=
ys in which their actions outside Turkey's national borders could shape i=
ts political decisions at home.=20

This example, as Argun keenly observes, also points to the ways in which =
transnational politics often becomes a domestic issue in both Turkey and =
Germany. The Ocalan demonstrators not only drew the attention of Germans =
to the constitutional status of Kurds in Turkey; they also raised questio=
ns about immigration and the process of integration in Germany. After dec=
ades of residence in the Federal Republic, many immigrants clearly contin=
ued to engage in the political issues of their homeland. But precisely be=
cause of this ongoing engagement, Turkish immigrants simultaneously had a=
n effect on German political policy and decision-making. This example is =
so useful, in other words, because it shows us ongoing reciprocal relatio=
ns between Deutschkei, Turkey, and Germany.=20

For the most part, however, Argun does not follow up on this central insi=
ght in Turkey in Germany. Instead, she focuses almost exclusively on the =
implications of transnationalism for Turkish politics. The final third of=
 the book examines four groups within the Turkish immigrant community in =
Germany: Alevis, Kurds, ultranationalists, and Islamists (pp. 101-168). I=
n these case studies, Argun analyzes each group's political goals in rela=
tion to the Turkish state and Kemalism (which she considers official stat=
e ideology). She also reviews the activities and organizations among thes=
e different groups in Deutschkei, including their internet websites and e=
lectronic chat rooms. This section will be valuable for readers unfamilia=
r with the basic fault lines in Turkish politics, or the diversity of pol=
itical organizations that Turkish migrants have established in Germany. B=
ut it fails to deliver on the analytical promise set out in the book's op=
ening discussion of the Ocalan incident.=20
 Somewhat ironically, the problem here seems to be the reassertion of mut=
ually exclusive binary categories: dialectical relationships are superced=
ed by one-way national reverberations. Argun justifies this move by argui=
ng that Turkish-Germans represent an exceptional case within the larger s=
pectrum of late-twentieth-century migrant groups. In her view, because Tu=
rkish migrants have been so rigorously excluded from German civil society=
, their political identities, affiliations, and activities have largely p=
ointed in one direction--back to their country of origin.=20

The ongoing and deep connection which many (if not most) Turkish migrants=
 feel to their homeland, I think, is too little acknowledged in the growi=
ng literature on the labor migration to the Federal Republic. In this sen=
se, Argun's book provides an important corrective to a body of work that =
has almost exclusively emphasized the ways immigration has impacted Germa=
n society.[2] Yet her repeated insistence that German policies towards Tu=
rks make them more invested in homeland politics exists for the most part=
 as an unsubstantiated assertion. There is recent work, moreover, which c=
omes to the opposite conclusion: namely, that despite restrictive German =
naturalization laws, Turkish immigrants have sought to incorporate themse=
lves both socially and politically at the local level in their country of=
 residence.[3] My own sense is that this apparent discrepancy cannot be u=
nderstood in terms of a zero-sum game. The complexity of migrant experien=
ce in the Federal Republic undoubtedly su
 pports both views.=20

I suspect that each reader's assessment of Turkey in Germany will depend,=
 in large part, on his/her theoretical starting point. For those working =
on Turkish-German history, this book represents a pioneering work that fi=
lls out our understanding of the political affiliations and organizations=
 of Turks in the Federal Republic. Its examination of Deutschkei's effect=
s on Turkish politics, moreover, will force Germanists to pay closer atte=
ntion to the labor migration's broader, transnational consequences. Schol=
ars of transnationalism, by contrast, may view Argun's book as somewhat o=
ne-dimensional because it only concerns itself with the impacts of migran=
t politics and culture on Turkey. Indeed, it seems to me that an emphasis=
 on national reverberations need not require us to abandon one of the cru=
cial projects of transnational studies--namely, to draw attention to and =
explicate the reciprocal traffic of culture, bodies, and ideas that exist=
s between nations. Thus, it is quite poss
 ible to agree with Argun that studies of the Turkish-German community ha=
ve consistently neglected the migration's impacts on Turkish political di=
scourse, but also to note the book's limitations in advancing our underst=
anding of how this transnational public sphere impacted ideology and disc=
ourse in multiple directions.=20

Notes:=20

[1]. Important studies on the contours of transnationalism include Alejan=
dro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (Berkeley:=
 University of California Press, 1990); Nina Glick-Schiller, Linda Basch,=
 and Christina Szanton Blanc, eds., Towards a Transnational Perspective o=
n Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered (New Yo=
rk: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992); Linda Basch, Nina Glick-Schiller=
, and Christina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, P=
ostcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Basel: Gor=
don and Breach, 1994); and Thomas Faist, The Volume and Dynamics of Inter=
national Migration and Transnational Social Spaces (Oxford: Oxford Univer=
sity Press, 2000). For a useful assessment of theories of transnationalis=
m, see Peter Kivisto, "Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical R=
eview of Current Efforts," Ethnic and Racial Studies 24:4 (2001): pp. 549=
-577. On the postwar migration of Turks t
 o Germany, see Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 18=
80-1980: Seasonal Workers/Forced Laborers/Guest Workers, trans. William T=
empler (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1990); David Horr=
ocks and Eva Kolinsky, eds., Turkish Culture in German Society Today (Pro=
vidence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996); Peter O'Brien, Beyond the Swas=
tika (New York and London: Routledge, 1996); Karen Schoenwaelder, "Migrat=
ion, Refugees and Ethnic Plurality as Issues of Public and Political Deba=
tes in (West) Germany" in David Cesarani and Mary Fulbrook, eds., Citizen=
ship, Nationality and Migration in Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. =
159-178; Klaus J. Bade and Myron Weiner, eds., Migration Past, Migration =
Future: Germany and the United States (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Bo=
oks, 1997); Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State: The Unite=
d States, Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19=
99); Rita Chin, "Imagining a German Multi
 culturalism: Aras Oren and the Contested Meanings of the 'Guest Worker,'=
 1955-1980," Radical History Review 83:2 (2002): pp. 44-72; and "Toward a=
 'Minor Literature'? The Case of Auslaenderliteratur in Postwar Germany,"=
 New Perspectives on Turkey (Fall 2003).=20

[2]. Exceptions to this rule include Faruk Sen, Tuerkische Migranten in D=
eutschland (Essen: Center for Turkish Studies, 1997); Sami Ozkara, ed., T=
uerkische Migranten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Cologne: Onel Verl=
ag, 1990); and Ertekin Ozcan, Tuerkische Immigrantenorganisationen in der=
 Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Hitit Verlag, 1989).=20

[3]. Brett Klopp, for example, has recently traced immigrants's efforts t=
o achieve social integration in the schools, unions, and political organi=
zations in Frankfurt. German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and =
the Transformation of Citizenship (Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger, 2=
002).=20

Citation: Rita Chin . "Review of Betigul Ercan Argun, Turkey in Germany: =
The Transnational Sphere of Deutschkei," H-German, H-Net Reviews, Decembe=
r, 2003. URL: http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=3D3179410=
73606076.=20
=20
------------------------------------

II.=20

Iman Bibars. Victims and Heroines: Women, Welfare, and the Egyptian State=
=2E London: Zed Books, 2001. x + 330 pp. Bibliography, index. $69.95 (clo=
th), ISBN 1-85649-934-0; $25.00 (paper), ISBN 1-85649-935-9.=20
Reviewed by A. Nilufer Isvan, Department of Sociology, State University o=
f New York, Stony Brook.
Published by H-Gender-MidEast (October, 2003)=20

A Secondary Patriarchal Bargain
This sensitively written and thought-provoking book is based on the autho=
r's fieldwork in seven poor neighborhoods within the Cairo-Alexandria con=
urbation. Even though a systematic survey was conducted in one of the res=
earch sites, the major portion of the empirical material used in the book=
 come from in-depth informal interviews with over four hundred female hea=
ds of households. Bibars documents these women's experiences with state w=
elfare bureaucracies and privately funded religious charity organizations=
=2E She is careful to include both Islamic and Coptic charities in her st=
udy, thus presenting the reader with a wide range of comparative cases. T=
he author's attention to detail and unyielding scrutiny of her own theore=
tical positions constantly caution the reader against making facile inter=
pretations or drawing hasty conclusions. Unfortunately for the reviewer, =
these very same features make this a difficult book to evaluate in a brie=
f and concise manner.=20

There are three main theoretical threads that run through the study, loca=
ting it at the crossroads of multiple debates. First, Bibars addresses th=
e literature on the role of the state in reproducing gender systems. She =
successfully incorporates into her discussion conceptual frames formulate=
d by scholars such as Nancy Fraser, Theda Skocpol, and Anne Orloff, makin=
g this more than just a book about Egypt. Feminist students of state form=
ation and bureaucratic structures will find much to interest them in thes=
e pages. Second, the choice of empirical cases locates the book within th=
e literature on poverty and welfare provision within the global capitalis=
t system in general, and the feminization of poverty in particular. Last,=
 but not least, the author challenges some current intellectual trends by=
 exploring the limits of arguments about women's agency and everyday form=
s of resistance.=20

To my mind, the book's most important empirical finding is the sheer perv=
asiveness and persistence of the classical patriarchal order within the w=
orldviews of all the major actors of the narrative, including the poor wo=
men victimized by patriarchy and its attending mental constructs. Equally=
 important is the finding that this order is no longer the dominant form =
of family/household formation in Egypt. Just as Judith Stacey argues, in =
the case of the American family, that the modern nuclear household has lo=
st its dominance to a multiplicity of alternative household formations, w=
hich she describes as "postmodern," Bibars discovers that the classical p=
atriarchal family system in Egypt has given way to its own postmodern for=
ms.=20

These stories of the women who are the main breadwinners of their househo=
lds suggest to me that there are as many alternatives to the classical pa=
triarchal household as there are ways for men to default on their end of =
the patriarchal bargain. Some of Bibars's informants are de jure heads of=
 household. That is, the absence of a male provider in their lives confor=
ms to one of the patterns easily recognized by the state: widows, spinste=
rs, unmarried orphans, and to a lesser extent, divorce=E9s. The religious=
 charitable organizations in the study, be they Islamic or Coptic, make i=
t their priority to help orphans. To qualify for aid from these sources, =
women have to prove that they are widowed, and that they have dependent c=
hildren. Many women in the study are what the author refers to as de fact=
o household heads. That is, even though there is a man in their lives, he=
 has either abandoned them or is otherwise unable or unwilling to deliver=
 on his end of the patriarchal bargain. The
  lives of these women provide the most poignant examples of "the new pat=
riarchy" and its social, economic, and cultural consequences. They fall t=
hrough the cracks of the welfare and charity systems because, the author =
claims, these systems are organized around the assumption that men are pr=
oviders. Consequently, as long as a single woman's father or a married wo=
man's husband is alive, she has no legitimate claims to aid. Then there a=
re the spinsters (never-married women aged forty-eight or older) who fail=
 to provide proof of their virginity, thus failing to qualify for the sta=
te's spinster pension. What this picture makes very clear is that the sta=
te and/or religious foundations are willing to step in to help women who =
have kept their end of the patriarchal bargain (as wives, mothers, or cha=
ste and honorable single women) but are, nonetheless, manless.=20

Here, I disagree with the author on a matter of interpretation. She argue=
s that the de jure female household heads are victimized because gate-kee=
pers of the social safety net simply refuse to believe that their husband=
s or fathers could fail to support them. In other words, she maintains th=
at their patriarchal assumptions are blinding these officials to the real=
ities of these women's lives. I see a somewhat more sinister process unde=
rlying the tragedy of these women. This "blindness" on the part of welfar=
e providers is evidence of a less frequently addressed aspect of patriarc=
hal systems, namely, the fraternal ties that they establish and nourish a=
mong men. In the long run, these welfare agencies would suffer serious bl=
ows to their legitimacy if they were to put themselves in the position of=
 judging men's success in providing for their women, or by taking under t=
heir wings women who have shamed their men by engaging in extramarital se=
x (as in the case of non-virgin spinsters
 ). In short, I think that these women are victims of a tacit understandi=
ng, a secondary patriarchal bargain, if you will, whereby men respect eac=
h other's honor by acknowledging each others's rights over women (daughte=
rs, sisters, wives). The welfare agencies are simply behaving like honora=
ble men under a patriarchal order.=20

Egypt is not alone in witnessing an unprecedented level of male default i=
n the patriarchal bargain because there are global economic trends at pla=
y here. The decreasing bargaining power of labor and the related declines=
 in job security and real wages have made it impossible for many men all =
around the world to earn a family wage. On the other hand, deep-rooted cu=
ltural beliefs that link masculinity to the provider role and femininity =
to reproduction and nurturing make it difficult for the social imaginary =
to acknowledge and assimilate this reality. The consequences, as they pla=
y out in individual life stories, are often tragic, as Bibars's book so e=
loquently demonstrates.=20

Tragic as their lives may be, these women are not depicted as passive vic=
tims. They appear in the narrative as active agents who mobilize whatever=
 resources are available to them in order to cope with the difficulties t=
hey face. As the author is quick to point out, these coping mechanisms ha=
ve much in common with those utilized by other oppressed groups, be they =
slaves, industrial workers, or landless peasants. It has become fashionab=
le to refer to these mechanisms as everyday forms of resistance or, as Ja=
mes Scott called them, "weapons of the weak." However, Bibars disagrees. =
Using de Certeau's distinction between opposition and resistance, she cla=
ims that these mechanisms operate within the oppressive system, acknowled=
ging its basic assumptions, and thus reinforcing the oppression. They are=
 acts of opposition, not resistance. The resulting picture, then, is a ve=
ry pessimistic one: any coping mechanism short of organized rebellion aga=
inst patriarchy only works to strengthen=20
 its hold on the lives of its victims.=20

The author is painfully aware that this theoretical position is not exact=
ly popular within postmodern feminism, or post-colonial cultural theory c=
ircles, and that it leaves her open to criticism for observing these wome=
n through "Western eyes," for depicting them as victims who collude in th=
eir own victimization, and for imposing moral judgments where cultural re=
lativism is called for. Worse, she is concerned that her analysis might f=
eed into a neo-orientalist discourse equating Islam with oppression, espe=
cially gender oppression. I believe that her fears are unfounded.=20

I would like to take her to task on these points, though not exactly for =
the reasons she anticipates criticism. I have no serious quarrels with he=
r analysis of the reproduction of patriarchy through the actions of oppre=
ssed women. Neither do I think the book necessarily provides fuel for neo=
-orientalism. I do, however, find her approach to Islam lacking in apprec=
iation of the subtleties of current debates surrounding such practices as=
 reveiling. For example, she writes: "Although there are several attempts=
 to reinterpret the place of women and gender in Islam, there is no doubt=
 that when Islam is used by states or religious groups as a form of polit=
ical expression, it curtails women's autonomy" (p. 109). This is one of t=
he few references in the whole book to the complex issue of the role and =
meaning of Islamic identity in the lives of disadvantaged women. I believ=
e those issues merit more attention. For example, Bibars consistently bru=
shes aside--in the sense that she refrain
 s from exploring the full implications of--her finding that her responde=
nts report better experiences with Islamic charities than with state bure=
aucracies. In reporting these findings, she is quick to add that Islamic =
NGOs are as infused with patriarchal assumptions as the state, and that "=
[i]n the slums, six-year-old girls are veiling to gain access to the 'orp=
han's sponsorship' programme, a clear sign of these programmes at work" (=
p. 107). What, then, are we to make of women's reports that they feel mor=
e respected as human beings in the hands of religious officials than when=
 at the mercy of state bureaucrats? Why are they systematically humiliate=
d and stereotyped as ignorant, stupid, and incompetent by state welfare a=
gencies but not by Islamic charity workers? Why do they not complain as b=
itterly about having to veil their little girls as having to wait whole d=
ays outside state offices only to be told to come back next week? I belie=
ve these findings deserve more analytic s
 crutiny than they receive, and hold important clues about the attraction=
 of religious identity--and its visible symbols--to disadvantaged people =
who feel marginalized and dehumanized by the secular apparatuses of moder=
n nation states.=20

As mentioned above, the book's narrative strategy makes it very clear tha=
t these women are far from passive dupes of an oppressive system. However=
, this does not necessarily imply that they are feminist heroines. I see =
their daily struggles as combining elements of subversion and, yes, resis=
tance, with accommodation and collusion. Unlike the author, I would argue=
 that systems of oppression can be subverted from within, and that small,=
 everyday defiances do occasionally accumulate into serious systemic chal=
lenges. It does not necessarily follow, however, that she is wrong in her=
 assertion that the coping mechanisms adopted by her informants reproduce=
 important aspects of patriarchy. In the final analysis, these tensions b=
etween collusion and resistance are bound to impose changes on existing p=
atriarchal norms. However, the outcome will not necessarily be a feminist=
 utopia. This leaves much room for scholarly analysis and feminist praxis=
=2E=20

Finally, it is very clear from the empirical evidence she recounts (thoug=
h less so from her analysis of it) that Islam is not at the root of women=
's oppression. The gender ideology and resulting practices are extremely =
diffuse, and totally permeate all levels of Egyptian society, including t=
he state, the Islamic charities, and the Coptic Church. Furthermore, exam=
ples of this tension between economic reality and gender ideology and rel=
ated processes such as the feminization of poverty, and the second (and e=
ven third) shift, are global issues. Bibars provides us with insights int=
o how these global tensions play out within a specifically Egyptian conte=
xt, while at the same time remaining in touch with broader theoretical de=
bates.=20


Library of Congress call number: HQ1793 .B53 2001
Subjects:
Women--Egypt--Social conditions--20th century.=20
Poverty--Egypt--Sex differences.=20
Welfare economics.=20

Citation: A. Nilufer Isvan. "Review of Iman Bibars, Victims and Heroines:=
 Women, Welfare, and the Egyptian State," H-Gender-MidEast, H-Net Reviews=
, October, 2003. URL: http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=3D=
234771072583321.=20
=20

-----------------------------

III. Richard Sobel and Erik Shiraev, eds. International Public Opinion an=
d the Bosnia Crisis. Foreword by Robert Shapiro. Lanham: Lexington Books,=
 2003. xvi + 348 pp. Appendix, references, index. $80.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-=
7391-0479-9; $25.95 (paper), ISBN 0-7391-0480-2.=20
Reviewed by Ralph Levering, Department of History, Davidson College.
Published by H-Diplo (November, 2003)=20

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy during the Bosnian Crisis: A Comparativ=
e Perspective
This is an important book for several reasons. It is important because it=
 treats in detail public and governmental reactions in eight democratic n=
ations to the first extended post-Cold War crisis, the conflict in Bosnia=
 that erupted in warfare in the summer of 1992 and continued at least unt=
il the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995. It is import=
ant because, with the possible exception of the chapter on U.S. attitudes=
 and policy, all the essays in the book are persuasively argued, permitti=
ng readers to build on earlier essays as they proceed through the book to=
 deepen their understanding of the complex relationships between public o=
pinion and foreign policy in nations with different histories and politic=
al cultures. And it is important because the distinguished scholars who e=
dited the volume, Richard Sobel and Eric Shiraev, have contributed an exc=
ellent concluding chapter that advances our understanding of how public o=
pinion, broadly conceived, influences the
  making of foreign policy. This chapter--and perhaps some of the earlier=
 ones as well--should be required reading in courses (or sections of cour=
ses) that examine domestic influences on the making of foreign policy.=20

Drawing upon the case studies and upon a half-century of research by othe=
r scholars, the concluding chapter offers a nuanced, persuasive analysis =
of the "links" (p. 284) between public opinion and foreign policy. It is =
not possible in a short summary to do justice to the authors's argument. =
The following quotation is suggestive: "The impact of public opinion on p=
olicy is context-dependent and conditioned by mediating variables ... suc=
h as the context of the international problem under consideration; the na=
ture of the proposed policy; the effectiveness of the communication among=
 elites; elite awareness of the public opinion and the perceived level of=
 public support for the policy; and [the] structure and timing of decisio=
n making" (p. 284). Among several other mediating factors mentioned are "=
the structure of domestic political institutions," "media coverage of int=
ernational events," and "a relatively stable system of values developed t=
hrough socialization" (p. 284). In other=20
 words, how public opinion affects foreign policy differs from issue to i=
ssue and from nation to nation; it "is indispensably linked to the countr=
y's political system" (p. 289).=20

An important concept for Sobel and Shiraev is "policy climate," which the=
y define as "a set of beliefs about what the country and the government s=
hould or should not do on the international level and, in particular, in =
case of an international conflict" (p. 284). Two tables help greatly to e=
lucidate their ideas: "A Multiaxial Assessment of Policy Climate in Media=
ting Opinion-Policy Connections" (p. 286) and "A Comparative Analysis of =
Policy Climate in National Cases" (pp. 287-288). The latter table pulls t=
ogether, for comparison and contrast, many of the points made in the indi=
vidual chapters on the eight nations analyzed in the book.=20

Employing a useful metaphor, the authors argue that "the corridor between=
 opinion and policy resembles a multilevel highway intersection, not a na=
rrow one-way street. The links are interactive and reciprocal rather than=
 unidirectional and linear" (p. 303). A conclusion regarding policy towar=
d Bosnia is equally perceptive: "On the whole, in Bosnia, many government=
s aimed at conducting a relatively 'play-it-safe,' low-risk, and low-cost=
 foreign policy line" (p. 291). Based on my reading of the book, I believ=
e that the public's uncertainty in most countries about exactly what cour=
se their governments should pursue helps to explain why officials typical=
ly adopted a cautious approach. The concluding chapter admirably fulfills=
 the authors's promise in the introduction to "summarize the evidence in =
the book according to an approach for comparative study of opinion-policy=
 links" (pp. xiv-xv).=20

As suggested above, the least persuasive of the substantive chapters is p=
robably Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay's "U.S. Public Opinion on Interventio=
n in Bosnia" (pp. 69-106). I include "probably" because, as a student of =
U.S. public opinion and foreign policy, I feel better qualified to assess=
 the merits of Kull and Ramsay's essay than I do the seven chapters on ot=
her nations.=20

Kull and Ramsay argue that "the majority of Americans, from the beginning=
 of the war to the present, have shown a desire to take some action in Bo=
snia" (p. 69). They also note that "Americans have not felt compelled to =
be involved in Bosnia" (p. 95) and thus that they "feel that they can pla=
ce conditions on their support" (p. 70). The authors criticize the media =
for "asserting that the public was overwhelmingly opposed to U.S. interve=
ntion in Bosnia" (p. 69), and criticize the Clinton administration for us=
ing perceived public opposition as an excuse for not taking more forceful=
 action (p. 101).=20

I agree that there was considerable public support for intervention in re=
sponse to at least some questions, but only (as the authors note) as part=
 of a multilateral coalition. But I disagree that support for interventio=
n was as strong as the authors suggest it was. To make their case for a "=
majority position" favoring intervention (p. 69), the authors cite (among=
 many sources) what I consider to be highly leading questions asked in fo=
cus groups (e.g., pp. 71 and 72). And they largely ignore what I see as m=
uch more objective questions asked by the Gallup organization. A Gallup p=
oll in April 1993, for example, showed 30 percent supporting U.S. air str=
ikes against Serbian forces, whereas 62 percent responded that "we should=
 not get militarily involved." A Gallup poll in October 1993 asked whethe=
r, if a peace agreement was reached in Bosnia, the United States should c=
ontribute 20,000 troops to a U.N. peacekeeping force. Here was a chance t=
o express support for multilateralism; ye
 t 52 percent opposed sending the troops, while only 40 percent supported=
 that action. No wonder the news media frequently cited a lack of public =
support for intervention and President Clinton, eagerly desiring to be re=
elected in 1996, generally pursued a cautious policy.=20

The other substantive chapters are worth reading not only for their analy=
ses of the impact of public opinion (broadly conceived) on governmental p=
olicies toward Bosnia, but also as insightful introductions to the politi=
cal cultures and "policy climates" in the 1990s in seven important democr=
atic nations. I learned much from reading these chapters and found the ar=
guments highly convincing overall.=20

In Canada, Erin Carriere, Marc O'Reilly, and Richard Vengroff argue, ther=
e was strong public and governmental support for participation in interna=
tional peacekeeping, which helps to explain why "Canadian troops were amo=
ng the first to touch down in the former Yugoslavia in 1992" (p. 1). The =
authors do an excellent job of showing how Canadian support for peacekeep=
ing grew out of the nation's internationalist public culture and Canadian=
s' efforts to distinguish themselves in a positive way from their more po=
werful and warlike southern neighbor.=20

In Britain, Robert J. Wybrow concludes, "the British public were in favor=
 of British troops being used in Bosnia, particularly when they appeared =
to be doing 'something useful,' such as protecting the aid convoys or in =
a peacekeeping role.... It is equally apparent that government officials =
=2E.. felt that they were being pressured by the media into actions that =
they felt were ... premature and risky" (pp. 66-67).=20

In France, Marc Morje Howard and Lise Morje Howard argue, the public (inc=
luding many influential intellectuals centered in Paris) strongly support=
ed military intervention on the side of the Bosnian Muslims from 1992 for=
ward, whereas high officials were reluctant to sever France's historic ti=
es to Yugoslavia/Serbia. As in Britain, the media was "essential in terms=
 of compelling the policymakers to take a stand, reach a decision, and so=
metimes even change their policies on Bosnia" (p. 130). The authors demon=
strate that "the gap between French policy and public opinion, initially =
quite wide, gradually narrowed over time, as the government's policy shif=
ted in the direction of public opinion" (p. 107).=20

In Russia, in contrast, "public opinion failed to become an important fac=
tor shaping foreign policy, despite Russia's struggle to develop democrac=
y" (p. 135). Eric Shiraev and Deone Terrio argue that most Russians "had =
low interest in the conflict" (p. 142) and wanted above all to keep the n=
ation out of war. Elites in Moscow thus dominated the debates over policy=
, with President Boris Yeltsin typically setting the nation's course with=
out effective legislative input. But there were glimmerings of true democ=
racy, for "in the end the government did not ignore or shut down critics,=
 but instead inched toward their positions" (p. 167).=20

Paolo Bellucci and Pierangelo Isernia are critical of Italian officials' =
ignoring of pro-interventionist public opinion: "we found on the one hand=
 a strong and quite steady support for a more active armed involvement of=
 Italian troops in Bosnia and on the other hand an extreme reluctance of =
[the] Italian government to even consider and openly discuss such an invo=
lvement" (p. 206). This well-argued chapter is marred by numerous stylist=
ic errors--understandable for authors whose native language is not Englis=
h--that the editors should have made more effort to correct.=20

The public in the Netherlands, Philip Everts argues, "generally felt that=
 the international community should intervene, but it was uncertain how o=
r what should be done and what would be the likely consequences.... [P]ub=
lic opinion was divided, but in the sense of ambivalence rather than pola=
rization" (p. 225). An example of divisions was the relatively influentia=
l peace movement, "with some sticking to a commitment to nonviolent resol=
ution and others pleading for military intervention, if only out of despa=
ir" (p. 242). Everts criticizes many politicians' "unwillingness to run r=
isks" in support of more forceful action (p. 246).=20

In Germany, Karin Johnston contends, the public gradually became more sup=
portive of the nation's military involvement in peacekeeping operations i=
n Bosnia: "ethnic cleansing and other atrocities seen in news broadcasts"=
 undercut support for pacifism "and contributed to a shift in attitudes t=
oward an acceptance in principle for military interventions in clearly de=
fined circumstances (such as genocide) within a collective security conte=
xt" (p. 264). In an especially well-organized and insightful chapter that=
 emphasizes "the reciprocity between public opinion and policymaking" (p.=
 251), Johnston argues that "the relationship between public opinion and =
foreign policymaking in Germany is influenced by the interaction of three=
 factors: external events, domestic institutional structures (party syste=
m), and the political culture (civilian power, historical memory)" (p. 25=
4). She is especially insightful on how attitudes toward NATO and policy =
toward Bosnia in the former East Germany=20
 differed from those in the former West Germany.=20

Several of the chapters in the book (including Johnston's) rightly emphas=
ize the importance of media images of war and "ethnic cleansing" in Bosni=
a in shifting public opinion and governmental policy toward military inte=
rvention on behalf of the Bosnia's Muslims. I believe that substantial, p=
ersistent concerns about human rights, especially on the political left, =
also played a key role--one that is neglected more than it should be, I b=
elieve, in several of the essays.=20

Overall, however, this is an excellent book, one that belongs on a short =
list of indispensable recent books on public opinion and foreign policy, =
including (among others) Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presid=
ents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (1999); Richard Sobel, The Impac=
t of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since Vietnam (2001); and Brig=
itte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Decisionm=
aking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and Euro=
pean Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (2000). As these and other books =
and articles demonstrate, scholarship on the links between public opinion=
 and policymaking has advanced greatly during the thirty years since the =
publication of Bernard C. Cohen's path-breaking but far too narrowly focu=
sed book, The Public's Impace on Foreign Policy (1973).=20

Library of Congress call number: DR1313.7.P83 I58 2003
Subjects:
Yugoslav War, 1991-1995--Public opinion.=20
Yugoslav War, 1991-1995--Bosnia and Hercegovina.=20
Citation: Ralph Levering. "Review of Richard Sobel and Erik Shiraev, eds,=
 International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis," H-Diplo, H-Net Revi=
ews, November, 2003. URL: http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?pa=
th=3D26191072286886.=20
=20
--------------------------------

IV.  Lennard J. Davis. Bending over Backwards: Disability, Dismodernism, =
and Other Difficult Positions. Foreword by Michael B=E9rub=E9. Cultural F=
ront Series. New York: New York University Press, 2003. 224 pp. Notes, bi=
bliography, index. $60.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-8147-1949-X; $19.00 (paper), IS=
BN 0-8147-1950-3.=20
Reviewed by Susan Burch, Department of History and Government, Gallaudet =
University.
Published by H-Disability (November, 2003)=20


Lenny Davis's admirers will welcome his most recent work, Bending over Ba=
ckwards: Disability, Dismodernism, and Other Difficult Positions. This co=
mpilation of nine separate essays offers a panoramic view of the author-a=
ctivist's evolving ideas about disability, disability studies, and litera=
ry historical criticism. It covers a breadth of topics--the human genome =
project, ADA court cases, concepts of citizenship, the history of the nov=
el, homosexuality, postmodernist theory, the rise of Disability Studies, =
etc. A recent addition to the NYU series Cultural Fronts, which seeks to =
promote works of cultural criticism with policy implications, this is not=
 intended primarily for an audience of historians. Still, Davis's work of=
fers creative and challenging examples that may be useful to our discipli=
ne and particularly to Disability historians.=20

Davis argues that disability, as a category of identity, has the potentia=
l to transform the postmodern notion of identity. In previous works, whic=
h include Enforcing Normalcy and The Disability Studies Reader, Davis out=
lined the social, scientific, and linguistic processes that inform the me=
aning of "disability." In an edited collection of his parents' correspond=
ence, Shall I Say a Kiss, and in his own memoir, My Sense of Silence, Dav=
is revealed in poignant and personal images the complexities of living as=
/with Deaf people. Inspired by Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault, Davis m=
elds the theoretical with the personal.=20

His most recent work is primarily a collection of pieces previously publi=
shed and the result of dialogues Davis had with himself and others since =
their publication. Consequently, some chapters overlap in content and arg=
ument. Still, taken together, they reveal a steep evolution of understand=
ing. In writing this book, Davis strives to remind scholars of the pervas=
ive presence of disability, and its manifest possibilities for clarifying=
 and reconceptualizing academic and practical definitions of identity and=
 status.=20

Several chapters in Bending over Backwards summarize arguments previously=
 made by Davis in his other books; most widely known is his contention th=
at the nineteenth century witnessed a watershed change in conceptions of =
humans from ideals to norms, exemplified by the rise of eugenics. Include=
d in this argument, Davis elucidates the extent to which the idea of norm=
alcy has been tied to, created by, and developed with the idea of abnorma=
l bodies. Several chapters from this newest installment go further, linki=
ng disability in new ways to the legal system, American politics, the env=
ironment, technology, and the economy. Moreover, Bending over Backwards s=
harpens the application of disability to cultural studies and postmoderni=
st theory, challenging the theoretical basis of identity politics and soc=
ial constructionism, and promoting instead what he calls "dismodernism." =
Rather than tack on disability to the traditional interpretive troika of =
race, class, and gender, Davis provocativ
 ely suggests that disability embodies, supplants, and transcends these p=
ostmodernist classifiers. According to Davis, it is in part disability's =
instability as a category that will allow Disability Studies the chance t=
o "provide a critique of and a politics to discuss how all groups, based =
on physical traits or markings, are selected for disablement by a larger =
system of regulation and signification. So it is paradoxically the most m=
arginalized group--people with disabilities--who can provide the broadest=
 way of understanding contemporary systems of oppression" (p. 29).=20

His introduction, entitled "People with Disability: They Are You," goes f=
urther than most disability theory scholarship. Augmenting the position t=
hat disability directly and indirectly influences everyone, Davis advocat=
es a broader civil rights mandate by linking disability much more closely=
 with legal, cultural, governmental, and social matters. His solution is =
called dismodernism, which incorporates the value that protections offere=
d to any class be offered to all classes (p. 30). With this theory, Davis=
 conveys the potential of dismodernism succinctly, asserting, that "[i]mp=
airment is the rule, and normalcy is the fantasy. Dependence is the reali=
ty, and independence grandiose thinking. Barrier-free access is the goal,=
 and the right to pursue happiness the false consciousness that obscures =
it. Universal design becomes the template for social and political design=
s" (p. 31).=20

Several chapters may be of particular interest to historians of Disabilit=
y. Chapter 1, "The End of Identity Politics and the Beginning of Dismoder=
nism," offers a coherent description of the parallels between historical =
expressions of minority identities, particularly framed by literary criti=
cisms of Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butl=
er. Critiquing genetic interpretations of disability and normalcy, Davis =
relocates the discussion of essentialism. He makes perhaps his strongest =
case for the instability of identity and the value of dismodernism here. =
Using the example of transgender politics and intersexed people, Davis re=
veals the "dissolving boundaries" of traditional identity categories (p. =
17). The human genome project--a common target for disability scholars--a=
lso plays a prominent role in this essay. Yet Davis raises fresh and coge=
nt questions about the meaning of "correct" or "real" genomes--what is th=
e ideal, and how is that being defined? F
 or instance, he questions what it means to eradicate certain conditions =
that may ultimately prevent those individuals from experiencing other dis=
abling conditions.=20

The chapter "Bending over Backwards" is particularly strong and illuminat=
ing. In it, Davis outlines the Americans with Disabilities Act and specif=
ic current cases testing the ADA. This close reading of legal texts empha=
sizes the ways cultural norms frame such documents and judicial decisions=
=2E The references to common historical and contemporary popular images o=
f disability broaden the implications of the case studies, demonstrating =
in vivid ways the construction of disability. "Go to the Margins of the C=
lass," which focuses primarily on the brutal murder of James Byrd Jr., is=
 one of the finest pieces Davis has created. In 1999 Byrd, a citizen of J=
asper, Texas, was dragged behind a truck for two miles, before he ultimat=
ely was dismembered and killed. Viewing this hate crime with equal and in=
tensified attention to the issue of disability produced superb, shocking =
results. This reviewer, like many, had heard nothing of Byrd's impairment=
s--seizures and debilitating arthritis--whe
 n national media covered the case. Davis potently challenges the premise=
 that certain identities are more important than others in hate crimes, a=
nd in society generally. The writing is crisp and focused; his explanatio=
n of evidence and his analysis will appeal to the historically trained.=20

Although it was not his primary aim to do so, Davis's increased attention=
 to the economic factors that compound physical and mental impairment was=
 greatly appreciated by this reader. A multitude of his examples depict t=
he intimate and inextricable tie between class circumstances and experien=
ces of disability. Genetic testing, for example, occurs mainly in affluen=
t societies and for its members (p. 21), and the majority of people with =
disabilities are poor, under or unemployed, and undereducated (p. 28). Es=
pecially in his study of employment law and disability, he illuminates th=
e "dissolving boundaries" of identity and brings disability into closer p=
roximity to the mainstream world. It is hoped that Davis will continue to=
 probe this issue in future works.=20

This book was not intended, nor does it qualify, as a "history collection=
=2E" Its interdisciplinary nature and strong theoretical and literary cri=
ticism framework necessitate a different standard of argument than histor=
ians apply. Thus this review cannot fairly critique the sources using tra=
ditional historical measures. It should be noted, however, that Davis's p=
rimary evidence reflects the diverse nature of his pieces. He cites many =
classic texts in Disability Studies, including Freakery, Claiming Disabil=
ity, The Black Stork, and Nothing about Us without Us. He frequently refe=
rences his own previous works, as well as critical literary studies, Brit=
ish novels, current American legal briefs, and recent New York Times arti=
cles. Several of the pieces in this collection, while historical in natur=
e, might have benefited from greater attention to past evidence of activi=
sm. "The Crip Strikes Back," for instance, shares many similarities with =
Paul Longmore's work on the League of the P
 hysically Handicapped; Bob Buchanan's work on deaf laborers and activist=
s resonate with and contradict Davis's position that before the 1970s dif=
ferent populations of people with disabilities did not previously see com=
monality with others (p. 11).[1]=20

One regret this reviewer had with the work was the relative absence of di=
rect evaluation and theoretical study of Deafness with/versus disability.=
 As a leading theoretician of disability and the son of deaf parents, Dav=
is is uniquely poised to review both. His provocative ideas about the ins=
tability of identity and the powerful advantages of embracing disability =
might well challenge or at least complicate the tense relationship betwee=
n the Deaf world and people who identify as disabled. The collection woul=
d have benefited significantly from more thorough copyediting, too; the e=
ndnotes are inconsistent and often inaccessible. Davis should be commende=
d for his provocative discussion of the human genome project and his prev=
ious work on the impact of eugenics. He could go still further with his a=
nalysis of the role of science and popular culture; his next work--on wha=
t he calls "bioculture"--promises to address this topic more fully.=20

Like Paul Longmore's recent memoir-collection Why I Burned My Book, Davis=
's compilation ultimately allows readers to see the ebb, flow, and evolut=
ion of positions as well as the complex and difficult personal relationsh=
ip between scholar, activist, and member of the disability community. In =
Bending over Backwards, the author acknowledges at the outset that the pi=
eces do not fit neatly together. Since many chapters repeat similar theme=
s and assume some grounding in Disability Studies and Davis's previous wo=
rks, it may be less useful to students or general readers. Some of the re=
petition may prove useful in the end, however. Many selections, for examp=
le, address issues of control and marginalization, lending themselves nat=
urally as complementary pieces to works like Inventing the Feeble Mind, I=
llusions of Equality, or sections from The New Disability History. Davis'=
s theoretical components, especially his critiques of Foucault, could cou=
nterbalance the lack of such study in vir
 tually all Disability social histories.=20

Bending over Backwards may not be not an easy read for traditional histor=
ians; the essays are highly theoretical, often reading as a keen stream o=
f consciousness. Something Davis does particularly well is juggle theory =
and activism deftly, employing language that makes their overlap plain to=
 academics who claim they are not activists, and activists who stake no c=
laim on theory. The writing is quirky at times, sarcastic at others, and =
the high spiritedness of the book may challenge those who prefer more str=
aightforward, tangible explanations. Still, this kind of cutting edge his=
toricization-meets-literary criticism may delight many, opening new groun=
d for interdisciplinary dialogue.=20

Thus even with its limitations, Bending over Backwards remains an importa=
nt and useful work for historians as a template for examining the myriad =
ways disability and Deafness infiltrate vital aspects of our identity, in=
cluding laws, cultural icons, literature, and citizenship.=20

Note:=20

[1]. Paul Longmore, "League of the Physically Handicapped and the Great D=
epression: A Case Study in the New Disability History," Journal of Americ=
an History 87:3 (2000): pp. 888-921; and Robert Buchanan, Illusions of Eq=
uality: Deaf Americans in School and Factory, 1850-1950 (Washington: Gall=
audet University Press, 1999).=20

Library of Congress call number: HV1553 .D38 2002
Subjects:
United States. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.=20
People with disabilities--United States.=20
Sociology of disability--United States.=20
Disability studies--United States.=20
Disabled Persons--legislation & jurisprudence--United States.=20
Public Policy--United States.=20

Citation: Susan Burch. "Review of Lennard J. Davis, Bending over Backward=
s: Disability, Dismodernism, and Other Difficult Positions," H-Disability=
, H-Net Reviews, November, 2003. URL: http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/sh=
owrev.cgi?path=3D29591072287185.=20
=20