[Discussion] The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World

[sule tarakcioglu]

Richard Madsen and Tracy B. Strong, eds. The Many and the One: Religious
and Secular Perspectives on Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World.
Ethikon Series in Comparative Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003. vi + 372 pp. Bibliography, index. $65.00 (cloth), ISBN
0-691-09993-6 ISBN 0-691-09992-8; $22.95 (paper), ISBN .
*Reviewed by:* Fatmag=FCl Berktay, Department of International Relations,
Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Istanbul.
*Published by:* H-Gender-MidEast <http://www.h-net.msu.edu/%7Egend-mid/>
(April, 2004)

Burdens of Existential Pluralism

This is a timely book. It deals with the crucial question of whether the
different ethical systems can be reconciled through rational dialogue
rather than political struggle. In a world where different ethical
systems have become so polarized that the debate over the alleged "clash
of civilizations" is becoming ever more heated, the necessity to mediate
among the very different cultures and ways of life of different peoples
inevitably takes on a heightened significance. This is not only due to
the implications of the ongoing process of globalization but also to the
fact that since the September 11 attacks the issues posed by ethical
pluralism have gone beyond the academic interest they have always
enjoyed and become matters of "most urgent public interest," as Madsen
and Strong point out in their introduction. In order to pave the way for
reconciliation we first have to understand the position of the "other,"
which might then carry us beyond mere toleration to reconciliation. This
book's major contribution is that it gives us resources for both of
these Herculean tasks.

The book contains nine essays about how the problem of ethical pluralism
can be understood by different philosophical and religious traditions.
Each essay is paired with a shorter "response essay" and juxtaposes
modern secular philosophical traditions with older religious traditions,
with the aim of bringing these juxtaposed traditions into "genuine
dialogue with another." The authors of the main essays are asked to
respond to five broad questions (concerning attitude towards ethical
pluralism, social regulation, citizenship, human sexuality, life and
death decisions) within the framework of a particular tradition. Besides
these eighteen essays there is an introduction by the editors and a
concluding essay by J. D. Moon which helps to put different traditions
into perspective by bringing out the resemblances as well as differences
between them.

The editors' declared focus is on "ethical pluralism" manifested at the
level of tension between rather than within cultures which brings
confrontation with the "other" culture where personal identity is at
stake. "Ethical pluralism" is defined as the recognition that there are,
in the world, different ethical traditions that differ not only in
matters of practical judgment or moral issues (e.g., citizenship,
euthanasia, relationships between the sexes, etc.), but also in modes of
reasoning used to reach these judgments. Human beings find themselves,
whether they will it or not, in a world of incommensurable values and
they have to make choices between them. This "existential pluralism,"
burdens them with acute dilemmas, pulling them in incompatible
directions, especially in a world where the conflict between different
values has become more intense and the various spheres of life more
differentiated.

Religious traditions and classical philosophical traditions such as
natural law theory--rightly defined by the editors as being
"perfectionist"--assume it is good to live a coherent, ethical life and
they also have a vision of such a life. These prescriptive traditions
insist that the state and society should help people to achieve this
life. Within most perfectionist ethical traditions there is a tendency
towards fundamentalist arguments for limiting value spheres and thus
"saving the society from the burdens of existential pluralism." One way
to achieve this is to limit the development of diverse value spheres the
way the Taliban attempted to do. Of course, not all the perfectionist
theories go this far, but it is no surprise that the issues addressed in
this book concern, for the most part, the proper role of society and the
state in dealing with disagreements over ethical judgments.

In his lucid concluding essay "Pluralisms Compared," J. D. Moon defines
the "perfectionist" traditions of Confucianism, Judaism, natural law,
Christianity, and Islam as "comprehensive perspectives." Unlike the
"partial perspectives" (classical and egalitarian liberalism, critical
theory, and feminist theory), these are comprehensive in the sense that
they seek to provide answers to a wide range of questions about the
nature of human life and the human good, our place in the cosmos, the
ideal forms of character, and the principles that should govern a wide
variety of relationships among people. However, he is quick to note that
all of the comprehensive perspectives represented in the book have also
the resources to acknowledge "perspectival pluralism" (the idea that
there can be a basis for reasonable disagreement among adherents to
different ethical perspectives), at least to some degree: "All
perspectives are internally complex, marked by more or less well defined
traditions of interpretation and/or different sects, and the arguments
among these traditions and sects in large part define the perspective
itself. No one can avoid the experience of having to confront opposing
arguments and ideas and, as a result, developing the capacity to view
one's own ideas with a certain distance. Further, all perspectives place
value on behavior that is sincere, that is motivated by the individual's
ethical convictions rather than being coerced. Valuing persuasion, one
must learn to engage the other, and so to develop the capacity to see
the world through the other's eyes" (p. 346).

Hence the existence of an adaptability to existential pluralism within
these traditions (but only insofar as it contributes to a transcendent
substantive good, one may add with the editors). The possibility of
developing the capacity to view one's own ideas with a certain distance
is invaluable for acquiring a critical perspective on one's judgments
and practices which may open the way for genuine dialogue between very
different traditions. However, although there is the possibility of
acknowledging perspectival pluralism and significant resources within a
tradition that leads to the acceptance of reasonable disagreement, there
are also more conservative interpretations in each tradition that serve
to end such dialogue even before its onset. And one of the strong points
of this book is that the reader can get a sense of both (more liberal
and conservative) positions within each tradition by comparing the main
chapters and the response essays.

Modern secular philosophies are resigned to the impossibility of
integrating the diverse value spheres into a commonly accepted ethically
coherent order; in this sense they are procedural not perfectionist,
trying to allow individuals freely to pursue their own versions of the
good (unless interfering with the liberty of others). Here the "burdens"
of existential pluralism, the existential struggles when confronting
incommensurable values, are relegated to the "private realm" where they
cannot undermine (at least in theory) the universally accepted public
procedures that ensure an overall social order. This is especially true
of liberalism. However, the boundaries between the public and the
private realms are not so strict and not always in the same place. Thus
a sharp separation between the public realm (the realm of universal
procedures) and the private (the realm of particular versions of the
substantive good) is needed which, in turn, leads to the serious
criticisms from certain versions of feminist and postmodernist theories.

Here one should note that such secular procedural, moral philosophical
traditions, although seemingly more equipped to deal with the
difficulties posed by value pluralism, have their own forms of
fundamentalism that restrict the existential pluralism of a morally
complex society. But moral relativism--the doctrine that in matters of
morality there are no universals, no standards by which to judge moral
action, independent of historical and individual contingencies--cannot
be a way out either. Because, then, the question of power determining
what counts as morally and ethically true arises. The most dominant
Western approach to this problem presented by ethical pluralism has been
to identify a core of values on which all reasonable people might agree
and then to try to extend that core rationally to different practices
and cultures. However, it is difficult to use the fundamental
assumptions of the Western Enlightenment, about the possibility and
necessity for individuals to achieve moral autonomy through the use of
reason, as a basis for dialogue with non-Western traditions, especially
religiously based ones, that do not accept such fundamental assumptions.
Likewise, reconciling them with postmodernist perspectives that
emphasize the extent to which our notions of freedom and rationality are
constructed by language and culture is also very difficult.

Western liberalism has been crticized for its tendency to sidestep the
encounter with difference by relegating incommensurable values to the
private realm and confining the considerations of justice and
enforcement of moral standards within the public realm. Issues such as
race and sexual orientation are generally seen as private matters. In
this framework, liberalism is understood as the philosophy of societies
in which liberty or autonomy takes pride of place. However, as W. A.
Galston points out, liberalism can also be intrepreted as to be about
the protection of diversity, not the promotion of autonomy. In this
sense liberal societies can and must make room for individuals and
groups whose lives are guided by tradition, authority, and faith.

But obviously there are "liberal fundamentalists" in the West who
maintain that this is not possible and that the non-westerners have to
accept the main tenets of western liberalism if they are to be fully
modern, stable, and peaceful. Such liberal fundamentalists would only
tolerate those forms of Islam, Judaism, or Christianity that would
relegate themselves to a private sphere. However, one has to remember
that if value pluralism is correct, liberalism cannot sustain its
universalist claims and emerges at best as one valid form of political
association among many others. As Madsen and Strong point out, modern,
secular traditions of liberalism, critical theory, and feminism are not
without challenges in trying to formulate their traditions. They stress
the need for individual autonomy more than the religious traditions, but
in the early twenty-first century they have to contend with a world
dominated by large multinational organizations, and the apparent
pluralism promised in such a world is superficial--a Benetton type of
pluralism! Modern secular ethical theories, which stress the autonomy of
the empowered individual, have to struggle with basic definitions of
fundamental concepts like "individual autonomy" and "empowerment," and
they have to be critically sensitive to the possibility of ethnocentrism
within their traditions.

Maintaining peace in a world of ongoing process of globalization depends
on establishing institutions that both protect and limit the ethical
pluralism that comes with modernization. But different types of
societies have different ways of doing this, diferences being based not
simply on moral principles but on configurations of political
arrangements bolstered by economic interests. Here, of course, the
questions posed by the editors become crucial: are we then really
destined for a "clash of civilizations" that cannot be resolved until
the whole world adopts the liberal institutions of the West? Or are
there multiple models for a humane, flexible modernity? Can the modern,
globally interdependent world accomodate "civilizational pluralism" as
well as "ethical pluralism"? These are all vital questions and any book
that addresses such questions is bound to be interesting and meaningful.
Moreover, this book is another example that globalization, apart from
bringing dangers of deadly conflict, may also bring opportunities for
constructive interconnection and dialogue.

Indeed, as the editors note, with regards to style, a concern for
building bridges between different ethical traditions is manifest in the
chapters of the book which in itself is a hopeful element, and also
supports the claim that "giving a serious account of major ethical
traditions never takes pace in a historical vacuum," but is always "a
response to the moral predicaments arising in certain political and
social contexts." I agree with the editors' claim that this is due to
the eruption of religious and ethnic warfare since the end of the Cold
War, leading to raised stakes in discussions of ethical pluralism. The
Many and the One gives us lots of food for thought and information about
how to start and sustain a dialogue between different ethical traditions
of a diverse yet interdependent world. However, the difficult problem
and the task still remain: to provide hopeful examples of how the
challenges posed by existential, ethical, and civilizational pluralism
can be resolved in a constructive, peaceful way!

Library of Congress Call Number: BJ69 .M26 2003 Subjects:

    * Ethics, Comparative.
    * Pluralism (Social sciences)


Citation: Fatmag=FCl Berktay. "Review of Richard Madsen and Tracy B.
Strong, eds, The Many and the One: Religious and Secular Perspectives on
Ethical Pluralism in the Modern World," H-Gender-MidEast, H-Net Reviews,
April, 2004. URL:
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=3D115701084744547.