[Discussion] The Role of Pleasure and Culture in the Making of Foreign Affairs_

[Paksoy, Hb]

The Role of Pleasure and Culture in the Making of Foreign Affairs_


H-ASIA=20
March 10, 2003=20

Book Review by Eileen Scully on Thomas A. Breslin. _Beyond Pain: The=20
Role of Pleasure and Culture in the Making of Foreign Affairs_=20
(x-post H-Diplo)=20
************************************************************************ =

From: H-Net Reviews <books@H-NET.MSU.EDU>=20

H-NET BOOK REVIEW=20
Published by H-Diplo@h-net.msu.edu (January, 2003)=20

Thomas A. Breslin. _Beyond Pain: The Role of Pleasure and Culture in=20
the Making of Foreign Affairs_. Praeger Studies on Ethnic and=20
National Identities in Politics. Westport and London: Praeger, 2001.=20
x + 203 pp. Bibliography, index. $67.95 (cloth), ISBN 0-275-97430-8;=20
$19.00 (paper), ISBN 0-275-97431-6.=20

Reviewed for H-Diplo by Eileen Scully <scullyep@earthlink.net>,=20
Social Sciences Division, Bennington College=20

Wine, Women, and Bribes--Not Bombs=20

Certainly a timely book, this is an historical inquiry into "the=20
uses various cultures have made of pleasure in international=20
relations," with "pleasure" defined to include both culturally=20
specific values and universal human desires.  Thomas Breslin, Vice=20
President for Research and associate professor of International=20
Relations at Florida International University, argues that "policies=20
of pain," e.g. military attacks, trade restrictions, and rhetorical=20
demonization, "have invariably crippled aggressor nations,=20
immiserating all and sundry," while "the use of [sexual,=20
psychological, celebratory, and gustatory] pleasure has almost never=20
led to the downfall of a nation and the ruination of all its people"=20
(pp. ix-x).=20

Breslin, speaking as an historian, a past anti-war activist, and,=20
more recently, an arms-limitations advocate, hopes to counterbalance=20
fellow scholars' tendency to focus on wars and conflicts, "rather=20
than the periods in between them when diplomats are working to=20
prevent wars."[1] He has this message for readers (and leaders):=20
"Were pleasure in its culturally relevant setting acknowledged=20
adequately as an effective diplomatic tool and often a cheap and=20
safe one at that, then pain, which is ever more costly and deadly,=20
might lose both its primacy and whatever shreds of legitimacy it may=20
still have in this nuclear age" (p. ix).  The work, a series of case=20
studies, is based predominantly on a wide reading of relevant=20
secondary sources, ranging in type from a 1985 article in _FIU=20
Hospitality Review_ comparing French and Chinese cuisines, to a 1982=20
American Civil Liberties Union report on the Reagan administration's=20
perceived assault on the Bill of Rights.  Trained as a specialist in=20
the history of Sino-American relations, Breslin's most extensive=20
case study in the cost-benefit ratio of pain-pleasure diplomacy is=20
China.[2] Chapter 1, "The Five Baits," runs from the ancient Han=20
period up through the advent of the Qing dynasty in the mid-1600s;=20
chapter 9, "Sweet and Sour: China Deals with the Modern West,"=20
continues the case study, taking us up through the 1990s.  From the=20
start, military adventurism and aggression competed for primacy=20
against a diplomacy of accommodation and indulgence; the latter=20
"utilized pleasure in various forms as basic as sex or gold and as=20
refined as the pleasures of the banquet hall to defend and even=20
expand the Han living area" (p. 1).  "Sex, for example, was a=20
powerful tool for the Chinese ruler," as, according to one=20
nineteenth-century Western observer of China, foreign visitors were=20
presented with "trained dancing girls and female musicians to=20
entertain and engage in sexual relations"; indeed, such women "often=20
changed hands, being sold and resold, or offered as presents" (p.=20
2).=20

The template for the pleasure principle in diplomacy was the Han=20
"heqin policy," developed circa 198-138 B.C.E., after repeated=20
disastrous battles with the neighboring Xiongnu.  The strategist=20
behind the "heqin policy" understood how the "five baits" could=20
corrupt and sedate horse-riding, nomadic warriors: "elaborate=20
clothes and carriages to corrupt their eyes; fine food to corrupt=20
their mouths; music and effeminate women to corrupt their ears;=20
lofty buildings, granaries, and slaves to corrupt their stomachs=20
(i.e., slow them down); and royal banquets to corrupt their minds"=20
(p. 6).  A powerful, costly military backed up this policy, but also=20
made Han rulers vulnerable to manipulation and betrayal.  To reduce=20
reliance on the military underpinnings of the "five baits," Han=20
diplomat Zhang Qian turned to a divide-and-conquer policy to=20
neutralize the Xiongnu, resulting in internal divisions among the=20
nomads into northern and southern branches (p. 7).  Breslin concedes=20
that the cost-benefit ratio of "pleasurably pacifying" was=20
complicated.  A "demonstration of the emperor's command of the=20
finest things under heaven" required a government-elite monopoly=20
over the dazzling array of sumptuous food, seductive women, and high=20
material culture (p. 16). This, in turn, required the dominant group=20
to exploit the peasantry, send off some of their own women as brides=20
and concubines, round up all of those "trained dancing girls and=20
female musicians" from non-Han groups, and restrict direct trade=20
between border-area inhabitants and neighboring peoples (pp.  4-5).=20
Exploitation often brought revolts, with large casualties and harsh=20
aftermaths.  Policing a state monopoly on trade often provoked wars=20
by frustrated outsiders, which in turn entailed conscripting=20
peasants to arms, draining granaries to feed troops, and diverting=20
farmland to breed military horses.  Removing land from cultivation=20
then cut grain supplies, forcing rulers to reduce troop levels (so=20
as to lower demand for grain), to shrink elite consumption, "or to=20
starve the peasantry until they revolted, became sick and died" (p.=20
5).  As well, the recipients of Chinese largess often "grew soft and=20
fond enough of luxury to oppress their subjects and stir up=20
discontent" (p. 15), on occasion letting their sharpened appetites=20
take them into cross-border raids or military campaigns.=20

Through the rise and fall of dynasties, Breslin identifies the=20
recurring pattern: aggressive expansion, a longer wall, and=20
militarism led to over-extension, wars, and collapse; "pleasurably=20
pacifying" neighbors and foes squeezed peasants, but was ultimately=20
less costly to them and to the dynasty than military conscription=20
and land diversion (p. 13). The People's Republic of China and=20
Taiwan have both carried on the tradition of "cultural diplomacy=20
toward nations," combining trade opportunities, cultural=20
extravaganzas, and "[e]xquisite hospitality" (p. 168).  A strong=20
military (or a military alliance with a more powerful nation)=20
buttresses this pleasure-diplomacy.  Still, the lesson derived from=20
Chinese experience with outsiders, far and near, is this: "All in=20
all, openness, fair dealing, generosity, and friendliness with=20
foreign nations and individuals have amply rewarded China for more=20
than two and a half millennia, while belligerence, tightfistedness,=20
sharp dealing, and anti-foreignism have invariably led to disaster=20
and decline" (p. 175). Readers will find interesting and even more=20
immediately relevant Breslin's case study of the United States.=20
Chapter 8, "Whiskey versus Rum: The Roots of America's Bicultural=20
Foreign Policy," seems to be a preview of the author's current work=20
in progress "on the ethnicity of American presidents as a major=20
factor in American foreign policy."[3] Departing from familiar=20
vantage points on the subject (such as realist, New Left,=20
Wilsonian), Breslin re-tells the narrative of U.S. expansion and=20
diplomacy as a continuing clash "between Anglican system builders=20
and militant Celtic anti-establishments types" (p. 141). The=20
"whiskey versus rum" dichotomy originated with the nation itself,=20
according to Breslin.  Anglo-American types sought "to control the=20
frontiers through grand development schemes featuring well-ordered=20
relations with aboriginals whom they systematically plied with=20
modest amounts of New England rum and other gifts" (p. 137). In=20
contrast, those who had come from "Britain's Celtic fringe,"=20
bringing their whiskey distilling know-how with them, "resisted=20
Anglo-American rule and used their cheaper whiskey to get Indian=20
lands" through duplicity and coercion (p. 137).=20

Across time, Anglo-Americanist policy makers (e.g. Thomas Jefferson,=20
William Seward, William Howard Taft, Franklin Roosevelt, George=20
Marshall, and Dwight Eisenhower) employed "a mixture of pain and=20
pleasure"  to control others, order reality, and uphold national=20
interests (p. 133).  This approach has been manifest in aid=20
programs, cultural and educational exchanges, tourism and trade=20
incentives, and international exhibitions. No mere idealists,=20
adherents saw the connection between U.S. prosperity and positive=20
diplomacy, but also incorporated a strong defense into the mix. In=20
contrast, Celtic frontier types (e.g., James Polk, Andrew Johnson,=20
Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan) almost reflexively cut cultural=20
budgets, bombastically touted American superiority, fueled military=20
buildups, and pursued aggressive expansion.  Elsewhere, Breslin has=20
lamented the precedence of this latter orientation, evident since=20
the Jimmy Carter administration in the late 1970s through the=20
Clinton era into the new century.  Americans have been "abandoning=20
the use of money and other approaches for a much more militarized=20
approach.... There's a bias against diplomacy. We are now going back=20
to a new wave of enthusiasm for increasingly sophisticated weaponry=20
and military command systems and the fixation on these means blinds=20
us to simpler, less expensive and more ingratiating methods that are=20
time tested over the centuries."[4]=20

Anglo-American types grew in sophistication and humanity, as they=20
responded to social and political democratization, and to changing=20
national interests. Payoffs, State Department-paid prostitutes, and=20
heavy handed, trade-promoting internal improvements were supplanted=20
by missionaries, overseas investors, public school teachers,=20
doctors, international exhibitions, the Council on Foreign=20
Relations, the United Nations, Fulbright fellowships, tourism, and=20
peace-keepers and supplemented by NATO, arms treaties, and periodic=20
troop deployments. To the extent seductive women, payoffs, and=20
classified "lubrication efforts"  have still found a place in U.S.=20
diplomacy, revelations of this type of pleasuring are turned into=20
"scandals" and "corruption" by the political party system, media,=20
and public opinion.  According to philosophers and political=20
scientists, democracy curbs war-mongering demagogues, yet the=20
two-party system also turns pleasure-based international initiatives=20
into a debate on taxes and domestic spending priorities.=20

In contrast to those of an Anglo-American orientation, "Celtic=20
fringe" types learned little, it seems. In the (Celtic) tradition of=20
James Polk and Andrew Johnson, Harry Truman abandoned Anglo-American=20
Franklin Roosevelt's hopes for post-war internationalism, built upon=20
cooperation, negotiation, and accommodation.  A "pugnacious,=20
confident" president, this "Celtic-American from the Midwest" pushed=20
the country "toward a permanent war economy," utterly indifferent to=20
the nuances of "pleasuring" enemies and rivals (pp. 148, 150).  What=20
positive initiatives in cultural exchange and economic assistance=20
remained, says Breslin, were owed to the efforts of leftover=20
Roosevelt-era Anglo-American types in the State Department,=20
Congress, and elsewhere in Washington.  Based on a limited,=20
selective reference to material in the Cold War International=20
History Project collection, Breslin asserts that Truman "rejected=20
conciliatory gestures by the Soviet Union," including their=20
non-occupation of South Korea, and their non-interference with sole=20
U.S. occupation of Japan.  Moreover, he refused to accept reciprocal=20
Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.  Only "[h]omesick soldiers,"=20
and "the anti-militarism of the war-weary American people as a=20
whole," kept Truman from turning the end of one war into the onset=20
of another (p. 149).  In this tendentious interpretation of Truman=20
and the origins of the Cold War, as in other sections of the book,=20
it is difficult to disentangle Breslin's historical research from=20
his political outlook, and his philosophical-religious premises.=20

Hearing U.S. history related as an object lesson in the efficacy and=20
ultimate economy of pleasure-based diplomacy can be jarring for=20
American readers, even sophisticated historians who are=20
self-consciously disdainful of American exceptionalism and well=20
steeped in "history from the bottom up."  Not many textbook chapters=20
on the American Revolutionary War, for example, explain how "[t]he=20
amatory successes of ... seductive womenfolk helped to drive the=20
English out of southern coastal cities into the open, where they=20
were vulnerable to military defeat" (p. 134).  Similarly, at a time=20
when diplomatic historians are becoming more careful about referring=20
to countries--even great countries--as "she," it would be difficult=20
to find another recent analysis of late nineteenth-century=20
Anglo-American conflicts over Canadian fisheries that focuses on a=20
love match between British representative Joseph Chamberlain and the=20
daughter of President Grover Cleveland's Secretary of War. Breslin=20
laments that this love match, notwithstanding "Cupid's darts, failed=20
to smooth out the dispute between America and its northern neighbor"=20
(p. 143).  He also quotes agreeably from an earlier historian's=20
observation regarding this love match that, "[o]nce more ... the=20
ancient mystery of the way of a maid with a man was enacted on the=20
diplomatic stage" (p. 144).=20

The author makes a good case that, by and large, historical examples=20
show the efficacy and ultimate economy of a "culturally appropriate"=20
pleasure-based diplomacy.  Various area specialists will no doubt=20
contest the details of Breslin's far-ranging historical=20
interpretation of how societies and peoples across time and space=20
have employed both pain and pleasure in their external relations.=20
However, there are several broad assertions and assumptions in the=20
book likely to irk postmodern sensibilities across specialties and=20
disciplines.  The cost-benefit analysis of "pleasuring" as=20
preferable, and indeed more efficient and economical than=20
pain-inflicting foreign policies, turns upon Breslin's belief in=20
"the fundamental natural law that the human species must preserve=20
itself" (pp. ix-x).  Who could disagree?  Yet, for Breslin,=20
collective self-preservation is not simply one "fundamental natural=20
law" among many competing moral imperatives; it is instead the prime=20
directive of human society, trumping all other considerations.=20

We see the implications and complications of this logic in Breslin's=20
critical references to the work of two other scholars, Dru C.=20
Gladney and Gabriel Kolko.  In one of the endnotes to a discussion=20
concerning Han Chinese rulers' use of the aforementioned "trained=20
dancing girls and female musicians to entertain and engage in sexual=20
relations," Breslin complains about "[t]he all-too-common blind spot=20
of social scientists toward pleasuring," and their "lamentable=20
inability to see erotic pleasuring as a strategy for dealing with=20
others" (p. 176, n. 3). He admits some groups under siege who have=20
relied upon sex-as-diplomacy (e.g., native Hawaiians and some=20
Amerindians) incurred pandemic and fatal consequences.  These,=20
however, represent the exceptions acknowledged in Breslin's earlier=20
quote that "the use of pleasure has _almost never_ led to the=20
downfall of a nation and the ruination of all its people" (p. ix,=20
emphasis added).=20

Exceptions aside, Breslin suggests, the utility of "pleasurably=20
pacifying"  policies has been obscured by post-modern, implicitly=20
moralizing arguments asserting that hegemonic core groups=20
historically built their self-definition and supposed superiority=20
upon the representation of minority groups as primitive, exotic, and=20
erotic.  As opposed to Dru Gladney's "false conclusion that the=20
eroticism of the minorities is a mental construct of the core Han=20
cultural group," Breslin suggests that non-Han minorities deployed=20
sexuality--primitive, exotic, and erotic--as a survival strategy, to=20
avoid paying the even higher price of brutalization and=20
extinction.[5] At the same time, the Han core group co-opted that=20
sexuality into its "five baits" approach by way of avoiding constant=20
war, which would have cost peasants and minorities even more than=20
did playing their part in pacification.  Thus, Breslin's account=20
does, in fact, validate Gladney's point that eroticized, exoticized=20
minorities served as "symbolic capital"  in Chinese state-building=20
and external relations. However, each scholar seems to use a=20
different slide ruler to measure the ultimate morality of the=20
process.=20

Breslin's moral calculus asserting self-preservation of the species=20
as the highest human value also prompts his critique of Gabriel=20
Kolko's "acidly"  expressed characterization of post-war occupied=20
Berlin (p. 147).  In _The Politics of War: The World and United=20
States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945_, Kolko describes a dismal scene:=20
"What the Russians took the Americans bought, until the spoils of=20
war became a common enterprise ... as the Germans sold what little=20
merchandise and honor their men and women had left. Not for the=20
first time or last time, Americans discovered that the misery of=20
others could afford them the pleasures and luxuries of a society=20
built upon chocolate and cigarettes if only one were willing to=20
deprive the Germans of what small virtue they retained."  According=20
to Kolko, black marketeering and advantageous currency transactions=20
meant that "United States troops in the Berlin area shipped out a=20
sum six to seven times their total pay over the same period.  The=20
ultimate German overdraft in this form cost the United States=20
Treasury $271 million before the military stopped it" (p. 147).=20

For Breslin, a longer historical perspective and a different slide=20
ruler create a contrasting picture.  "It would be more accurate to=20
observe that in the Berlin area the Germans bought peace from the=20
American soldiers at a price six to seven times higher than the=20
American government paid its soldiers to kill Germans.  Since the=20
U.S. Treasury bore the cost of this overdraft, the Germans made a=20
good bargain.... 'Honor,' if worth anything at all, ought never be=20
equated solely with stoic resignation to brutality or annihilation.=20
Moreover, the natural, moral imperative for each member of the human=20
species is to keep the species alive, not to manifest 'honor'" (p.=20
147).  Similarly, the "pleasure and companionship traded by Italian=20
women and girls for food" when American troops moved into Italy,=20
undermined U.S. military strength through sexual infection, and=20
generally "softened the Americans," so that "Italy's subsequent=20
political capitulation brought relatively lenient terms" (p. 146).=20

American-occupied Japan was one notable case where the "pleasure=20
exacted proved to be far less efficacious than pleasure transacted"=20
(p. 148). "Having built their empire on the bones of foreigners and=20
their own young men, Japanese authorities sought to sweeten the=20
surrender and muffle the American invasion by sacrificing Japanese=20
women" (p. 148).  Drawing on their earlier conscription of "comfort=20
women" for "the sexually frustrated and harshly disciplined imperial=20
Japanese military forces," Japanese officials had police set up a=20
brothel-bar complex for U.S. troops, mobilizing some 5,000 Japanese=20
women for sexual duties.  However, says Breslin, this boomeranged=20
when "the Americans proved even more rapacious than anticipated and=20
forced themselves on still other Japanese women" (p. 148), leading=20
to high rates of rape, robbery, and murder.=20

Leaving aside the problematic distinction between "rape,"=20
"companionship," and "prostitution" in an inherently coercive=20
setting, one wonders why Breslin, in regards to occupied Tokyo, is=20
as "acidly" moralizing as is Kolko on occupied Berlin.  Perhaps, for=20
Breslin, there is a moral difference between a situation when=20
placation, ingratiation, and proffered sexuality ostensibly came=20
from individuals who chose to yield and sacrifice "honor"  and=20
"virtue," and the situation in Tokyo, when such sacrifices were by=20
official command.  As in other examples throughout the book, the=20
absolute imperative of species self-preservation is not quite the=20
polar star of navigators.=20

Notes=20

[1]. Breslin, quoted in "VP Breslin's Book Focuses on Role of=20
'Pleasure' in Foreign Affairs," NOW@FIU: Alumni Monthly=20
E-Newsletter, February 2002.=20
<http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/alumni/newsletter/2002/feb/breslinbook.htm>=20
(12 December 2002). See also Breslin's very informative 1978=20
interview about his Vietnam-era experiences at the University of=20
Virginia, at <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~UG01/angelo/breslin.html>=20
(28 December 2002).=20

[2]. Thomas A. Breslin, _China, American Catholicism, and the=20
Missionary_ (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press,=20
1980); and Daniel M.  Crane and Thomas A. Breslin, _An Ordinary=20
Relationship: American Opposition to Republican Revolution in China_=20
(Miami: University Press of Florida, 1986).=20

[3]. Information from=20
<http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/breslin.html> (25 December=20
2002).=20

[4]. Breslin, quoted in "VP Breslin's Book Focuses on Role of=20
'Pleasure' in Foreign Affairs," NOW@FIU: Alumni Monthly=20
E-Newsletter, February 2002.=20
<http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/alumni/newsletter/2002/feb/breslinbook.htm>=20
(12 December 2002).=20

[5]. Breslin, 176, n. 3, citing Dru C. Gladney, "Representing=20
Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,"=20
_Journal of Asian Studies_ 53.1 (February 1994), pp. 92-123. Article=20
available at <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~dru/exotic.htm> (1 January=20
2003).=20