[Discussion] Clash of Globalizations

Tue, 21 Jan 2003 11:13:15 -0600

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Clash of Globalizations 

By Stanley Hoffmann

Foreign Affairs ( July/August 2002 )

A NEW PARADIGM?

What is the state of international relations today? In the 1990s,
specialists concentrated on the partial disintegration of the global order's
traditional foundations: states. During that decade, many countries, often
those born of decolonization, revealed themselves to be no more than
pseudostates, without solid institutions, internal cohesion, or national
consciousness. The end of communist coercion in the former Soviet Union and
in the former Yugoslavia also revealed long-hidden ethnic tensions.
Minorities that were or considered themselves oppressed demanded
independence. In Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Haiti, rulers waged open
warfare against their subjects. These wars increased the importance of
humanitarian interventions, which came at the expense of the hallowed
principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention. Thus the dominant
tension of the decade was the clash between the fragmentation of states (and
the state system) and the progress of economic, cultural, and political
integration -- in other words, globalization.

Everybody has understood the events of September 11 as the beginning of a
new era. But what does this break mean? In the conventional approach to
international relations, war took place among states. But in September,
poorly armed individuals suddenly challenged, surprised, and wounded the
world's dominant superpower. The attacks also showed that, for all its
accomplishments, globalization makes an awful form of violence easily
accessible to hopeless fanatics. Terrorism is the bloody link between
interstate relations and global society. As countless individuals and groups
are becoming global actors along with states, insecurity and vulnerability
are rising. To assess today's bleak state of affairs, therefore, several
questions are necessary. What concepts help explain the new global order?
What is the condition of the interstate part of international relations? And
what does the emerging global civil society contribute to world order?

SOUND AND FURY

Two models made a great deal of noise in the 1990s. The first one -- Francis
Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis -- was not vindicated by events. To be
sure, his argument predicted the end of ideological conflicts, not history
itself, and the triumph of political and economic liberalism. That point is
correct in a narrow sense: the "secular religions" that fought each other so
bloodily in the last century are now dead. But Fukuyama failed to note that
nationalism remains very much alive. Moreover, he ignored the explosive
potential of religious wars that has extended to a large part of the Islamic
world.

Fukuyama's academic mentor, the political scientist Samuel Huntington,
provided a few years later a gloomier account that saw a very different
world. Huntington predicted that violence resulting from international
anarchy and the absence of common values and institutions would erupt among
civilizations rather than among states or ideologies. But Huntington's
conception of what constitutes a civilization was hazy. He failed to take
into account sufficiently conflicts within each so-called civilization, and
he overestimated the importance of religion in the behavior of non-Western
elites, who are often secularized and Westernized. Hence he could not
clearly define the link between a civilization and the foreign policies of
its member states.

Other, less sensational models still have adherents. The "realist" orthodoxy
insists that nothing has changed in international relations since Thucydides
and Machiavelli: a state's military and economic power determines its fate;
interdependence and international institutions are secondary and fragile
phenomena; and states' objectives are imposed by the threats to their
survival or security. Such is the world described by Henry Kissinger.
Unfortunately, this venerable model has trouble integrating change,
especially globalization and the rise of nonstate actors. Moreover, it
overlooks the need for international cooperation that results from such new
threats as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And it
ignores what the scholar Raymond Aron called the "germ of a universal
consciousness": the liberal, promarket norms that developed states have come
to hold in common.

Taking Aron's point, many scholars today interpret the world in terms of a
triumphant globalization that submerges borders through new means of
information and communication. In this universe, a state choosing to stay
closed invariably faces decline and growing discontent among its subjects,
who are eager for material progress. But if it opens up, it must accept a
reduced role that is mainly limited to social protection, physical
protection against aggression or civil war, and maintaining national
identity. The champion of this epic without heroes is The New York Times
columnist Thomas Friedman. He contrasts barriers with open vistas,
obsolescence with modernity, state control with free markets. He sees in
globalization the light of dawn, the "golden straitjacket" that will force
contentious publics to understand that the logic of globalization is that of
peace (since war would interrupt globalization and therefore progress) and
democracy (because new technologies increase individual autonomy and
encourage initiative).

BACK TO REALITY

These models come up hard against three realities. First, rivalries among
great powers (and the capacity of smaller states to exploit such tensions)
have most certainly not disappeared. For a while now, however, the existence
of nuclear weapons has produced a certain degree of prudence among the
powers that have them. The risk of destruction that these weapons hold has
moderated the game and turned nuclear arms into instruments of last resort.
But the game could heat up as more states seek other WMD as a way of
narrowing the gap between the nuclear club and the other powers. The sale of
such weapons thus becomes a hugely contentious issue, and efforts to slow
down the spread of all WMD, especially to dangerous "rogue" states, can
paradoxically become new causes of violence.

Second, if wars between states are becoming less common, wars within them
are on the rise -- as seen in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, much of Africa,
and Sri Lanka. Uninvolved states first tend to hesitate to get engaged in
these complex conflicts, but they then (sometimes) intervene to prevent
these conflicts from turning into regional catastrophes. The interveners, in
turn, seek the help of the United Nations or regional organizations to
rebuild these states, promote stability, and prevent future fragmentation
and misery.

Third, states' foreign policies are shaped not only by realist geopolitical
factors such as economics and military power but by domestic politics. Even
in undemocratic regimes, forces such as xenophobic passions, economic
grievances, and transnational ethnic solidarity can make policymaking far
more complex and less predictable. Many states -- especially the United
States -- have to grapple with the frequent interplay of competing
government branches. And the importance of individual leaders and their
personalities is often underestimated in the study of international affairs.

For realists, then, transnational terrorism creates a formidable dilemma. If
a state is the victim of private actors such as terrorists, it will try to
eliminate these groups by depriving them of sanctuaries and punishing the
states that harbor them. The national interest of the attacked state will
therefore require either armed interventions against governments supporting
terrorists or a course of prudence and discreet pressure on other
governments to bring these terrorists to justice. Either option requires a
questioning of sovereignty -- the holy concept of realist theories. The
classical realist universe of Hans Morgenthau and Aron may therefore still
be very much alive in a world of states, but it has increasingly hazy
contours and offers only difficult choices when it faces the threat of
terrorism.

At the same time, the real universe of globalization does not resemble the
one that Friedman celebrates. In fact, globalization has three forms, each
with its own problems. First is economic globalization, which results from
recent revolutions in technology, information, trade, foreign investment,
and international business. The main actors are companies, investors, banks,
and private services industries, as well as states and international
organizations. This present form of capitalism, ironically foreseen by Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels, poses a central dilemma between efficiency and
fairness. The specialization and integration of firms make it possible to
increase aggregate wealth, but the logic of pure capitalism does not favor
social justice. Economic globalization has thus become a formidable cause of
inequality among and within states, and the concern for global
competitiveness limits the aptitude of states and other actors to address
this problem.

Next comes cultural globalization. It stems from the technological
revolution and economic globalization, which together foster the flow of
cultural goods. Here the key choice is between uniformization (often termed
"Americanization") and diversity. The result is both a "disenchantment of
the world" (in Max Weber's words) and a reaction against uniformity. The
latter takes form in a renaissance of local cultures and languages as well
as assaults against Western culture, which is denounced as an arrogant
bearer of a secular, revolutionary ideology and a mask for U.S. hegemony.

Finally there is political globalization, a product of the other two. It is
characterized by the preponderance of the United States and its political
institutions and by a vast array of international and regional organizations
and transgovernmental networks (specializing in areas such as policing or
migration or justice). It is also marked by private institutions that are
neither governmental nor purely national -- say, Doctors Without Borders or
Amnesty International. But many of these agencies lack democratic
accountability and are weak in scope, power, and authority. Furthermore,
much uncertainty hangs over the fate of American hegemony, which faces
significant resistance abroad and is affected by America's own oscillation
between the temptations of domination and isolation.

The benefits of globalization are undeniable. But Friedmanlike optimism
rests on very fragile foundations. For one thing, globalization is neither
inevitable nor irresistible. Rather, it is largely an American creation,
rooted in the period after World War II and based on U.S. economic might. By
extension, then, a deep and protracted economic crisis in the United States
could have as devastating an effect on globalization as did the Great
Depression.

Second, globalization's reach remains limited because it excludes many poor
countries, and the states that it does transform react in different ways.
This fact stems from the diversity of economic and social conditions at home
as well as from partisan politics. The world is far away from a perfect
integration of markets, services, and factors of production. Sometimes the
simple existence of borders slows down and can even paralyze this
integration; at other times it gives integration the flavors and colors of
the dominant state (as in the case of the Internet).

Third, international civil society remains embryonic. Many nongovernmental
organizations reflect only a tiny segment of the populations of their
members' states. They largely represent only modernized countries, or those
in which the weight of the state is not too heavy. Often, NGOs have little
independence from governments.

Fourth, the individual emancipation so dear to Friedman does not quickly
succeed in democratizing regimes, as one can see today in China. Nor does
emancipation prevent public institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization from remaining opaque
in their activities and often arbitrary and unfair in their rulings.

Fifth, the attractive idea of improving the human condition through the
abolition of barriers is dubious. Globalization is in fact only a sum of
techniques (audio and videocassettes, the Internet, instantaneous
communications) that are at the disposal of states or private actors.
Self-interest and ideology, not humanitarian reasons, are what drive these
actors. Their behavior is quite different from the vision of globalization
as an Enlightenment-based utopia that is simultaneously scientific,
rational, and universal. For many reasons -- misery, injustice, humiliation,
attachment to traditions, aspiration to more than just a better standard of
living -- this "Enlightenment" stereotype of globalization thus provokes
revolt and dissatisfaction.

Another contradiction is also at work. On the one hand, international and
transnational cooperation is necessary to ensure that globalization will not
be undermined by the inequalities resulting from market fluctuations, weak
state-sponsored protections, and the incapacity of many states to improve
their fates by themselves. On the other hand, cooperation presupposes that
many states and rich private players operate altruistically -- which is
certainly not the essence of international relations -- or practice a
remarkably generous conception of their long-term interests. But the fact
remains that most rich states still refuse to provide sufficient development
aid or to intervene in crisis situations such as the genocide in Rwanda.
That reluctance compares poorly with the American enthusiasm to pursue the
fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban. What is wrong here is not patriotic
enthusiasm as such, but the weakness of the humanitarian impulse when the
national interest in saving non-American victims is not self-evident.

IMAGINED COMMUNITIES

Among the many effects of globalization on international politics, three
hold particular importance. The first concerns institutions. Contrary to
realist predictions, most states are not perpetually at war with each other.
Many regions and countries live in peace; in other cases, violence is
internal rather than state-to-state. And since no government can do
everything by itself, interstate organisms have emerged. The result, which
can be termed "global society," seeks to reduce the potentially destructive
effects of national regulations on the forces of integration. But it also
seeks to ensure fairness in the world market and create international
regulatory regimes in such areas as trade, communications, human rights,
migration, and refugees. The main obstacle to this effort is the reluctance
of states to accept global directives that might constrain the market or
further reduce their sovereignty. Thus the UN's powers remain limited and
sometimes only purely theoretical. International criminal justice is still
only a spotty and contested last resort. In the world economy -- where the
market, not global governance, has been the main beneficiary of the state's
retreat -- the network of global institutions is fragmented and incomplete.
Foreign investment remains ruled by bilateral agreements. Environmental
protection is badly ensured, and issues such as migration and population
growth are largely ignored. Institutional networks are not powerful enough
to address unfettered short-term capital movements, the lack of
international regulation on bankruptcy and competition, and primitive
coordination among rich countries. In turn, the global "governance" that
does exist is partial and weak at a time when economic globalization
deprives many states of independent monetary and fiscal policies, or it
obliges them to make cruel choices between economic competitiveness and the
preservation of social safety nets. All the while, the United States
displays an increasing impatience toward institutions that weigh on American
freedom of action. Movement toward a world state looks increasingly
unlikely. The more state sovereignty crumbles under the blows of
globalization or such recent developments as humanitarian intervention and
the fight against terrorism, the more states cling to what is left to them.

Second, globalization has not profoundly challenged the enduring national
nature of citizenship. Economic life takes place on a global scale, but
human identity remains national -- hence the strong resistance to cultural
homogenization. Over the centuries, increasingly centralized states have
expanded their functions and tried to forge a sense of common identity for
their subjects. But no central power in the world can do the same thing
today, even in the European Union. There, a single currency and advanced
economic coordination have not yet produced a unified economy or strong
central institutions endowed with legal autonomy, nor have they resulted in
a sense of postnational citizenship. The march from national identity to one
that would be both national and European has only just begun. A world very
partially unified by technology still has no collective consciousness or
collective solidarity. What states are unwilling to do the world market
cannot do all by itself, especially in engendering a sense of world
citizenship.

Third, there is the relationship between globalization and violence. The
traditional state of war, even if it is limited in scope, still persists.
There are high risks of regional explosions in the Middle East and in East
Asia, and these could seriously affect relations between the major powers.
Because of this threat, and because modern arms are increasingly costly, the
"anarchical society" of states lacks the resources to correct some of
globalization's most flagrant flaws. These very costs, combined with the
classic distrust among international actors who prefer to try to preserve
their security alone or through traditional alliances, prevent a more
satisfactory institutionalization of world politics -- for example, an
increase of the UN's powers. This step could happen if global society were
provided with sufficient forces to prevent a conflict or restore peace --
but it is not.

Globalization, far from spreading peace, thus seems to foster conflicts and
resentments. The lowering of various barriers celebrated by Friedman,
especially the spread of global media, makes it possible for the most
deprived or oppressed to compare their fate with that of the free and
well-off. These dispossessed then ask for help from others with common
resentments, ethnic origin, or religious faith. Insofar as globalization
enriches some and uproots many, those who are both poor and uprooted may
seek revenge and self-esteem in terrorism.

GLOBALIZATION AND TERROR

Terrorism is the poisoned fruit of several forces. It can be the weapon of
the weak in a classic conflict among states or within a state, as in Kashmir
or the Palestinian territories. But it can also be seen as a product of
globalization. Transnational terrorism is made possible by the vast array of
communication tools. Islamic terrorism, for example, is not only based on
support for the Palestinian struggle and opposition to an invasive American
presence. It is also fueled by a resistance to "unjust" economic
globalization and to a Western culture deemed threatening to local religions
and cultures.

If globalization often facilitates terrorist violence, the fight against
this war without borders is potentially disastrous for both economic
development and globalization. Antiterrorist measures restrict mobility and
financial flows, while new terrorist attacks could lead the way for an
antiglobalist reaction comparable to the chauvinistic paroxysms of the
1930s. Global terrorism is not the simple extension of war among states to
nonstates. It is the subversion of traditional ways of war because it does
not care about the sovereignty of either its enemies or the allies who
shelter them. It provokes its victims to take measures that, in the name of
legitimate defense, violate knowingly the sovereignty of those states
accused of encouraging terror. (After all, it was not the Taliban's infamous
domestic violations of human rights that led the United States into
Afghanistan; it was the Taliban's support of Osama bin Laden.)

But all those trespasses against the sacred principles of sovereignty do not
constitute progress toward global society, which has yet to agree on a
common definition of terrorism or on a common policy against it. Indeed, the
beneficiaries of the antiterrorist "war" have been the illiberal, poorer
states that have lost so much of their sovereignty of late. Now the
crackdown on terror allows them to tighten their controls on their own
people, products, and money. They can give themselves new reasons to violate
individual rights in the name of common defense against insecurity -- and
thus stop the slow, hesitant march toward international criminal justice.

Another main beneficiary will be the United States, the only actor capable
of carrying the war against terrorism into all corners of the world. Despite
its power, however, America cannot fully protect itself against future
terrorist acts, nor can it fully overcome its ambivalence toward forms of
interstate cooperation that might restrict U.S. freedom of action. Thus
terrorism is a global phenomenon that ultimately reinforces the enemy -- the
state -- at the same time as it tries to destroy it. The states that are its
targets have no interest in applying the laws of war to their fight against
terrorists; they have every interest in treating terrorists as outlaws and
pariahs. The champions of globalization have sometimes glimpsed the "jungle"
aspects of economic globalization, but few observers foresaw similar aspects
in global terrorist and antiterrorist violence.

Finally, the unique position of the United States raises a serious question
over the future of world affairs. In the realm of interstate problems,
American behavior will determine whether the nonsuperpowers and weak states
will continue to look at the United States as a friendly power (or at least
a tolerable hegemon), or whether they are provoked by Washington's hubris
into coalescing against American preponderance. America may be a hegemon,
but combining rhetorical overkill and ill-defined designs is full of risks.
Washington has yet to understand that nothing is more dangerous for a
"hyperpower" than the temptation of unilateralism. It may well believe that
the constraints of international agreements and organizations are not
necessary, since U.S. values and power are all that is needed for world
order. But in reality, those same international constraints provide far
better opportunities for leadership than arrogant demonstrations of contempt
for others' views, and they offer useful ways of restraining unilateralist
behavior in other states. A hegemon concerned with prolonging its rule
should be especially interested in using internationalist methods and
institutions, for the gain in influence far exceeds the loss in freedom of
action.

In the realm of global society, much will depend on whether the United
States will overcome its frequent indifference to the costs that
globalization imposes on poorer countries. For now, Washington is too
reluctant to make resources available for economic development, and it
remains hostile to agencies that monitor and regulate the global market. All
too often, the right-leaning tendencies of the American political system
push U.S. diplomacy toward an excessive reliance on America's greatest asset
-- military strength -- as well as an excessive reliance on market
capitalism and a "sovereigntism" that offends and alienates. That the mighty
United States is so afraid of the world's imposing its "inferior" values on
Americans is often a source of ridicule and indignation abroad.

ODD MAN OUT

For all these tensions, it is still possible that the American war on
terrorism will be contained by prudence, and that other governments will
give priority to the many internal problems created by interstate rivalries
and the flaws of globalization. But the world risks being squeezed between a
new Scylla and Charybdis. The Charybdis is universal intervention,
unilaterally decided by American leaders who are convinced that they have
found a global mission provided by a colossal threat. Presentable as an epic
contest between good and evil, this struggle offers the best way of rallying
the population and overcoming domestic divisions. The Scylla is resignation
to universal chaos in the form of new attacks by future bin Ladens, fresh
humanitarian disasters, or regional wars that risk escalation. Only through
wise judgment can the path between them be charted.

We can analyze the present, but we cannot predict the future. We live in a
world where a society of uneven and often virtual states overlaps with a
global society burdened by weak public institutions and underdeveloped civil
society. A single power dominates, but its economy could become unmanageable
or distrupted by future terrorist attacks. Thus to predict the future
confidently would be highly incautious or naive. To be sure, the world has
survived many crises, but it has done so at a very high price, even in times
when WMD were not available.

Precisely because the future is neither decipherable nor determined,
students of international relations face two missions. They must try to
understand what goes on by taking an inventory of current goods and
disentangling the threads of present networks. But the fear of confusing the
empirical with the normative should not prevent them from writing as
political philosophers at a time when many philosophers are extending their
conceptions of just society to international relations. How can one make the
global house more livable? The answer presupposes a political philosophy
that would be both just and acceptable even to those whose values have other
foundations. As the late philosopher Judith Shklar did, we can take as a
point of departure and as a guiding thread the fate of the victims of
violence, oppression, and misery; as a goal, we should seek material and
moral emancipation. While taking into account the formidable constraints of
the world as it is, it is possible to loosen them.

Stanley Hoffmann is Buttenwieser University Professor at Harvard University
and a regular book reviewer for Foreign Affairs.

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font-family:Arial'>By </span></font><st1:City><st1:place><font size=3D2
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Hoffmann<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

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<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
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font-family:Arial'>A NEW PARADIGM?<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

What is the state of international relations today? =
In the
1990s, specialists concentrated on the partial disintegration of the =
global
order's traditional foundations: states. During that decade, many =
countries,
often those born of decolonization, revealed themselves to be no more =
than
pseudostates, without solid institutions, internal cohesion, or =
national
consciousness. The end of communist coercion in the former =
<st1:place>Soviet
 Union</st1:place> and in the former =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Yugoslavia</s=
t1:place></st1:country-region> also
revealed long-hidden ethnic tensions. Minorities that were or =
considered
themselves oppressed demanded independence. In =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Iraq</st1:pla=
ce></st1:country-region>, =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Sudan</st1:pl=
ace></st1:country-region>, =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Afghanistan</=
st1:place></st1:country-region>, and =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Haiti</st1:pl=
ace></st1:country-region>, rulers
waged open warfare against their subjects. These wars increased the =
importance
of humanitarian interventions, which came at the expense of the =
hallowed
principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention. Thus the =
dominant
tension of the decade was the clash between the fragmentation of states =
(and
the state system) and the progress of economic, cultural, and political
integration -- in other words, =
globalization.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Everybody has understood the events of September 11 =
as the
beginning of a new era. But what does this break mean? In the =
conventional
approach to international relations, war took place among states. But =
in
September, poorly armed individuals suddenly challenged, surprised, and =
wounded
the world's dominant superpower. The attacks also showed that, for all =
its
accomplishments, globalization makes an awful form of violence easily
accessible to hopeless fanatics. Terrorism is the bloody link between
interstate relations and global society. As countless individuals and =
groups
are becoming global actors along with states, insecurity and =
vulnerability are
rising. To assess today's bleak state of affairs, therefore, several =
questions
are necessary. What concepts help explain the new global order? What is =
the
condition of the interstate part of international relations? And what =
does the
emerging global civil society contribute to world =
order?<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>SOUND AND FURY<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Two models made a great deal of noise in the 1990s. =
The
first one -- Francis Fukuyama's &quot;End of History&quot; thesis -- =
was not
vindicated by events. To be sure, his argument predicted the end of =
ideological
conflicts, not history itself, and the triumph of political and =
economic
liberalism. That point is correct in a narrow sense: the &quot;secular
religions&quot; that fought each other so bloodily in the last century =
are now
dead. But <st1:City><st1:place>Fukuyama</st1=
:place></st1:City> failed to
note that nationalism remains very much alive. Moreover, he ignored the
explosive potential of religious wars that has extended to a large part =
of the
Islamic world.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<st1:City><st1:place>Fukuyama</st1=
:place></st1:City>'s academic
mentor, the political scientist Samuel Huntington, provided a few years =
later a
gloomier account that saw a very different world. =
<st1:City><st1:place>Huntington</s=
t1:place></st1:City> predicted
that violence resulting from international anarchy and the absence of =
common
values and institutions would erupt among civilizations rather than =
among
states or ideologies. But <st1:City><st1:place>Huntington</s=
t1:place></st1:City>'s conception
of what constitutes a civilization was hazy. He failed to take into =
account
sufficiently conflicts within each so-called civilization, and he =
overestimated
the importance of religion in the behavior of non-Western elites, who =
are often
secularized and Westernized. Hence he could not clearly define the link =
between
a civilization and the foreign policies of its member =
states.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Other, less sensational models still have adherents. =
The
&quot;realist&quot; orthodoxy insists that nothing has changed in =
international
relations since Thucydides and Machiavelli: a state's military and =
economic
power determines its fate; interdependence and international =
institutions are
secondary and fragile phenomena; and states' objectives are imposed by =
the
threats to their survival or security. Such is the world described by =
Henry
Kissinger. Unfortunately, this venerable model has trouble integrating =
change,
especially globalization and the rise of nonstate actors. Moreover, it
overlooks the need for international cooperation that results from such =
new
threats as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And =
it
ignores what the scholar Raymond Aron called the &quot;germ of a =
universal
consciousness&quot;: the liberal, promarket norms that developed states =
have
come to hold in common.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Taking Aron's point, many scholars today interpret =
the world
in terms of a triumphant globalization that submerges borders through =
new means
of information and communication. In this universe, a state choosing to =
stay
closed invariably faces decline and growing discontent among its =
subjects, who
are eager for material progress. But if it opens up, it must accept a =
reduced
role that is mainly limited to social protection, physical protection =
against
aggression or civil war, and maintaining national identity. The =
champion of
this epic without heroes is The New York Times columnist Thomas =
Friedman. He
contrasts barriers with open vistas, obsolescence with modernity, state =
control
with free markets. He sees in globalization the light of dawn, the =
&quot;golden
straitjacket&quot; that will force contentious publics to understand =
that the
logic of globalization is that of peace (since war would interrupt
globalization and therefore progress) and democracy (because new =
technologies
increase individual autonomy and encourage =
initiative).<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>BACK TO REALITY<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

These models come up hard against three realities. =
First,
rivalries among great powers (and the capacity of smaller states to =
exploit
such tensions) have most certainly not disappeared. For a while now, =
however,
the existence of nuclear weapons has produced a certain degree of =
prudence
among the powers that have them. The risk of destruction that these =
weapons
hold has moderated the game and turned nuclear arms into instruments of =
last
resort. But the game could heat up as more states seek other WMD as a =
way of
narrowing the gap between the nuclear club and the other powers. The =
sale of
such weapons thus becomes a hugely contentious issue, and efforts to =
slow down
the spread of all WMD, especially to dangerous &quot;rogue&quot; =
states, can
paradoxically become new causes of =
violence.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Second, if wars between states are becoming less =
common,
wars within them are on the rise -- as seen in the former =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Yugoslavia</s=
t1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:countr=
y-region><st1:place>Iraq</st1:pla=
ce></st1:country-region>, much of =
<st1:place>Africa</st1:p=
lace>, and =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Sri =
Lanka</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Uninvolved
states first tend to hesitate to get engaged in these complex =
conflicts, but
they then (sometimes) intervene to prevent these conflicts from turning =
into
regional catastrophes. The interveners, in turn, seek the help of the =
United
Nations or regional organizations to rebuild these states, promote =
stability,
and prevent future fragmentation and =
misery.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Third, states' foreign policies are shaped not only =
by
realist geopolitical factors such as economics and military power but =
by
domestic politics. Even in undemocratic regimes, forces such as =
xenophobic
passions, economic grievances, and transnational ethnic solidarity can =
make
policymaking far more complex and less predictable. Many states -- =
especially
the <st1:country-region><st1:place>United =
States</st1:place></st1:country-region> -- have to
grapple with the frequent interplay of competing government branches. =
And the
importance of individual leaders and their personalities is often
underestimated in the study of international =
affairs.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

For realists, then, transnational terrorism creates =
a
formidable dilemma. If a state is the victim of private actors such as
terrorists, it will try to eliminate these groups by depriving them of
sanctuaries and punishing the states that harbor them. The national =
interest of
the attacked state will therefore require either armed interventions =
against
governments supporting terrorists or a course of prudence and discreet =
pressure
on other governments to bring these terrorists to justice. Either =
option
requires a questioning of sovereignty -- the holy concept of realist =
theories.
The classical realist universe of Hans Morgenthau and Aron may =
therefore still
be very much alive in a world of states, but it has increasingly hazy =
contours
and offers only difficult choices when it faces the threat of =
terrorism.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

At the same time, the real universe of globalization =
does
not resemble the one that Friedman celebrates. In fact, globalization =
has three
forms, each with its own problems. First is economic globalization, =
which
results from recent revolutions in technology, information, trade, =
foreign
investment, and international business. The main actors are companies,
investors, banks, and private services industries, as well as states =
and
international organizations. This present form of capitalism, =
ironically
foreseen by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, poses a central dilemma =
between
efficiency and fairness. The specialization and integration of firms =
make it
possible to increase aggregate wealth, but the logic of pure capitalism =
does
not favor social justice. Economic globalization has thus become a =
formidable
cause of inequality among and within states, and the concern for global
competitiveness limits the aptitude of states and other actors to =
address this
problem.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Next comes cultural globalization. It stems from the
technological revolution and economic globalization, which together =
foster the
flow of cultural goods. Here the key choice is between uniformization =
(often
termed &quot;Americanization&quot;) and diversity. The result is both a
&quot;disenchantment of the world&quot; (in Max Weber's words) and a =
reaction
against uniformity. The latter takes form in a renaissance of local =
cultures
and languages as well as assaults against Western culture, which is =
denounced
as an arrogant bearer of a secular, revolutionary ideology and a mask =
for <st1:country-region><st1:place>U.S.</st1:pla=
ce></st1:country-region> =
hegemony.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Finally there is political globalization, a product =
of the
other two. It is characterized by the preponderance of the =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region> and its political =
institutions and
by a vast array of international and regional organizations and
transgovernmental networks (specializing in areas such as policing or =
migration
or justice). It is also marked by private institutions that are neither
governmental nor purely national -- say, Doctors Without Borders or =
Amnesty
International. But many of these agencies lack democratic =
accountability and
are weak in scope, power, and authority. Furthermore, much uncertainty =
hangs
over the fate of American hegemony, which faces significant resistance =
abroad
and is affected by <st1:country-region><st1:place>America</st1:=
place></st1:country-region>'s own
oscillation between the temptations of domination and =
isolation.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

The benefits of globalization are undeniable. But
Friedmanlike optimism rests on very fragile foundations. For one thing,
globalization is neither inevitable nor irresistible. Rather, it is =
largely an
American creation, rooted in the period after World War II and based on =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>U.S.</st1:pla=
ce></st1:country-region> economic
might. By extension, then, a deep and protracted economic crisis in the =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region> could have as devastating =
an effect
on globalization as did the Great =
Depression.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Second, globalization's reach remains limited =
because it
excludes many poor countries, and the states that it does transform =
react in
different ways. This fact stems from the diversity of economic and =
social
conditions at home as well as from partisan politics. The world is far =
away
from a perfect integration of markets, services, and factors of =
production.
Sometimes the simple existence of borders slows down and can even =
paralyze this
integration; at other times it gives integration the flavors and colors =
of the
dominant state (as in the case of the =
Internet).<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Third, international civil society remains =
embryonic. Many
nongovernmental organizations reflect only a tiny segment of the =
populations of
their members' states. They largely represent only modernized =
countries, or
those in which the weight of the state is not too heavy. Often, NGOs =
have
little independence from governments.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Fourth, the individual emancipation so dear to =
Friedman does
not quickly succeed in democratizing regimes, as one can see today in =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>China</st1:pl=
ace></st1:country-region>. Nor does
emancipation prevent public institutions such as the International =
Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization from remaining =
opaque in
their activities and often arbitrary and unfair in their =
rulings.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Fifth, the attractive idea of improving the human =
condition
through the abolition of barriers is dubious. Globalization is in fact =
only a
sum of techniques (audio and videocassettes, the Internet, =
instantaneous
communications) that are at the disposal of states or private actors.
Self-interest and ideology, not humanitarian reasons, are what drive =
these
actors. Their behavior is quite different from the vision of =
globalization as
an Enlightenment-based utopia that is simultaneously scientific, =
rational, and
universal. For many reasons -- misery, injustice, humiliation, =
attachment to
traditions, aspiration to more than just a better standard of living -- =
this &quot;Enlightenment&quot;
stereotype of globalization thus provokes revolt and =
dissatisfaction.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Another contradiction is also at work. On the one =
hand,
international and transnational cooperation is necessary to ensure that
globalization will not be undermined by the inequalities resulting from =
market
fluctuations, weak state-sponsored protections, and the incapacity of =
many
states to improve their fates by themselves. On the other hand, =
cooperation
presupposes that many states and rich private players operate =
altruistically --
which is certainly not the essence of international relations -- or =
practice a
remarkably generous conception of their long-term interests. But the =
fact
remains that most rich states still refuse to provide sufficient =
development
aid or to intervene in crisis situations such as the genocide in =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Rwanda</st1:p=
lace></st1:country-region>. That
reluctance compares poorly with the American enthusiasm to pursue the =
fight
against al Qaeda and the Taliban. What is wrong here is not patriotic
enthusiasm as such, but the weakness of the humanitarian impulse when =
the
national interest in saving non-American victims is not =
self-evident.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>IMAGINED COMMUNITIES<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Among the many effects of globalization on =
international
politics, three hold particular importance. The first concerns =
institutions.
Contrary to realist predictions, most states are not perpetually at war =
with
each other. Many regions and countries live in peace; in other cases, =
violence
is internal rather than state-to-state. And since no government can do
everything by itself, interstate organisms have emerged. The result, =
which can
be termed &quot;global society,&quot; seeks to reduce the potentially
destructive effects of national regulations on the forces of =
integration. But
it also seeks to ensure fairness in the world market and create =
international
regulatory regimes in such areas as trade, communications, human =
rights,
migration, and refugees. The main obstacle to this effort is the =
reluctance of
states to accept global directives that might constrain the market or =
further
reduce their sovereignty. Thus the UN's powers remain limited and =
sometimes
only purely theoretical. International criminal justice is still only a =
spotty
and contested last resort. In the world economy -- where the market, =
not global
governance, has been the main beneficiary of the state's retreat -- the =
network
of global institutions is fragmented and incomplete. Foreign investment =
remains
ruled by bilateral agreements. Environmental protection is badly =
ensured, and
issues such as migration and population growth are largely ignored.
Institutional networks are not powerful enough to address unfettered =
short-term
capital movements, the lack of international regulation on bankruptcy =
and
competition, and primitive coordination among rich countries. In turn, =
the
global &quot;governance&quot; that does exist is partial and weak at a =
time
when economic globalization deprives many states of independent =
monetary and
fiscal policies, or it obliges them to make cruel choices between =
economic
competitiveness and the preservation of social safety nets. All the =
while, the <st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region> displays an increasing =
impatience
toward institutions that weigh on American freedom of action. Movement =
toward a
world state looks increasingly unlikely. The more state sovereignty =
crumbles
under the blows of globalization or such recent developments as =
humanitarian
intervention and the fight against terrorism, the more states cling to =
what is
left to them.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Second, globalization has not profoundly challenged =
the
enduring national nature of citizenship. Economic life takes place on a =
global
scale, but human identity remains national -- hence the strong =
resistance to
cultural homogenization. Over the centuries, increasingly centralized =
states
have expanded their functions and tried to forge a sense of common =
identity for
their subjects. But no central power in the world can do the same thing =
today,
even in the European Union. There, a single currency and advanced =
economic
coordination have not yet produced a unified economy or strong central
institutions endowed with legal autonomy, nor have they resulted in a =
sense of
postnational citizenship. The march from national identity to one that =
would be
both national and European has only just begun. A world very partially =
unified
by technology still has no collective consciousness or collective =
solidarity.
What states are unwilling to do the world market cannot do all by =
itself,
especially in engendering a sense of world =
citizenship.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Third, there is the relationship between =
globalization and
violence. The traditional state of war, even if it is limited in scope, =
still
persists. There are high risks of regional explosions in the =
<st1:place>Middle =
East</st1:place> and in =
<st1:place>East =
Asia</st1:place>, and these
could seriously affect relations between the major powers. Because of =
this
threat, and because modern arms are increasingly costly, the =
&quot;anarchical
society&quot; of states lacks the resources to correct some of =
globalization's
most flagrant flaws. These very costs, combined with the classic =
distrust among
international actors who prefer to try to preserve their security alone =
or
through traditional alliances, prevent a more satisfactory =
institutionalization
of world politics -- for example, an increase of the UN's powers. This =
step
could happen if global society were provided with sufficient forces to =
prevent
a conflict or restore peace -- but it is =
not.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Globalization, far from spreading peace, thus seems =
to
foster conflicts and resentments. The lowering of various barriers =
celebrated
by Friedman, especially the spread of global media, makes it possible =
for the
most deprived or oppressed to compare their fate with that of the free =
and
well-off. These dispossessed then ask for help from others with common
resentments, ethnic origin, or religious faith. Insofar as =
globalization
enriches some and uproots many, those who are both poor and uprooted =
may seek
revenge and self-esteem in terrorism.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>GLOBALIZATION AND =
TERROR<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Terrorism is the poisoned fruit of several forces. =
It can be
the weapon of the weak in a classic conflict among states or within a =
state, as
in <st1:place>Kashmir</st1:place> or the =
Palestinian
territories. But it can also be seen as a product of globalization.
Transnational terrorism is made possible by the vast array of =
communication
tools. Islamic terrorism, for example, is not only based on support for =
the
Palestinian struggle and opposition to an invasive American presence. =
It is
also fueled by a resistance to &quot;unjust&quot; economic =
globalization and to
a Western culture deemed threatening to local religions and =
cultures.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

If globalization often facilitates terrorist =
violence, the
fight against this war without borders is potentially disastrous for =
both
economic development and globalization. Antiterrorist measures restrict
mobility and financial flows, while new terrorist attacks could lead =
the way
for an antiglobalist reaction comparable to the chauvinistic paroxysms =
of the
1930s. Global terrorism is not the simple extension of war among states =
to
nonstates. It is the subversion of traditional ways of war because it =
does not
care about the sovereignty of either its enemies or the allies who =
shelter
them. It provokes its victims to take measures that, in the name of =
legitimate
defense, violate knowingly the sovereignty of those states accused of
encouraging terror. (After all, it was not the Taliban's infamous =
domestic
violations of human rights that led the =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region> into =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>Afghanistan</=
st1:place></st1:country-region>; it was the
Taliban's support of Osama bin Laden.)<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

But all those trespasses against the sacred =
principles of
sovereignty do not constitute progress toward global society, which has =
yet to
agree on a common definition of terrorism or on a common policy against =
it.
Indeed, the beneficiaries of the antiterrorist &quot;war&quot; have =
been the
illiberal, poorer states that have lost so much of their sovereignty of =
late.
Now the crackdown on terror allows them to tighten their controls on =
their own
people, products, and money. They can give themselves new reasons to =
violate
individual rights in the name of common defense against insecurity -- =
and thus
stop the slow, hesitant march toward international criminal =
justice.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Another main beneficiary will be the =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the only actor capable =
of carrying
the war against terrorism into all corners of the world. Despite its =
power,
however, <st1:country-region><st1:place>America</st1:=
place></st1:country-region> cannot
fully protect itself against future terrorist acts, nor can it fully =
overcome
its ambivalence toward forms of interstate cooperation that might =
restrict <st1:country-region><st1:place>U.S.</st1:pla=
ce></st1:country-region> freedom of
action. Thus terrorism is a global phenomenon that ultimately =
reinforces the
enemy -- the state -- at the same time as it tries to destroy it. The =
states
that are its targets have no interest in applying the laws of war to =
their
fight against terrorists; they have every interest in treating =
terrorists as
outlaws and pariahs. The champions of globalization have sometimes =
glimpsed the
&quot;jungle&quot; aspects of economic globalization, but few observers =
foresaw
similar aspects in global terrorist and antiterrorist =
violence.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Finally, the unique position of the =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region> raises a serious question =
over the
future of world affairs. In the realm of interstate problems, American =
behavior
will determine whether the nonsuperpowers and weak states will continue =
to look
at the United States as a friendly power (or at least a tolerable =
hegemon), or
whether they are provoked by Washington's hubris into coalescing =
against
American preponderance. =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>America</st1:=
place></st1:country-region> may be a hegemon,
but combining rhetorical overkill and ill-defined designs is full of =
risks. <st1:State><st1:place>Washington</s=
t1:place></st1:State> has yet to
understand that nothing is more dangerous for a &quot;hyperpower&quot; =
than the
temptation of unilateralism. It may well believe that the constraints =
of
international agreements and organizations are not necessary, since =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>U.S.</st1:pla=
ce></st1:country-region> values and
power are all that is needed for world order. But in reality, those =
same
international constraints provide far better opportunities for =
leadership than
arrogant demonstrations of contempt for others' views, and they offer =
useful
ways of restraining unilateralist behavior in other states. A hegemon =
concerned
with prolonging its rule should be especially interested in using
internationalist methods and institutions, for the gain in influence =
far
exceeds the loss in freedom of action.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

In the realm of global society, much will depend on =
whether
the <st1:country-region><st1:place>United =
States</st1:place></st1:country-region> will
overcome its frequent indifference to the costs that globalization =
imposes on
poorer countries. For now, <st1:State><st1:place>Washington</s=
t1:place></st1:State> is too
reluctant to make resources available for economic development, and it =
remains
hostile to agencies that monitor and regulate the global market. All =
too often,
the right-leaning tendencies of the American political system push U.S.
diplomacy toward an excessive reliance on America's greatest asset -- =
military
strength -- as well as an excessive reliance on market capitalism and a
&quot;sovereigntism&quot; that offends and alienates. That the mighty =
<st1:country-region><st1:place>United
 States</st1:place></st1:country-region> is so afraid of the =
world's
imposing its &quot;inferior&quot; values on Americans is often a source =
of
ridicule and indignation abroad.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>ODD MAN OUT<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

For all these tensions, it is still possible that =
the
American war on terrorism will be contained by prudence, and that other
governments will give priority to the many internal problems created by
interstate rivalries and the flaws of globalization. But the world =
risks being
squeezed between a new Scylla and Charybdis. The Charybdis is universal
intervention, unilaterally decided by American leaders who are =
convinced that
they have found a global mission provided by a colossal threat. =
Presentable as
an epic contest between good and evil, this struggle offers the best =
way of
rallying the population and overcoming domestic divisions. The Scylla =
is
resignation to universal chaos in the form of new attacks by future bin =
Ladens,
fresh humanitarian disasters, or regional wars that risk escalation. =
Only
through wise judgment can the path between them be =
charted.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

We can analyze the present, but we cannot predict =
the
future. We live in a world where a society of uneven and often virtual =
states
overlaps with a global society burdened by weak public institutions and
underdeveloped civil society. A single power dominates, but its economy =
could
become unmanageable or distrupted by future terrorist attacks. Thus to =
predict
the future confidently would be highly incautious or naive. To be sure, =
the
world has survived many crises, but it has done so at a very high =
price, even
in times when WMD were not available.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

Precisely because the future is neither decipherable =
nor
determined, students of international relations face two missions. They =
must
try to understand what goes on by taking an inventory of current goods =
and
disentangling the threads of present networks. But the fear of =
confusing the
empirical with the normative should not prevent them from writing as =
political
philosophers at a time when many philosophers are extending their =
conceptions
of just society to international relations. How can one make the global =
house
more livable? The answer presupposes a political philosophy that would =
be both
just and acceptable even to those whose values have other foundations. =
As the
late philosopher Judith Shklar did, we can take as a point of departure =
and as
a guiding thread the fate of the victims of violence, oppression, and =
misery;
as a goal, we should seek material and moral emancipation. While taking =
into
account the formidable constraints of the world as it is, it is =
possible to
loosen them.<o:p></o:p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'>Stanley Hoffmann is Buttenwieser University =
Professor at </span></font><st1:place><st1:PlaceName><font
  size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>Harvard</span></font></st1:=
PlaceName><font
 size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> =
</span></font><st1:PlaceType><font
  size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'>University</span></font></s=
t1:PlaceType></st1:place><font
size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Arial'> and a
regular book reviewer for Foreign Affairs.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><font size=3D2 face=3DArial><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Arial'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></font></p>

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