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[Paksoy, Hb]

http://www.claremont.org/writings/crb/fall2002/blitzintel.html
The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals
Reviews of The Reckless Mind: Intellectuals in Politics, by Mark Lilla, =
and
Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl L=F6with, Hans Jonas, and =
Herbert
Marcuse, by Richard Wolin.
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	 <<...OLE_Obj...>> 	 <<...OLE_Obj...>> 	By Mark Blitz Posted
September 9, 2002 This review appears in the Fall 2002 issue of the
Claremont Review of Books.
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What is the political responsibility of serious intellectuals? What =
should
those who consider matters not as specialists but broadly or even
philosophically attempt to achieve politically through their teachings =
and
actions?=20
The two books before us, Mark Lilla's The Reckless Mind
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0940322765/theclaremontinst> =
and
Richard Wolin's Heidegger's Children
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0691070199/theclaremontinst>, =
are
concerned with these problems as they appear to several thinkers =
affected by
Martin Heidegger. Lilla considers Carl Schmitt, Alexandre Koj=E8ve, =
Walter
Benjamin, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and to a lesser extent =
Hannah
Arendt, Karl Jaspers, and Heidegger himself. Lilla's theme and summary
chapter concern intellectuals' proclivity to tyranny. Wolin looks at =
Arendt,
Karl L=F6with, Hans Jonas, Herbert Marcuse and, at some length, =
Heidegger: his
theme is the reaction of Heidegger's Jewish students to his Nazism, and =
the
continued influence on their own political thinking of the illiberal =
milieu
that he reflected.=20
Although all these thinkers are gifted, few deserve truly extended =
study. I
say this despite the fact that each is more penetrating than nearly =
anyone
writing today. We are declining from our decline. In a sense both Lilla =
and
Wolin recognize this, precisely because they state the themes I have
mentioned rather than claiming to be guided fully by the thinkers' own
purposes.=20
As it turns out, the themes themselves are pursued fitfully. Each is at =
best
a minimally developed program. Neither is a firmly guiding =
compositional
motif. This surely is connected to the books' origins, Lilla's as =
separate
articles in the New York Review of Books and Times Literary Supplement =
and
several of Wolin's in The New Republic. Other themes-Lilla's analysis =
of the
theological interest of several of his subjects and Wolin's of the =
common
intellectual and historical roots of their illiberal political =
attitudes-are
equally interesting and no less (or more) developed. No question, =
however,
is truly pressed: even Lilla's concluding discussion of tyranny and
philosophy makes no reference to the thinkers he discussed earlier.=20
Although Wolin does not work through his theme, the issues I mentioned =
do
structure his approach. The result is that his discussions of Arendt,
L=F6with, Jonas, and Marcuse are not complete, nor are they meant to be
complete. One cannot read his book to receive a full description of =
their
thought. He writes as an intellectual historian, moreover, so he =
sometimes
verges on reducing his subjects to their origins. That said, his =
pursuit,
however episodic, of the question of Heidegger's continuing effect on =
his
Jewish students leads him to pay attention to L=F6with and Jonas who in =
this
country are too often ignored, and to deal critically and convincingly =
with
Arendt's work on totalitarianism and the Eichmann trial. These are
significant contributions.=20
Lilla's theme is less a matter of intellectual history and more an =
attempt
to look at intellectuals through the perspective of a single problem.
Although he does not truly pursue the issue of tyranny his approach =
leads
him to consider his authors more completely than Wolin, and often with =
an
eye toward larger concerns. He raises questions, however briefly, about =
the
truth of their positions and not only their origins. His discussions,
nonetheless, sometimes betray their own genesis, because their quality =
is to
a degree dependent on the quality of the books that occasioned them. =
This
difficulty is especially prominent when he covers Arendt, Heidegger, =
and
Jaspers in a single chapter, prompted by letters among the three of =
them.
His analysis here stays largely on the surface analytically and in the =
case
of Heidegger is misleading. That said, Lilla's approach to the affair
between Arendt and Heidegger is much more balanced, mature, and free of
ideological nonsense than that of most other critics. His other =
chapters,
moreover, are deeper and more acute. All are intelligent, fair-minded, =
and
properly critical, some (for example on Benjamin and Foucault) are nice
examples of how to understand sympathetically a thinker with whom one
disagrees, and two (the chapters on Schmitt and Foucault) are in my =
judgment
the best comprehensive short discussions that currently exist.=20
I
The first and in a sense the final responsibility of intellectuals, qua
intellectuals, is to secure and improve as best they can in their own
circumstances the conditions that make their enterprise possible.
Self-interest fully and properly grasped will lead them to a =
fundamental
moderation, from which, occasionally, an appropriate radical action =
might
follow. Ultimately, this requires that intellectuals need to consider =
two
things, their own enterprise at its peak or in its best light; and the
effects on each other of intellectual effort, on the one hand, and a
reasonably free and virtuous political life, on the other. The =
difficulty
with all or almost all the thinkers that Wolin and Lilla discuss is =
their
failure properly to consider these two issues.=20
The first consideration requires that the full meaning, significance, =
and,
consequently, the full radicalism of philosophical inquiry come clearly
enough into view that one can judge honestly the justification and =
intention
of one's own lesser efforts. If this does not occur, the characteristic
distortions of philosophic inquiry, the characteristic sophistries that
Plato explores in his Sophist and Republic, will take root. The =
difference
between intellectualism however impressive and philosophy, which seeks
nothing except the truth about what is, will be passed over or denied.
Sophistries will not be seen for what they are or will be mistaken for =
the
real thing. The radicalism of unbridled inquiry will congeal into the
half-true assertion that categories, distinctions, indeed all important
articulations are conventional. The search for what truly is highest =
will
exhaust itself and rest content with bogus theology. The obviously
unconventional place of the philosopher, moreover, will transform =
itself
into the fashionable effort to shock. The strange dignity or prominence =
of
the philosopher will become willful peculiarity or isolation. Even the
philosophic attempt to find out what is simply natural is prone to
distortion when the natural is seen only as unconventional spontaneity, =
or
only as the material or environmental. In one way or the other each of =
the
intellectuals discussed in these books exemplifies these distortions.=20
The second consideration requires not just that the highest aspiration =
of
the intellectual life be understood but that the elements of good =
politics
be grasped. The connection between the two must then be fully thought
through. When this does not happen, the characteristic distortions of
political understanding and of the intellectuals' view of their =
political
place occur that Plato explores in his Statesman and Republic. Thinkers =
come
to believe that their radical schemes for perfection actually can take =
place
in the flesh because they do not face the inevitable limits of =
political
life, a life based not only on the wish to be just but also on opinion,
fraud, and force. Or, having discovered politics to be imperfect, they =
come
to believe it to be nothing but force and deceit. At the same time, =
they
tend at least today to assume that the prestige of science and of
intellectual life mean that these will go on safely forever. For these
reasons, the differences between what intellectuals think and what they
should do politically, and the dangers of their extremism to themselves =
and
others often are ignored, just as the difference between how they use =
their
minds and the true goal that justifies the radical intellect is set =
aside.
Ultimately it is only a proper understanding of the true meaning of =
free
thought and its conditions that can enable thinkers to avoid these
distortions and to remain both radical in their own domain and =
appropriately
moderate politically.=20
II
This sketch of the political-philosophical problem obviously owes much =
to
Leo Strauss's understanding of Plato. His view in turn owes more than a
little to the territory opened by Heidegger, although most of =
Heidegger's
students and their own students failed to explore it adequately. We =
will
further improve our grasp of the issues that motivated most of the =
authors
about whom Lilla and Wolin write if we recreate for a moment the =
perspective
of a student studying with Heidegger, when he himself was young.=20
>From such a standpoint, several things would have looked remarkable. By =
the
time they came to his courses in their very early 20s or even as with =
Hannah
Arendt in her teens, Heidegger's students would have read old books
seriously and completely, often in the original. What precisely these =
books
had to teach, however, why exactly they were being read beyond the =
general
desire for culture or education, would not have been clear. In Kant's =
case
it was evident enough that the neo-Kantians-figures such as Cohen, =
Natorp,
Windleband and Cassirer-believed that he had something to say. In other
cases this was less obvious. Who, after all, taught Plato and =
Aristotle, the
twin pillars of thinking, as if they pointed to, grappled with, or =
answered
the most vital questions? Heidegger's most visible initial impact was =
to
make ancient thinkers come alive, to treat them with concentrated =
passion.
It is not that what he said was clear-L=F6with and Jonas report that =
the
mystery was part of the attraction-but that he (who so visibly excelled =
his
contemporaries) treated them as indispensable. The so-called history of
philosophy was a vital part of philosophy itself. Although Heidegger is =
now
often treated as if he plays with texts willfully, he in fact normally =
does
not. His care should be visible to anyone-at least up through the =
courses he
offered on Nietzsche that lasted well into the 1940s and were published =
in
1961. His lectures on Plato's Sophist, with their painstaking analysis =
both
of the Sophist and of the sixth book of Aristotle's Ethics, are the =
most
obvious example of this care, and they are lectures L=F6with would have
attended and of which Arendt, Jonas, Marcuse, and Koj=E8ve would have =
been
aware.=20
This is not to say that Heidegger usually comments on these books =
completely
from beginning to end or that finding another author's intention is his
final goal. But his teaching always revolved around careful discussions =
with
others. The result was that for his generation Heidegger saved great =
minds
from ossification. Reading texts carefully, taking the ancients =
seriously,
seeing what actually was at stake in Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and =
Nietzsche
became in one way or the other a hallmark of Heidegger's students. The
arbitrariness of Derrida one generation removed can be laid only =
indirectly
at Heidegger's door. His more immediate students, both those Wolin and =
Lilla
discuss and Hans Gadamer, Jacob Klein, and still others in Heidegger's
orbit, learned to take old books with deep concern. One wonders if =
Strauss's
exquisite care in reading texts would have occurred when and as it did =
apart
from Heidegger's teaching.=20
Today, of course, we face this same question of the purpose of old =
books,
but our circumstances are in some ways more dire. While it was easy =
then for
old books to be read simply as old, as part of a normal tradition of
education, few today have read these books to begin with. "Great" books
labor under the contempt of Derrida and Heidegger's other
step-grandchildren. Strauss and other counter examples are not =
sufficiently
influential. Whereas Heidegger helped make clear why such books were =
being
read by those already conditioned to read them, it is difficult today =
to
find people who have read very many of these books at all or believe =
they
should. Who can wish to read well who does not first wish to read? This =
is
one of the ways in which the condition of "culture" generally, i.e. the
condition not just of the intellect but of politics in the widest =
sense,
must concern those who aspire to philosophy.=20
III
A student is interested not only in books but in their ideas, or more
precisely he is finally interested in books because he is interested in
ideas. Are the ideas vital, central, and urgent or are they the merely
inherited topics and conundrums that define an academic field? Is =
philosophy
an activity of immense urgency or merely a set of games at which one is
better or worse and from which one can earn a living and live =
respectably or
even outrageously, but in any event securely?=20
Heidegger did not merely bring the old books alive. He re-energized the
meaning of philosophical concepts and the whole point of philosophy. =
Marcuse
wrote to Heidegger that he had taught him what philosophy is. Heidegger
freed the traditional topics by seeking to locate them in their ground. =
He
placed words back in the soil from which they grew and were drawn.
Philosophy had become academic or scholastic, an ordinary or =
acknowledged
pursuit even if one with special power. Its possibility was taken for
granted because its existence was actual in academic life. Heidegger,
however, raised the following question: What is the ordinary or basic
perspective from which philosophy arises, and how does it originate =
from
this perspective? Philosophy's radical questioning is most unusual =
because
it questions the ordinary. Yet its very activity must somehow originate =
in
the ordinary. The "everyday" itself, however, is mysterious in the =
sense
that it manifests itself less as a single ordinary perspective or =
horizon
than as a variety of peoples, cultures, histories, and political =
regimes.
One important step that Heidegger took to revitalize philosophy was to
attempt to root it again in ordinary existence.=20
Needless to say, how Heidegger did this is controversial. His =
understanding
of human being as fundamentally open to a Being that is beyond =
theoretical
and practical activity but makes them intelligible, and his =
articulating the
various existential structures that describe this openness, are central =
to
his endeavor. Wolin suggests that Heidegger means to make theoretical
activity no longer the central element of human being. This is correct, =
but
Heidegger also intends to find a ground beyond ordinary practice; =
attention
to the ordinary world of tools and work is only a clue to this ground. =
Wolin
also suggests that Heidegger links living one's own historical =
existence to
our basic existential openness to Being. This too is correct, except =
that
Wolin overly connects historical activity as Heidegger understands it =
to the
immediate facts of Heidegger's or anyone else's life. What is central =
for
Heidegger is what makes history possible, not this or that set of =
facts.
This is why Heidegger scorns biography and social milieu in discussing
philosophers, a disdain that Wolin finds hard to understand.=20
Wolin's confusion about how Heidegger justifies this disdain arises =
from his
understandable difficulty in grasping Heidegger's discussions of =
history.
This confusion emerges again in what I believe is Wolin's overemphasis =
on
the immediate historical facts as the cause of Heidegger's support for =
the
Nazis. After all, there was much in the air and on the ground other =
than the
Nazis and their views. Heidegger chose as he did because of the =
illiberalism
and totalizing perspective inherent in his understanding of the =
decisive
importance of the "people" and of "authentic" existential choice. What =
the
unimpeded intellect and political excellence share, but also how they =
must
differ, could not come properly to light. From this Heideggerian =
perspective
the facts appeared in a certain way: different facts would have =
appeared
differently and did for Heidegger in later times. The issues of the =
1920s
and 1930s looked to him as they did because of his intellectual =
standpoint
and endeavor that brought them to life. Wolin deserves praise for the
serious way he faces the connection between Heidegger's politics and =
his
thought, but I believe that despite his searching discussion of the =
"people"
(the Volk) and the origins of Being and Time, he makes this connection =
too
historical and not, fundamentally, intellectual.=20
IV
Heidegger's seeking to root thought in what is ordinary opened a new =
view
for many of his students. Political philosophy, especially ancient =
political
philosophy, begins with just this question of the link between the
theoretical and the everyday. The root of the reasoned life in lives =
devoted
to goods other than understanding, and the place and limits of reason =
in
these lives, come vividly into view. In this way philosophy is =
justified as
it could not be by Heidegger himself, yet in terms he began to clarify. =
At
the least, the question of justification could be raised intelligibly. =
The
discoveries of theory also could be accounted for in a manner similar =
to
Heidegger's notion that theory does not deal with alien worlds but, =
rather,
makes thematic what comes to light in ordinary action and in the =
meaning of
the things we use. Although Heidegger's work is not necessary for and, =
as
developed, is in important and obvious respects counter to political
philosophy, the questions he addresses helped set the stage for Strauss =
and
Klein.=20
Lilla's final chapter, a thoughtful discussion of the lure of tyranny =
for
intellectuals, is a good example of the approach this standpoint opens =
up.
After discussing the possibility of ascribing the tyrannical lure to a
surfeit of French intellectual engagement or a surfeit of German
intellectual apoliticism, to an excess of reason without judgment or of
irrationalism, he looks for a more adequate standpoint. He finds it in
Plato's analysis of the link between tyranny, eros, and philosophy in =
the
Republic and Phaedrus. Common roots of tyranny and philosophy enrich =
our
grasp of their profound difference. I believe Lilla's own discussion =
would
have been improved had he considered the power and possible madness of
spiritedness, anger, and pride as well as of eros, and had he =
considered
more the question of justice and our misunderstandings of it. =
Nonetheless,
it is a fine discussion on its own.=20
V
The possibilities for thinking seriously about the connection between =
theory
and practice were pursued less successfully by others in Heidegger's =
circle.
For several of the authors discussed in these books-Marcuse, Schmitt,
Koj=E8ve, and Arendt-politics was a central activity or theme. Wolin =
believes
Arendt to be the foremost political thinker of the 20th century. Yet =
his
cogent attack on her Origins of Totalitarianism and, especially, on her
irresponsible Eichmann in Jerusalem belies this general judgment. Lilla
describes at length Carl Schmitt's work, his Nazism, and the current
fascination with his claim that the essence of politics is the split =
between
friends and enemies. Still, Lilla concludes, correctly, that Schmitt's
significance is vastly overstated. Wolin ascribes Marcuse's politics to =
the
Marxism that preexisted whatever existentialism or Freudianism he later
added to it, and (to a lesser degree) to the general illiberalism Wolin
finds in the thought of L=F6with and Jonas as well. Lilla ascribes =
Koj=E8ve's
attraction to the world state or world bureaucracy to his Hegelianism, =
and
to the lure of the tyrannical generally. We may say that in each case th=
ese
thinkers misconstrued the link between thought and action.=20
Wolin and Lilla's discussions of the political thought of these authors =
have
much to offer. In particular, they display the great virtue of not =
making
excuses for political excess. In the end, however, I believe their =
analysis
is imperfect because, strange as it may seem, they hold their authors =
to too
low a standard. They usually rest content with reporting-and where
necessary, criticizing-standpoints and positions but do not consider
rigorously enough the arguments and evidence that their authors employ. =
The
ground and reasons for their pretensions or even their integrity can
therefore not fully come to life. I have suggested that the chief
responsibility of intellectuals is to protect the conditions of their =
own
activity and that this requires them always to have in mind their =
enterprise
at its peak. This means that our understanding of the political actions =
of
intellectuals, for good or ill, will inevitably fall short to the =
degree we
separate it from the question of what is true, and how what is true can =
best
be pursued.=20
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