[Discussion] (no subject)

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Europe & Islam =20
        thinking for our time    =20
 http://www.opendemocracy.net/forum/strand_home.asp?CatID=3D126
03 July 2002

The trail of political Islam
Gilles Kepel

Gilles Kepel, one of the world's foremost experts on the modern Middle =
East,
has written Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam, the first =
comprehensive
attempt to follow the history and spread of Islamist political =
movements. In
a talk given at the Institut Fran=E7ais in London as part of a =
collaboration
between European cultural institutes on the relationship between Europe =
and
Islam, he gave a deeply insightful analysis of the past, present and
possible future of a new and frightening politico-religious phenomenon. =
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=20


In the mid 1990s, when I was Visiting Professor at Columbia University, =
a
rather simple question arose which, in spite of its simplicity, was =
still
unanswered at the time: "Why did Islamist movements succeed in seizing =
power
in places, such as Iran, whereas in the majority of cases, such as =
Algeria,
they failed?"

I hoped that, by addressing this question, we would be able to find =
some
clues to understanding Islamism, a subject that produces more value
judgments than cool analysis. There are a number of writers hostile to =
the
movement; a number who have become favourable to it; some who say that =
it is
the embodiment of the identity of the Muslim people; and others who =
argue
that, precisely for that reason, it should either be encouraged or =
fought
against.=20

I was interested in being able to find a device which would allow me to
analyse these movements in social and cultural terms, just as I might =
have
analysed social democrat, fascist, communist or liberal movements.

I wrote my first book, Muslim Extremism in Egypt : The Prophet and =
Pharaoh
based on my doctoral thesis, in the early 1980s. It focused on the =
Egyptian
Islamist movements in the Sadat era. Twenty-five years later, I thought =
it
was time to take stock and assess the record of these movements. When I =
had
started, they were to a large extent 'Utopian' - none of them had yet =
taken
power or even played a significant political role. But, from the mid =
1990s
onwards, they did of course start to become much more significant.=20

Islamist movements are in fact clusters of different social groups with
different social agendas. They are strong when they manage to mobilise =
or
coalesce these different components, until they actually seize power. =
What
has interested me is their capacity to mobilise different social groups =
with
different social agendas, to keep them united, to reconcile them. There
might be violence or even the 'semi-Islamicisation' of a society, but =
the
Islamist groups will never seize power if they cannot unite these =
social
groups.=20

The first literate generation

So what are these groups? I singled out three. The first group was the =
one I
dubbed the Young Urban Poor. These people in the 1970s became the most
important demographic newcomers in this part of the world.

The 1970s were a watershed decade in the Muslim world, and what then =
came to
be known as the 'Third World' as a whole. The first generation from the
demographic explosion of the post Second World War era was reaching
adulthood. There was a tremendous population increase. In the =
populations in
some countries of the Middle East and North Africa, 70-75% were under
twenty-five years of age. The base of the age pyramid was extremely =
wide.
This was a totally new phenomenon - from the 14th century, the majority =
of
the population in the Muslim world had been rural. Now, due to the fact =
that
the countryside could not feed its children, it became urban or =
semi-urban.
There was a mass migration from the countryside to the outskirts of the =
big
cities.

Thanks to the education policies of the newly-independent states, this
generation was the first in the region to be literate en masse. For =
males at
least (though for many females too), young adults had access to literacy=
 in
the national language - written Urdu, Arabic or Farsi - which meant =
that
they could read and interpret religious texts without mediation. They =
would
no longer have to refer to the authority of an ulam, a doctor of law, =
or a
sheikh.

The significance of literacy was that it created a tremendous cultural =
gap
between this generation and its parents. The latter were often rural =
and
illiterate. Their offspring had migrated to the outskirts of the big =
cities,
where the reference points that the parents used to mark their life =
were of
very little use.

Yet the younger generation, in facing the challenges that confronted =
them in
this strange environment, could hardly draw on their newly-acquired =
written
culture. Because they had acquired this cultural capital, they had =
'great
expectations' - which were not met - and this led to social deprivation =
on
quite a new scale.

Such experiences were all the more bitter in the 1970s, as this was =
also the
first generation to reach adulthood without any living memory of the
colonial era. As a result, they tended to take the political elite in =
power
at its word. The latter, young people believed, was accountable for =
what it
had delivered (or, in most cases, not delivered). This created a huge
feeling of disarray, of relative deprivation, of social frustration - =
and,
in consequence, a desire to find a language which would be able to =
decipher
the evils of society, and to bring about an alternative.

The pious middle...and the intellectuals

A second group, which would become part of the Islamist cluster, was =
the one
I call the Pious Middle Classes. Most regimes in Islamic countries in =
the
post-war era were in one of two categories. In the first were regimes
aligned to the Soviet bloc, military regimes with a socialist tendency =
and a
strong tribal, regional or ethnic minority base; this was the case in
Algeria, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and Egypt. In the second category =
were
regimes leaning more towards the West, as in the monarchies of the Arab
peninsula such as Morocco and Jordan.

Both types of regime had one thing in common. In order to have access =
to
political or even economic power, it was necessary to have some sort of =
kin
relationship to the ruling elite. If you were not the nephew of a =
general or
a member of the royal family, it was very difficult for you even to =
have
access to credit, to import anything or become an entrepreneur.

This led to very strong frustrations among the 'bazaar people', and =
those
young professionals who had gone to the oil-exporting countries, made a =
lot
of money and returned home only to find themselves exploited by the =
ruling
elite. They were not as violently deprived as the Young Urban Poor, but =
they
also longed for a different type of governance.

The third important social group - you must add a third - is that which =
I
call the Islamist Intelligentsia. These were the militant ideologues =
who
delivered a discourse of political mobilisation to the first two =
groups; one
that the latter would understand and translate quite differently into =
their
social practice. They would talk about an Islamic state, and the
implementation of sharia (religious law).

The Young Urban Poor hoped that the Islamic state would give them what =
they
had been deprived of: respect, a job, a house, marriage. More often =
than not
they would translate Islamic law into an attempt at revolutionary =
upheaval -
an overturning of social hierarchies.

In contrast, the Pious Middle Classes were mainly interested in ousting =
the
ruling incumbents, encouraging the masses of Young Urban Poor to take =
to the
streets, and withstand the violence from the regimes, in order that =
they
might take the place of the elite. They were not really interested in a
significant upheaval of social hierarchies. They just wanted to repaint =
the
system green, and to repay the Young Urban Poor with moral rather than
social rewards and retribution.

So the Islamic Intelligentsia, when they were successful, were =
extremely
careful to downplay the social content of their message. They were =
extremely
ambiguous, socially. If they had not kept it very vague - had they been
revolutionary in their discourse - they would have pleased the Young =
Urban
Poor, but displeased the Pious Middle Classes. Had they been too soft =
in
their desire for social change, then the Young Urban Poor would not =
have
'bought it'. They were strong on political, religious and moral =
slogans, but
they downplayed the social dimension that would divide groups. This is =
how
that ideology shaped up and progressed the demands of two completely
different groups with very different social agendas.

Three phases of Islamism

  Now, a few words about this discourse itself. By the 1960s, there =
were a
number of ideologues and thinkers in the Muslim world who had taken up =
the
challenge of the independent states, and tried to delegitimise them in =
the
name of Islam: Sayyid Qutb in Egypt (who was hanged by Nasser in 1986), =
or
Sayyid Maududi of Pakistan (who died in 1979), or Ayatollah Khomeini in =
Iran
(who died in 1989). In spite of their differences, they held in common =
the
conviction that the world today was not a Muslim world, that even those
countries professing themselves Muslim were actually what the Qu'ran =
calls
J=E2hiliyya - that is, the age of ignorance which prevailed in the =
Arabian
peninsula before the revelation of Islam to the prophet Mohammed.


To them, the modern age was a sort of 20th century remake of the =
J=E2hiliyya
of ancient times; it had to be destroyed as Mohammed the prophet had
destroyed its predecessor. There were a number of ways of seeing how =
this
would come about. In Egypt, Sayyid Qutb and his followers favoured a
revolutionary understanding of the need for the radical mobilisation of
something they referred to as 'the Movement' to bring about an Islamic
state. In Pakistan, Maududi was active mainly through elections, and =
legal
and institutional modernisation. In Iran, it was different again, =
because
the movement used the peculiar language of Shi'a Muslim to achieve its =
aims.
What they had in common, however, was the use of the paradigm of =
J=E2hiliyya
to analyse why these states were no longer Muslim, and the resulting
commitment to destroying those states.

This supplied the would-be members of the Islamic cluster with what =
they
wanted: a way to describe and decipher the present state of Islamic =
society
explaining why it had deteriorated; and also, an alternative, something =
to
fight for - a target.

The last three decades of the 20th century were crucial decades for =
this
movement. Behind them lay one pivotal moment - the jihad in Afghanistan =
in
the 1980s. In my view, the formation, expansion and decline of the =
Islamist
movements correspond to three distinct phases.

The first phase, from September 1970 to 1 February 1979 is the =
formative
one. In the Arab world, the first date epitomises the demise of Arab
nationalism, coinciding with the death of Nasser and civil war in =
Jordan.
This opened a huge window of opportunity for an alternative ideology. =
The
second date, 1 February 1979, is the day when Ayatollah Khomeini agreed =
to
return from his exile in Paris.

During this first phase, the Islamist Intelligentsia was built up =
mainly on
college campuses, with the encouragement of powerful elements in the =
Muslim
world who saw in these students of the Qu'ran a counterweight to =
leftists
who were at the time prevalent. People such as Anwar Sadat, who was
assassinated by the Islamists in 1981, at first thought that they could =
give
expression to social frustration in a religious language that would not
prove dangerous, that could be reigned in much more easily than that of
socialists and radicals, at a time when the Soviet Union was still a
reality.

The Islamic movement developed its intellectual and ideological =
dimensions
through the 1970s. It was always ambiguous. From the October War of =
1973
onwards, Saudi Arabia, which suddenly had an enormous amount of cash at =
its
disposal after the price of oil skyrocketed, invested heavily in the
movement. This was for several reasons: it was a means by which it =
could
translate its financial clout into political power in the region, an
opportunity to subsidise a movement which was turning its back on the =
Soviet
Union, and a vehicle to spread the Islamic religious agenda into the =
social
arena.

There were various charitable programmes to buy a full Islamic outfit =
for
Khomeini's students, and to subsidise bus journeys for female students. =
A
wide network of charities allowed them to gain a strong following among =
the
Young Urban Poor, providing an alternative to the derelict public =
services,
which could no longer cope with the exploding population.

But, by the end of the 1970s, the Saudi nightmare of an Islamic =
revolution
came true, in a country in which they had almost no influence: =
neighbouring
Iran - a Shi'a country which the Saudis considered as almost =
non-Muslim.

The Iranian breakthrough

 How did Ayatollah Khomeini manage it? Initially, the movement against =
the
Shah in Iran was not led by the clerics. But the Shah had broken the
backbone of secular movements - they did not have the capacity to =
organise.
Also, Khomeini was politically astute enough to work out that seizing =
power
for himself would involve widening his constituency of followers, and
isolating the Shah even more.

Khomeini was extremely careful to expand his constituency as much as
possible. For example, he would address his would-be followers as =
Mustazafin
- an Arabic and Persian word which means 'the ones who are weak,
disinherited, the enfeebled ones'. It is a Qu'ranic term, opposed in =
the
Qu'ran by another word - Mustakbirin - meaning 'the ones who are =
arrogant'.
These two opposing terms had been used by a predecessor of Khomeini's,
namely Ali Shariati. He had lived in France during the Franco-Algerian =
war
of 1954-62, where he sided with the Front de Lib=E9ration Nationale =
(FLN) and
translated Franz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth from its original =
French
into Persian. Shariati thought that its Marxist categories for =
'oppressors'
and 'oppressed' would not be understood, and replaced them with the =
moral
dimension of Islamic rhetoric. In doing this, he profoundly changed the
scope of these terms.

Khomeini built on this change of scope, including in the category of
Mustazafin not only the truly deprived, who had teemed in to southern
Teheran from the countryside, but also the bazaar people and, by the =
end of
1978, even the secularists among the Intelligentsia (who also thought =
that
Khomeini might be just the instrument to oust the Shah). The latter, of
course, then expected him to disappear into retirement in Qom where he =
could
write poetry or preoccupy himself with Islamic philosophy.

Khomeini's opening to new groups of followers was essential to the =
success
of his revolution. Afterwards, these supporting groups were gradually
eliminated until, in 1979, the hostage-taking at the American Embassy
exposed the secularists, who were ousted from power.

 The Young Urban Poor now occupied centre stage. At that point (as in =
the
French Revolution when the sans-culottes were sent to Italy to plunder =
and
were thereby expelled from the central drama back in France), the =
Iranian
Young Urban Poor were sent to a terrible death in the Iraqi minefields. =
They
might defend the Iranian revolution from the outside but, henceforth, =
they
were cut away from its centre.

Exporting revolution

The Iranian revolution took place in the Shi'a Muslim world, and =
employed
intensively a peculiar Shi'a political parlance. But since the Shi'a
constitute only about 15% of the entire Muslim world, in order to =
'export'
the revolution, this linguistic element had to be replaced by a more
mainstream Islamic rhetoric.

Here opened a second phase of Islamist movements, running from 1979 to =
15
February 1989. This was characterised by a terrific expansion of =
radical
Islam all over the Islamic world; yet it simultaneously exposed the =
blatant
contradictions that had been implicit in the Islamic movement from the
beginning. These would be epitomised by the rivalry between the Islamic
Republic of Iran on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia (backed by the US) =
on the
other - each seeking hegemony over this very strong political movement.

Iran's view was that it must export the Islamic Revolution to the =
Muslim
world in general. The new state was guided by a perspective which was
extremely anti-Western, primarily targeted against the Great Satan (and =
even
against the Little Satan, France - in spite of the hospitality that had =
been
accorded Khomeini). Of course, this made it a worrying issue for the =
West.

Saudi Arabia - backed by the US, and others such as Saddam Hussein (at =
that
time the darling of the West) - took it upon themselves to contain and =
repel
the Islamic Republic. Iraq attacked Iran in September 1980, leading to =
an
eight-year war in the trenches, ultimately with millions of casualties. =
The
Islamic Republic was contained on its western flank.

But the most important development was the jihad in Afghanistan, =
following
the Soviet invasion of 1979. This was a decoy, planned and used by the =
US
and the Saudis to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it =
would
marginalise Iran, rendering Saudi Arabia the recognised leader of the
Islamist movement worldwide, particularly in the Sunni world. On the =
other
hand, this 'counter-fire' to the Islamic revolution would direct the
energies of the radical Muslims away from the Great Satan, and against =
the
Soviet atheists that had invaded a Muslim country. For the US, jihad in
Afghanistan was a way of inflicting a Vietnam on the USSR, accelerating =
its
demise.

The day that the Red Army pulled out of Kabul, 15 February 1989, =
ultimately
led to the fall of the Berlin wall in November that year. Afghanistan, =
to a
large extent, was the graveyard of the Soviet Union. For the US - or so =
it
was perceived at the time - the jihad in Afghanistan was a bargain. It =
cost
only around $600 million a year. Moreover, no US troops were required. =
Not
only were Afghan mujahedin trained and equipped (under CIA supervision) =
by
the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence service - more importantly, recruits =
came
from many Muslim countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, the =
southern
Philippines and Turkey. These people were, in a way, members of =
Islamist
International Brigades.

This brought about a significant change within the Islamist movement =
itself.
In the 1970s, the recruits would read books by Sayyid Qutb or Maududi. =
These
were easy to read, written in an accessible language, and well adapted =
to
cater for this newly-educated, literate generation. Anyone with a high
school qualification could read these, and make up their own minds =
whether
they agreed or not.

In contrast, the training camps in Afghanistan and eastern Pakistan =
provided
a very different type of training for their militant recruits, of two =
kinds.
Firstly, total brainwashing and indoctrination. People were not taught =
to
discuss texts or think about them. They were force-fed the writings of
medieval ulema, which they did not understand, but which they knew =
granted
full authority to those in charge of the camps to direct their actions.
Secondly, they were trained and equipped in refugee camps for combat, =
again
through Pakistan's ISI via the tutelage of the US.

Out of these camps (whose students included a then darling of the CIA, =
Osama
bin Laden) developed a new culture of Islamist radicalism, combining =
the
brainwashing, which shaped a very cohesive structure of forces on the
ground, and the military training, which induced a particular =
fascination
for jihad. This, in turn, would lead to the creation of a network =
called
al-Qaida. In Arabic, the name means 'base', and indeed bin Laden and =
his
like, who were already post-modernists, had put all the names and =
addresses
of foreign militants on their database. This network was both a
state-of-the-art system, which could easily link up militants scattered =
all
over the world, and yet extremely cohesive, because of the deep level =
of
commitment.

The key year: 1989

The year 1989 was a turning point. Iran effectively lost the war, =
Khomeini
having been obliged to sign a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein in the =
summer of
1988. Nobody remembers 15 February 1989 because, on 14 February, the =
fatwa
against Salman Rushdie was issued. Khomeini launched it on that precise =
day,
because he wanted to be perceived as the herald of the Muslims, =
defending
Islam against the insults of Rushdie's book - something the Saudis had =
been
unable to do. But, at a symbolic level, it distracted people from the
important event at the level of realpolitik, the Soviet pull-out from
Afghanistan - in Islamic terms, a Saudi victory, not an Iranian one.

The year 1989 is, then, in my view the peak year of these decades: one =
which
saw not only the victory of jihad in Afghanistan, which would open the =
way
to the post-Soviet emergence of a number of new Islamic countries on =
the
southern fringe of the former Soviet Empire and the Balkans; but also =
the
Rushdie affair and of the 'veil' fracas in France. It was the year when =
the
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) were created in Algeria; when Hassan =
Turabi
seized power in the Sudan; when Kashmir became a hot issue; and when, =
during
the first intifada in Palestine (which started in December 1987), Hamas
started to significantly challenge the former hegemony of the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO).

Many people thought at the time that, with the demise of the Soviet =
Empire,
the last secular messianism of the 20th century, there might now be =
room for
a new Islamist messianism. From a US and Saudi point of view, the =
movement
seemed to be under control. Yet from 1990, when Saddam Hussein tried to
gobble up Kuwait, a third phase opened, one which continues up to and =
beyond
11 September 2001.

When King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (the 'Custodian of the Two Holy Places')
called US and Western troops to his rescue on 7 August 1990, this =
directly
led to a deep split in the Islamist movement. On the one hand, the =
Pious
Middle Classes consented to the Saudi line. On the other hand, the =
rebels
who had fought in Afghanistan attempted to build up a guerrilla =
movement
that could duplicate the successful jihad against the Soviets in
Afghanistan. It was successful there, they argued, so it should be
successful in Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia and Chechnya in bringing about the
Islamic state they longed for. Thus, the movement, having remained =
largely
united under Saudi guidance since the 1970s, started to fragment. There =
was
dissent within Saudi Arabia itself. And then the guerrilla movements =
came
into being in those different places.

>From Afghanistan to Algeria - and New York

The people who started these movements were fascinated by the Afghan
experience. They thought it unnecessary to waste one's time and energy
building charities that could reach out to the grassroots. Theirs was a
fantasy of the Afghan jihad, where it seemed violence was enough. It =
was
enough to strike a military blow at the regime, which would cave in, =
and the
local population would then welcome the new Islamic state.

But it did not work out, despite the easy beginnings of jihad in =
Algeria.
There, the Islamists had a promising start, managing to mobilise enough
people to enable the FIS to run in the 1990 local elections, and to =
achieve
a fair majority in the first round of the parliamentary elections in
December 1991. This movement was split up, however, in the course of =
the
subsequent civil war, and failed in its attempt to seize power.

The military coup of January 1992 deprived the FIS of their electoral
victory. Many of those deprived of their democratic rights backed armed
insurgency, at first. But after a while, they split along familiar =
lines. On
the one hand, there was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), former Afghan
guerrilla fighters who mainly recruited among the Young Urban Poor, =
with a
very radical agenda, which involved ousting the military and changing =
the
structure of society from top to bottom. On the other hand, there was =
the
Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), which catered to the needs of the Pious =
Middle
Classes.

Both collided with the military. But then, bloody confrontations took =
place
between them, eventually leading to the military's successful 'divide =
and
conquer' strategy, which defeated both GIA and AIS in 1997-98. There is =
a
lot unknown about the conduct of this war in Algeria, but it is =
necessary to
remember that from the early to mid 1990s, this split in the movement - =
when
the radical wing embarking on its guerrilla strategy caused an =
alienation of
the middle class constituencies - ultimately led to military defeat.

>From the mid 1990s onwards, the bourgeois Islamists tried to find a way =
out
of this impasse, by forging new alliances with secular-minded liberals =
or
the middle classes, on the basis of some mix of Islam and democracy. In
short, the Islamic Movement continues to exist, but it is deeply =
divided and
militarily defeated.

And this is where terrorism enters the picture. The masses have simply
failed to join the guerrilla movement. Leave aside the first attempt at
bombing the World Trade Center in 1993, which is still very mysterious. =
The
first attack traceable to the bin Laden group came in June 1996, an =
attack
on US troops in Saudi Arabia - precisely when it was beginning to be =
clear
that the guerrilla route was a failure. Then came the Embassy bombings =
in
Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, the very anniversary of the day =
King
Fahd called the West to his rescue. Then came the bombing of the USS =
Cole in
Yemen in 2000, and, lastly, 11 September 2001.

It seems clear that al-Qaida's aim was to engineer a very spectacular
attack, which would prove that the enemy was weak and not worthy of =
being
feared. The masses they wanted to reach out to, it was hoped, would =
join in
the jihad against the West to liberate themselves. But the problem is =
that
such a closely-knit conspiratorial movement is both the basis of their
success and, at the same time, the reason for their ultimate failure. =
They
have no way to reach out to the masses. They have no charities. They do =
not
spread the word. They have no way to deal with grassroots politics. So, =
they
cannot mobilise. They can only use the exemplarity of symbols, and the
media, to convey a message to the masses. Bin Laden became a mastermind =
in
using the media - particularly after he singled out the new Arab media, =
such
as the al-Jazeera channel, as the main medium of his political message.

 This led to a striking phenomenon. I have travelled widely in the =
Middle
East since 11 September, and I have frequently noticed a widespread
enthusiasm for Osama bin Laden - the man who 'stood for us' - =
particularly
among the youth, in (for example) Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and the =
Emirates.
They were not sure about the massacre of civilians at the World Trade
Center; it could not be him, 'it must have been Mossad, probably'. The
suicide attacks against Israel were a different matter, because Israel =
is a
country that has invaded Muslim lands. But what is crucial is that they =
were
not convinced by the 'violence argument' as such. They did not go for =
that.

In my view, this is a sign that in spite of the appearance of strength =
in
the violent events of 11 September, with many people massacred, and the =
very
visible threat to the West of these Islamist movements - in spite of =
this,
the very violence of these movements is not a symbol of strength, but
precisely shows that they cannot reach out to the constituencies they =
need
to mobilise, in order to seize power.

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=20
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Copyright =A9 Gilles Kepel, 2002. Published by openDemocracy. =
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Gilles Kepel is one of Europe's leading specialists on Middle Eastern
societies. He is a member of the research faculty of the Centre =
National de
la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and Professor at the Institut d'Etudes
Politiques of Paris where he heads the post-graduate programme on the =
Arab
and Muslim worlds. Among his books are Jihad: The Trail of Political =
Islam
(Harvard University Press, April 2002), Allah in the West: Islamic =
Movements
in America and Europe (Stanford University Press, 1997), Revenge of God =
The
Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994) and Muslim Extremism in =
Egypt:
The Prophet and Pharaoh (University of California Press, 1986, 1993).