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[Paksoy, Hb]

  http://www.stratfor.com/fib/topStory_view.php?ID=205579

Mobilizations Hint at Date and Strategy for Iraq War
2 August 2002 

Summary

As the debate over a potential U.S. attack on Iraq continues in Washington
and abroad, a subtle increase in the mobilization of Army combat troops is
underway. This development offers a hint to the Pentagon's evolving Iraq
strategy, with the specific units involved indicating that a conventional
attack on Iraq could be slated for January or February, with a major thrust
possibly coming from Turkey.

Analysis

According to a July 31 news release by the U.S. Department of Defense, the
total number of National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty in
support of the war on Al Qaeda declined over the previous week by 834 people
to 79,780 troops. This represents the fifth consecutive week of declines in
mobilized guard and reserve troops, with the total mobilized now down to
levels not seen since mid-March.

However, while reductions continue in the number of mobilized Air National
Guard and Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reserve forces,
call-ups of Army National Guard and Reserve troops continue to rise. Total
mobilized Army forces surpassed those of the Air Force in the week preceding
July 24, the first time this has happened since call-ups began Sept. 20,
2001. 

Numbers of National Guard and Reserve Mobilized
As Of 2002 Army  Air Force  Navy  Marines  Coast Guard  Total 
01/02
 17,952
 30,628
 9,193
 1,492
 2,108
 61,373 
01/30
 23,606
 33,550
 10,008
 3,135
 1,904
 72,203 
02/27
 25,731
 36,723
 10,597
 4,387
 1,831
 79,269 
04/03
 28,615
 37,813
 10,597
 4,398
 1,836
 83,259 
05/01
 28,013
 37,451
 9,629
 4,380
 1,762
 81,235 
05/29
 31,431
 37,404
 9,011
 4,265
 1,635
 83,746 
06/26
 34,478
 36,773
 8,760
 4,096
 1,485
 85,592 
07/31 36,914 30,923 6,882 3,846 1,215 79,780 

Source: US Department of Defense

In addition to the shift away from air and naval assets to ground forces,
the types of ground forces being mobilized are changing as well. Beginning
last September, the Army call-ups concentrated on units such as military
police, chemical and biological warfare, medical, mortuary affairs,
intelligence and civil affairs. 

Mobilization of these units was reactive and primarily defensive in
preparation for any potential follow-on attacks by al Qaeda after Sept. 11.
Later call-ups included units responsible for logistics and training, some
infantry for guarding airports and federal facilities and Special Forces for
dealing with contingencies in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Now the mobilization appears to be shifting to include more infantry, armor,
artillery, engineer and combat medical units. Moreover, the Army is
mobilizing full companies, battalions, and brigades, rather than just
individual augmentees or skeleton crews. Major units from the 28th, 35th and
40th Mechanized Infantry divisions, 29th Light Infantry Division and 49th
Armored Division have been mobilized. 

Some of these are tasked to other missions. For example, the 28th mechanized
is slated to deploy to Bosnia for six months beginning in October. But
others could be employed in action against Iraq.

Elements of the 35th mechanized are scheduled to deploy to Europe to provide
security and force protection to troops based there. Soldiers of the V
Corps' 1st Infantry and 1st armored divisions, based in Europe, are
contingency forces for the Persian Gulf region. In late March, more than
9,000 soldiers of the V Corps, in conjunction with Army Reserve and National
Guard troops, took part in exercise Urgent Victory, which modeled combat in
the Gulf region. V Corps troops continue to train, with air units of the 1st
Infantry Division currently engaged in live-fire exercises in Hungary.

The deployment of elements of the 35th Infantry Division to Europe presents
an interesting scenario. When National Guard and Reserve troops were called
up for action in the Persian Gulf in 1990, they received a great deal of
criticism for their state of readiness and the condition of their equipment.


One option, should Washington wish to avoid a recurrence of that problem,
would be to deploy National Guard and Reserve troops earmarked for an attack
on Iraq to large, underutilized bases in Europe, where they could train and
link up with vast stocks of pre-positioned equipment. From there they could
deploy quietly to Turkey to prepare for an attack.

The trouble is that such a move would require Europe, or at least Germany,
to buy into Washington's plans. And the Europeans currently remain highly
wary of an attack on Iraq or are outrightly opposed to such a plan

The timing of combat unit call-ups is interesting as well. Routine
mobilizations are limited to nine months in duration, meaning the clock is
ticking on the involvement of any of the currently mobilized combat units in
an attack on Iraq. Interestingly, the current mobilizations suggest a repeat
of the Desert Storm timetable. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 1, 1990, after
which the United States began a rapid buildup ahead of its attack on January
the next year. 

The weather conditions in Iraq are familiar and tolerable for combat in
January or February, and action then would allow the currently mobilized
troops to rotate home on schedule by the end of March.

Finally, the mobilization of heavy ground combat units indicates the
Pentagon's evolving strategy for an Iraq operation. There is an apparent
compromise being forged between those in Washington who argue for a
high-tech, low-manpower attack -- built around air strikes, Special Forces
and Unmanned Air Vehicles -- and those who argue that the Afghan model of
fighting will not work in this case.

The Iraqi army is not the Taliban, the ethnic Kurds are no Northern Alliance
and it is going to take more than a piecemeal international police force to
stabilize Iraq after the war. As yet, there is no indication the Pentagon is
planning for a massive ground war akin to Desert Storm. But large numbers of
conventional forces are certainly part of the plan.