[Discussion] Wittgenstein's......

[hpaksoy@ttacs.ttu.edu]

Wittgenstein's Curse=20
by Jay Tolson=20
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It's easy to go on about how bad most academic writing=20
is these days, and how it became so during the past 30=20
or 40 years. Curmudgeonly journalists have been=20
pouncing on prof-prose at least since the days of H. L.=20
Mencken. But now high sport is made of the subject even=20
within the academy. One academic journal awards annual=20
prizes in a Bad Writing Contest, causing pain and=20
sometimes anger among the unwitting winners. Scholars=20
agonize about the problem, too. Russell Jacoby, for=20
one, links it to the disappearance of the great public=20
intellectuals who once enriched the larger culture. And=20
it seems clear that the decline of scholarly writing=20
has widened the eternal divide between the world of=20
scholars and the public realm, to the impoverishment of=20
both. Just as bad, the pursuit of truth and knowledge--
an activity that should be charged with passion and=20
engagement--now appears to the larger public to be an=20
exercise in nonsensical irrelevance.

    Perhaps nothing brought the whole sorry matter to a=20
more dramatic head than the parodic gibberish-and-
jargon-filled article that New York University=20
physicist Alan Sokal tricked the scholarly journal=20
Social Text into publishing in 1996.=20
Titled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a=20
Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," the=20
essay argued that scientific knowledge was socially=20
constructed, an argument very much in line with the=20
journal's postmodernist agenda. What the editors failed=20
to see, though, is that the piece was packed with=20
illogic, non sequiturs, and nonsense, including an=20
unargued rejection of the "dogma" that asserts the=20
existence of "an external world, whose properties are=20
independent of any human being and indeed of humanity=20
as a whole."


    On the day the article was published, Sokal let the=20
world know that it had been a hoax, and an uproar=20
ensued. Many of the more interesting contributions to=20
that controversy were published last year in a book,=20
The Sokal Hoax--and not all of them were critical of=20
the journal's editors. In fact, literary scholar=20
Stanley Fish made a plausible defense of the argument=20
that Sokal had parodied: "What sociologists of science=20
say," Fish wrote, "is that of course the world is real=20
and independent of our observations but that accounts=20
of the world are produced by observers and are=20
therefore relative to their capacities, education,=20
training, etc. It is not the world or its properties=20
but the vocabularies in whose terms we know them that=20
are socially constructed--fashioned by human beings--
which is why our understanding of those properties is=20
continually changing."


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hat is true and sensible and clearly put.=20
Unfortunately, it's not a distinction the editors of=20
the journal seemed to grasp, because what Sokal said in=20
his trickster voice was precisely that there was no=20
external world independent of human constructions of=20
it. And the trickster didn't even make an argument for=20
his outlandish claim. He simply tossed around the=20
jargon, let it fall where it might, and concluded--
voil=E0--that there is nothing out there unless we=20
construct it into being.

Maybe Fish failed to get the point for the same reason=20
the editors didn't see it: because the writing was as=20
impenetrably bad as most prose published in Social=20
Text, and indeed as bad as so much current academic=20
writing. The not-so-secret little secret, it turns out,=20
is that no one really reads this stuff anyway, not even=20
folks who produce reams of it for countless scholarly=20
publications. And in truth, the stuff is not meant to=20
be read. It's a form of professional feather display,=20
the ritual gesturing by which scholars establish=20
standing with others in their particular niche, or=20
subniche, of the scholarly trade. Display the jargon--
feminist, neo-Marxist, postcolonialist,=20
deconstructionist, whatever--and you're in, you're one=20
of us, we want you on our tenure track.

If this seems to be a partisan slam against only the=20
more progressive, left-leaning, and postmodern members=20
of the academic community, let me second a point made=20
by Patricia Nelson Limerick in the New York Times Book=20
Review (Oct. 31, 1993): The more conservative=20
traditionalists within the academy can often be just as=20
bad as the Sado-Marxists and the Martian-Leninists (or=20
maybe almost as bad). Limerick quotes a passage from=20
that best-selling tract The Closing of the American=20
Mind (1987), by the late Allan Bloom, a University of=20
Chicago scholar who trained, and was subsequently=20
revered by, a cadre of neoconservative thinkers now=20
gone forth into the world to pursue an assortment of=20
academic and nonacademic occupations:

If openness means to "go with the flow," it is=20
necessarily an accommodation to the present. That=20
present is so closed to doubt about so many things=20
impeding the progress of its principles that=20
unqualified openness to it would mean forgetting the=20
despised alternatives to it, knowledge of which would=20
only make us aware of what is doubtful in it.

Got that? And does it not read like something only=20
barely translated from German, or a directive from the=20
Department of Housing and Urban Development?=20
Postmodernish, far-leftish types may commit more, and=20
more grievous, sins against the ideal of clear prose,=20
but they are not alone in their sins.


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hy have so many been undone by willful obscurantism and=20
given themselves over to cant and nonsense? So many=20
reasons, so little time to state them all. In fact,=20
many have already been stated, and many times over. But=20
let me mention a couple that might not have received=20
quite as much attention as they deserve, before coming=20
to what I think is a fundamental cause.

First of all, academic writing has never been all that=20
much fun to read. Mencken, as I mentioned earlier, went=20
to town on the foibles of academese, focusing with=20
particular viciousness on sociologist Thorstein=20
Veblen's tortured, jargon-flecked prose. But does that=20
mean that Veblen's theories about the leisure class and=20
conspicuous consumption were unimportant? Not at all.=20
Writing about difficult matters can be difficult--and=20
often requires neologisms and complicated, subtle=20
analysis. We have a hard time following the=20
explanations of auto mechanics. Why should the=20
explanations of a philosopher or sociologist be easier=20
to follow? Clarity of expression should be a handmaiden=20
of intellectual brilliance, but Veblen and many others=20
demonstrate that often it is not.

That said, the rife obscurantism in scholarly=20
publications today comports itself in a self-
congratulatory, almost arrogant manner. Its=20
promulgators argue that the difficulty is essential to=20
the gravity of their ideas or to an intellectual or=20
political stance, and that clarity, in any case, is=20
just some elitist, dead-white-male convention.=20
In "Troubling Clarity: The Politics of Accessible=20
Language," published by the Harvard Educational Review=20
(Fall 1996), Patti Lather justifies the liberating=20
complexity of her own feminist writings:

Sometimes we need a density that fits the thoughts=20
being expressed. In such places, clear and precise=20
plain prose would be a sort of cheat tied to the=20
antiintellectualism rife in U.S. society that deskills=20
readers. . . . Positioning language as productive of=20
new spaces, practices, and values, what might come of=20
encouraging a plurality of discourses and forms and=20
levels of writing in a way that refuses the binary=20
between so-called "plain speaking" and complex=20
writing? . . . What is the violence of clarity, its non-
innocence?

Claiming that her book about women with HIV/AIDS,=20
Troubling Angels, was aimed at a popular audience, and=20
even intended to be what she calls a "Kmart book,"=20
Lather boasts at the same time that she refused to=20
produce a "tidy book" or a "comfort text," with the=20
kind of writing "that maps easily into our ways of=20
making sense and 'giving sense.'" I have yet to=20
encounter Troubling Angels on any of my visits to=20
Kmart. I wonder whether any other Kmart shoppers have=20
come across it.

Lather, like so many who proudly assert their=20
obscurity, does not have the justification of a Veblen=20
or a Hegel. There is no brilliance or insight or=20
originality in her work. There is only a thicket of=20
nonsense, faddishness, and claptrap. But Lather wears=20
her opacity proudly, like a badge, and no doubt enjoys=20
tenure at Ohio State University because of it. And she=20
is no rarity, no exception. Her kind are everywhere--
troubling texts, troubling clarity, troubling the=20
hegemonic hold on beauty and truth--and the sheer=20
quantity of the drivel they produce is another big part=20
of the problem.

The endless production is a matter of necessity and=20
survival, of course. The academic professions require=20
it--and not just the noble drudgery of teaching,=20
research, editing, and monograph writing that engaged=20
more modest scholars in the past (particularly those=20
who recognized their intellectual and writerly=20
limitations). No, the professions today demand=20
substantial "original" works by all members of the=20
professoriate who hope to rise to tenure. And that=20
demand is simply unrealistic. For how much new is there=20
under the sun? Not much--in scholarship or in any other=20
human pursuit. Yet never have so many words been used=20
so badly, and to say so little, as in these works of=20
professedly original scholarship. Yes, there are still=20
scholarly writers who produce truly groundbreaking work=20
that reaches, informs, and enlightens not just other=20
scholars but popular audiences as well. But beneath=20
that apex, how enormous is the mountain of entirely=20
superfluous scholarly prose!

One remedy seems obvious: more modesty on the part of=20
the academic professions and a return to other=20
scholarly tasks, including teaching, greater mastery of=20
the core subject matter of a field, and recognition=20
that in the realm of "original" work, less is more. But=20
the obvious solution is no easy solution. It may even=20
require coming to terms with a difficult matter indeed--
the very character of the modern scholarly enterprise.=20
The formation of that character has a complicated=20
history, which has already been the subject of many=20
works of scholarship. Let me attempt to make sense of=20
the problem by blaming it, only half facetiously, on=20
one of the more brilliant minds of the past century.

Great minds can do great mischief, and few minds have=20
been greater than that of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889=96
1951), the Vienna-born philosopher who spent some of=20
his productive years disturbing the donnish waters of=20
Cambridge University. Wittgenstein first decided to=20
establish very precisely, in his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1922), what philosophy should and should=20
not discuss. He then all but reversed the conclusions=20
of that book to develop his notion that human language=20
has a fundamentally gamelike quality--a notion that=20
implied a far less restrictive view of philosophy's=20
mission. Though he accomplished those feats in a prose=20
so gnomically stringent that it almost defies=20
comprehension, he left a deep imprint not just on=20
philosophy but on 20th-century intellectual life in=20
general. But that influence, alas, was not wholly=20
benign.

The baleful part of Wittgenstein's legacy is not so=20
much a matter of strict logical-philosophical=20
inadequacy as it is a problem of intellectual style--a=20
certain prejudice, expressed both in his personal=20
dealings with people and in his work, about what the=20
life of the mind should be. One way to get a sense of=20
this style is through an anecdote recounted by one of=20
his Cambridge friends, the literary critic F. R.=20
Leavis. In a short memoir about their friendship,=20
Leavis told how Wittgenstein came to him one day "and,=20
without any prelude, said, 'Give up literary=20
criticism!'" Cambridge being a relatively civil place,=20
Leavis didn't assault the brash Austrian. He didn't=20
even make the obvious retort--"Give up philosophy!"--in=20
part because he thought that Wittgenstein had fallen=20
under the sway of John Maynard Keynes and other=20
Bloomsbury wits who liked to toss off facile putdowns=20
of people or ideas they disagreed with. More to the=20
point, Leavis noted that Wittgenstein had only=20
a "rudimentary" sense of literature, and so was=20
incapable of thinking that it (much less literary=20
criticism) "might matter intellectually." Such a view=20
could not have been more inimical to Leavis's=20
conviction "that the fullest use of language is to be=20
found in creative literature, and that a great creative=20
work is a work of original exploratory thought." And to=20
validate his conviction, Leavis adverted to his view=20
about the inadequacy of philosophers: They were, he=20
said, "weak on language."

What confidence! Had it endured within the precincts of=20
higher learning, it's fair to ask whether we would have=20
avoided the current parlous state of academic letters.=20
I think so, even as I acknowledge the overstatement=20
implicit in my assertion, and even as I allow that=20
Leavis's confidence was itself a little shaky.

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any factors share responsibility for the deplorable=20
condition of academic writing, but none is more=20
fundamental than the fatally mistaken view that=20
intellectual work must be "serious." By claiming that=20
literary criticism was serious in a way that=20
Wittgenstein should have been able to appreciate,=20
Leavis all but embraced, however unwittingly,=20
Wittgenstein's definition of seriousness: a rigorous=20
way of thinking and proceeding intellectually, rooted=20
in the assumedly clear procedural ways of the inductive=20
sciences and leading to objective truth about the=20
world, people, and what Wittgenstein called "everything=20
that is the case." That is scientism, of course, driven=20
by a Protestant intentness on having one's subjective=20
perceptions validated by claims to the kind of=20
objective truth that can be revealed by the scientific=20
method. No, I am not attacking science, the scientific=20
method, or the many real and obvious blessings that=20
have resulted from them. Nor am I attacking the notion=20
of objectivity or the laudable goal of objective truth.=20
I am merely pointing to the misapplication of the=20
scientific idea, and to the consequences of the same.

Wittgenstein's early philosophy led him to the=20
conclusion that we cannot talk rigorously or precisely=20
about most things that humans deem of ultimate=20
importance: truth, beauty, goodness, the meaning and=20
ends of life. We can speak precisely and meaningfully=20
only about those things that objective science can=20
demonstrate. In his view, philosophy was to be a=20
helpful tag-along of science: It can paint clear verbal=20
pictures of what science divulges. But even=20
Wittgenstein recognized that this understanding of the=20
limitations of language was too limiting, and he became=20
more and more interested in the provisional and social=20
character of language, and in how the mystery of=20
meaning emerges out of the shared play of making worlds=20
out of words. He was struggling beyond scientism, and=20
his final book, Philosophical Investigations (1953),=20
posthumously assembled, seems to point suggestively=20
away from the narrowness and inconsequentiality of his=20
earlier position.

But if Wittgenstein struggled against the conclusions=20
of his early work, I fear that the Western academic=20
world increasingly succumbed to a desire for the kind=20
of dubious seriousness that enticed the young=20
philosopher. Scholars of literature and the arts,=20
historians, philosophers, and other academic humanists=20
joined sociologists, anthropologists, and political=20
scientists in trying to make their fields as "serious"=20
as the hard sciences. They grew obsessed with theory=20
and methodology, and particularly with the most=20
abstract issues of epistemology--how we know what we=20
know. This is largely the story of professionalization,=20
of course, of how professional standards and approved=20
behaviors got established in the academic realm. It was=20
Wittgenstein's curse upon the professionals of the=20
humanistic and social science disciplines that they=20
took his kind of seriousness as an essential goal.

Why a curse? For one thing, because it burdened those=20
professions with a narrow-spirited utilitarianism. In=20
his early work, Wittgenstein believed that his job was=20
to make philosophy useful. He wanted to clear out, like=20
so much underbrush, all the metaphysics and other=20
matters that couldn't be resolved the way a problem in,=20
say, engineering (in which he had had training) can be=20
resolved. In his early view, remember, philosophy was=20
supposed to become a helpful user's manual for the hard=20
sciences. For it to be anything else was frivolous, an=20
indulgence, unserious. Wittgenstein, as many of his=20
contemporaries noted, had a genius for making=20
colleagues and students feel guilty about not doing=20
useful, productive work. He urged a number of his=20
students to abandon scholarship altogether and become=20
car mechanics or hospital orderlies. Some took his=20
advice--to the shock and sorrow of their parents.

The compulsion to prove the utility of ideas spread=20
through the humanities and social sciences like a=20
contagion, assuming a variety of political,=20
ideological, and theoretical colorings. It was no=20
longer sufficient to master and convey the great=20
historical record, or to locate and celebrate the=20
pleasures of great works of literature or painting or=20
music. Even the pursuit of wisdom was not enough, once=20
wisdom got problematized. Theorizing took over.=20
Elaborate theorymongering, often French- or German-
inspired, displaced the mastering of subject matter, so=20
that fledgling literary scholars, for example, ended up=20
knowing more (or thinking they knew more) about Bakhtin=20
than about Chekhov, more about queer theory than about=20
any literary tradition. The pretense of helping the=20
working class, or liberating gays by deconstructing=20
texts, or doing meta-meta-interpretations of historical=20
questions appeared to be the really serious work. No=20
matter that such seriousness arguably achieved no=20
serious real-world consequences. No matter that it=20
became increasingly irrelevant to the real world--and=20
completely impenetrable to most people in that world.

There's an additional problem. The drift of much=20
postmodern thought has been toward the conclusion that=20
there is no absolute or objective truth; there are only=20
constructions of the truth, influenced by power and=20
power relations within society (might makes right--and=20
truth) or by unacknowledged biases rooted in, say,=20
gender or race. This radical skepticism, elaborated by=20
such thinkers as the pragmatist Richard Rorty, holds=20
that the pursuit of truth is essentially bootless.=20
Whether such skepticism is itself simplistic (and, in=20
Rorty's case, whether it's a misreading of the far more=20
complicated view of truth held by earlier American=20
pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce) is beyond=20
discussion here. But skepticism's almost dogmalike=20
standing within much of the academic community=20
introduces a rich irony: Whereas skepticism would seem=20
to invite scholars within the humanities, and even the=20
social sciences, to abandon their reliance on=20
pseudoscientific theories and methodologies and become=20
truly independent thinkers and writers, it has in fact=20
enslaved them all the more to pseudoscientific=20
doctrines.

And make no mistake: The doctrines are pseudo. The same=20
Sokal who fooled the editors of Social Text=20
subsequently teamed up with philosopher Jean Bricmont=20
to write a book, Fashionable Nonsense (1998), that=20
showed the absurd and often hilarious efforts by=20
leading postmodern thinkers to dress up their theories=20
with scientific terminology and even mathematical=20
formulas. (The highly influential Jacques Lacan, for=20
example, boasted that his theories drew from "the most=20
recent developments in topology.") On close inspection,=20
the terminology and the formulas make no sense at=20
all. "They imagine, perhaps, that they can exploit the=20
prestige of the natural sciences in order to give their=20
own discourse a veneer of rigor," write Sokal and=20
Bricmont. "And they seem confident that no one will=20
notice their misuse of concepts."

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uch dishonesty is bad enough in itself. But the effect=20
of the pseudoscientific doctrines on writing throughout=20
the humanities and social sciences--and the writing=20
remains unchanged, despite Sokal and Bricmont's=20
valuable unmasking--only increases the seriousness of=20
the crime. Forcing their ideas into the Procrustean=20
beds of Foucaultian or Lacanian theoretical constructs--
or others equally dubious--scholars produce a prose=20
that seems to have emerged from a machine, a=20
subjectless void. Where in that prose is the self, the=20
individual? Nowhere. There is no mind grappling freshly=20
with a problem. There is no feeling, no humor, no spark=20
of what is human; there is only the unspooling of phony=20
formulas, speciously applied to the matter at hand.

The great harm in all of this has been a loss of=20
confidence in the fundamental worth of the seemingly=20
irrelevant pursuit of knowledge, wisdom, and even=20
pleasure for their own sake. Though an edge of=20
defensiveness crept into his voice, Leavis was right to=20
say that respectful but not uncritical reflection upon=20
great literary works was worthwhile. Such activity=20
deepens and complicates the individual, even as it=20
expands the individual's appreciation of the larger=20
world of other people, society, politics, the natural=20
and physical order. The pleasurable pursuit of=20
knowledge and wisdom is, in great part, an extended=20
meditation on the relations between self and world,=20
subjectivity and objectivity, and on the question of=20
where truth resides. It is, of all pursuits, the most=20
relevant for human lives, and to the extent that the=20
academy chooses to stand apart from it, academic=20
writing withers and dies.=20

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Reprinted from the Autumn 2001 Wilson Quarterly=20


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